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From: IBM Mainframe Discussion List [mailto:IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU] On
Behalf Of Tony Harminc
Sent: Tuesday, April 02, 2013 3:00 PM
To: IBM-MAIN@LISTSERV.UA.EDU
Subject: Re: The digital arms trade, article in the Economist, 2013 March
30
...
Vulnerabilities in the z/OS core certainly
This piece will repay your attention. It is the first open-literature
discussion of the market for 'exploits' and who is selling what to
whom for how much that I have seen.
An 'exploit' is a piece of software that can be used by its developer
or a purchaser to penetrate a computer that is using
On 4/2/2013 2:21 PM, John Gilmore wrote:
This piece will repay your attention. It is the first open-literature
discussion of the market for 'exploits' and who is selling what to
whom for how much that I have seen.
An 'exploit' is a piece of software that can be used by its developer
or a
GIYF. The Economist has its own, large website. I received my copy
of this week's Economist in this morning's mail.
On 4/2/13, Steve Comstock st...@trainersfriend.com wrote:
On 4/2/2013 2:21 PM, John Gilmore wrote:
This piece will repay your attention. It is the first open-literature
At 4/2/2013 04:26 PM, Steve Comstock wrote:
Do you have a link for an online version?
My friend, The Google tells me the link is
On 2 April 2013 16:21, John Gilmore jwgli...@gmail.com wrote:
This piece will repay your attention. It is the first open-literature
discussion of the market for 'exploits' and who is selling what to
whom for how much that I have seen.
There have been discussions in less well informed and well
You don't need to subvert z/OS to subvert a system. There are myriad
business critical programs that run in problem state. While well
formed RACF rules can offer protection, I wonder how many such rules
are well formed.
In any case, a malicious or sloppy insider doesn't have to be
inside the
On 2 April 2013 18:26, Dave Cole dbc...@gmail.com wrote:
You don't need to subvert z/OS to subvert a system. There are myriad
business critical programs that run in problem state. While well formed RACF
rules can offer protection, I wonder how many such rules are well formed.
In any case, a
I have had discussions with a number of other old dogs, and the
consensus is that it would still be possible to bring down z/OS from,
say, a TSO terminal. One would of course need to know what one was
doing; but the notion that there are no rogues who have the necessary
competences is a dangerous
Or know where the copy button is on the cut sheet printer!
In a message dated 4/2/2013 5:23:28 P.M. Central Daylight Time,
dbc...@gmail.com writes:
He need only be inside the
business-systems-knowledgeable community or even the system's trusted
user community.
On 2 Apr 2013 14:59:52 -0700, in bit.listserv.ibm-main you wrote:
On 2 April 2013 16:21, John Gilmore jwgli...@gmail.com wrote:
This piece will repay your attention. It is the first open-literature
discussion of the market for 'exploits' and who is selling what to
whom for how much that I
In
CAE1XxDEFdeTyx4UjpVjZS7KcRnr5HHvRt=ocvya84sor7ya...@mail.gmail.com,
on 04/02/2013
at 05:45 PM, John Gilmore jwgli...@gmail.com said:
I have had discussions with a number of other old dogs, and the
consensus is that it would still be possible to bring down z/OS
from, say, a TSO terminal.
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