What about those of us who are growing weary
of dozens of such messages per day? Shouldn't the dozen or so of you
have already retired to a special purpose mailing list as you promised?
It's bad enough that many of your messages consist of thousands of
bytes saying no more than "M
gs document here and now.
That would sound like a decision to me, but I'm not sure I'd call
it hasty even as committee clocks count time.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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an't see any significance for Mr. Phillips comment except as yet
more evidence that the default answer for individual submissions
must be "ABSOLUTE NO!" He is basically saying "You must publish our
BCP because we followed all of the steps as we
age the first time, I was reminded of an
IETF slogan about rejecting kings and presidents as well as ancient
friction between the DDN protocol designers and users and the ISO.
I suspect that the language tag saga is not as bad as it seems and
that some good new IETF documents might come of it.
ssumed from everyone outside the IESG.
Of course, 20 years or 25 years ago, things were nominally different.
In practical terms, the bar was higher still.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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F doesn't want to work on language tags by
having a WG and the rest of those delays and work, then so be it. Let
the standards body that evidently does care do it...unless the incredible
"I'm gona tell the Liason on you" threat was the vacuous, standards
committee politicing as usual that it sounded like.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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it has in recent months. Such stuff
would have been flatly inconceivable for the IETF of the 1980s. However,
it's best to acknowledge and deal with such irresistible changes.
They're the stuff of life and death.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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TF version of the printer
protocol was just plain broken.
Other targets of this exercise describe protocols that were never
implemented and should never have been allowed on the standards track.
Why not scale back the exercise to attack only obvioulsy dead or
stillborn protocols?
Vernon Schryver
id, if you must have contradictions between your ABNF and your
English, you must accept the fact that most technical people will
assume your ABNF is right and your English is wrong. That fact seemed
to me to conflict with statements in this thread, and that suggests a
problem in your working group and
> From: "Peter Constable" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
>
> --===1521567419==
> Content-class: urn:content-classes:message
> Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
> boundary="_=_NextPart_001
ng things in secret is always expensive. Sometimes the costs
of secrecy are less than the alternatives, but they always exist. In
this case, I'm now convinced that the reorganization stuff is less
boring than I assumed. I still prefer to let you and others deal with
it in private than to
seem inappropriate for confidentiality.
I don't care about bureaucratic organizing and almost certainly would
not read published minutes of whatever. I don't see any issues that
aren't better handled by people other than me. Or until the supposed
need to keep stuff secret was i
ive
> issues, but a summary of conclusions and justifications will be
> made available as soon as that is possible consistent with that
> level of sensitivity" and "the community isn't entitled to know
> that the discussions are being held".
True.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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patents. The calls for the IETF
and open source authors to get involved in patent fights can be seen
as efforts by politicians and redistributors of our work to shift even
more of the burden of making their profits and reputations to us.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
__
he IETF would
help Mr. Raymond's efforts to get the world to believe the phrase "open
source community" is not silly nonsense like "netizen," that it has
spokesmen, and that he is one.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
P.S. I don't entirely agree with Mr. Vixie's
erted
versions of my epistles in C. Still, someone who claims to represent
refuseniks like me in negotiations concerning open source with an
organization in which I've been particpating for decades ...
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
___
Ie
about being trustworthy and not having
power over me. Don't insult my intelligence. Your efforts here to
be named co-negotiator for open source authors are intended to exercise
power over me.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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uch stuff in proximity to the IETF administrative
reoganization...uh...negotiations is not really irony. Such things
tend to attract each other.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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games were in
play, which is not at clear.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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7;T BE
STUPID!" sounds unlikely to solve many problems in NAT boxes, even if
committee "solutions" weren't the hallmark of the design and implementation
of garbage, probably including the junk NAT boxes at issue.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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ld things that make you say "no one would
do that!" and then defend their braindamage as valuable features.
Perhaps more NAT RFCs would help; they couldn't hurt much. They'd be
a lot of work and would certainly be ignored by many people who consider
themselves designers. I can
d drafts about encoding more than 4,294,967,296
addresses in 32 bits in order to avoid the hassles of IPv6.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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roup=30
http://www.rhyolite.com/anti-spam/bin/group.cgi?group=140 and
http://www.rhyolite.com/anti-spam/bin/group.cgi?group=165
Spammers can deploy sender authentication mechanisms far faster
than their victims.
- This thread has the wrong subject. It should be more like
&q
x mailboxes? Doesn't enough of that code already exist,
and doesn't all of it use transport mechanisms other than SMTP?
Isn't the IETF supposed to be about on-the-wire bits and keep its
noses out of host data structures?
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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lity? What good is an RFC that says "consult as yet
unwritten specifications from undetermined sources to handle the data
standardized by this RFC"? Isn't the first sanity test of a standard
whether one can determine if an implementation is compliant? As far
as I can see, Eric Ha
ad of subscribing. That's how I follow some mailing
lists that for various reasons I choose to not give my address.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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antly reduce whitelisting requirements.
Logging bodies involve some obvious privacy hassles. You must keep the
logs private. The logs can have only censored copies of the envelope
so that recipients can't know who else was sent the same message.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
___
ovider
(or a government) to determine compliance.
Maybe this needs a WG.
> In general I support all what you said to some extent.
In that case it would be nice if you would not write as if you vehimently
opposed the notion of standardizing terms for classes or kinds of
Internet service. Excep
urf Accounts" be added?
- exactly what filtering is imposed on a "DSL Surf Account"? Is
port 25 filtered? 22? 135 and 138? Some or all UDP? ICMP?
- and the same questions for "business access."
Telling people to read contracts ISP today is disingenuous. If t
hing. The
issue is whether we must wait for the market to provide equivalents
to "ham radio," "CB radio," "satellite radio," "AM," "FM," "TV," and
"cell phone." Arguing against the idea of draft is like saying
"the term
27;t know the differences among
"web," "Internet," and "telephone."
Users who do not distinguish between "web" and "Internet" also
think "WebTV" is Internet service. IETF cannot change that. That
VoIP, text messaging, and cel
h of them are infected with the
latest worms and viruses must block and redirect port 25 to their own
SMTP servers and so not provide what that draft calls "Full Internet
Connectivity."
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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s business, and not merely because of scaling problems.
I care about this issue because other individual IETF and ASRG
participants have threatened or started attacks on me similar to Mr.
Anderson's attack on Mr. Austein, because my mail systems are configured
eal IP. Labelling such
filtered access as what it is or at least something other than "Full
Internet Connectivity" would reduce its popularity.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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ttp://ietf.org/html.charters/marid-charter.html),
maybe we'll get to hear a new chorus. Maybe a few will stop praying
for the salvation of business models that depend on abusing the commons
and switch business models. (e.g. actually deal with abusive users)
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROT
dialup accounts (or any other
} Internet service) will have no effect in mitigating these types
} of attacks.
That is mistaken. Spam, worms, and viruses sent through ISP mail
systems can be filter. I understand that worm and virus filtering is
quite effective, but don't really know. Filt
d to marketing departments resisting
blocking port 25 for customers who aren't competent to use it.
Until consumer grade services providers such as Comcast do something
to stem the floods of spam they are sending, other organizations will
stem their incoming floods with bad tactics
> From: Nathaniel Borenstein <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> On May 30, 2004, at 2:27 PM, Vernon Schryver wrote:
>
> > So what ISP was blocked?
>
> What are you, the ISP police? Not that it's any of your business, it
> was X0 DSL
Your repeated, unprovoked pub
untermeasure of using the ISP's servers, but many would not.
Besides, the ISP is could filter or at least rate limit, and there
are no easy countermeasures for spammers against that.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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t
> is all I can afford, to be far more costly than the very
> negligable reduction in spam I would receive if TCP port 25 was
> blocked by ISPs.
I cannot understand that as other than a demand that I subsidize your
Internet service.
If you think that everyone has the right to run
to reach reputable MTAs.
Note also the disconnect between the reverse-DNS of Mr. Borenstein's
SMTP client and his envelope Mail_From and header From: values,
and the lack of DNS RRs supporting any of the proposals for DNS-based
sender authentication. According to the advocates of those me
Connectivity from many service providers, although
not at $30/month.
Mr. Borenstein and others like him expect the rest of us to subsidize
their $30/month connectivity by dealing with the network abuse of his
fellow customers, because they find $30/month comfortable. That position
would be less des
at send any spam,
regardless of whether they are paid for their efforts (e.g. operators
of trojan zombies), then there would be no spam problem.
Why should the rest of us subsidize your ISP and your connectivity by
accepting SMTP/TCP/IP SYNs from your neighbors that are more than 99%
likel
te, the spam problem results from service providers
such as UUNet, Comcast, and Yahoo and software vendors such as your
employer refusing to pay their shares of the costs to stop network abuse.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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inating all spammers including customers who let their machines
be "owned" or if all users were willing to pull their own weight instead
of expecting something for nothing.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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ve often said that the IETF is well served by working groups that do
no more than absorb the energies of standards committee goers.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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could doubtless arrange things so that even if they were using Microsoft
virus, worm, spam, and OFN distrubution malware, their mail headers
would lie.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: Eric Burger <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
&
a dozen other proposals to use
public keys or other mechanisms along with the domain name system to
authenticate mail senders.
My rather negative view of the area can be inferred from
http://www.rhyolite.com/anti-spam/you-might-be.html
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
__
e of affecting even that
particular attack mode for years, because none can have any significant
effect until deployed on most SMTP clients. Many seem to be based on
insufficient familiarity with the nature of SMTP (e.g. SPF's incredible
source-routing scheme) and the urg
ers'
motives. That allowing customers to run "servers" increases provider
costs for bandwidth, technical support, and abuse handling is irrelevant.
The document should not spell out business models any more than it
should have a matrix of all possible combinations of offerings or
technical details of how the limitations of the various types of
services are implemented.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
t into each
of the 1st three descriptions or having it one place.)
> Thanks. I've started a discussion with some selected ADs about
> what they want to do with this, if anything. My intent is to
> wait to see what they have to say. If they aren't interested,
> and interested in moving toward BCP, then the effort is, as far
> as I'm concerned, dead. If they want a WG, then the next real
> task is "charter". Otherwise... well, let's how they want to
> proceed.
That sounds right to me.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
onal to and independent of the
filtering John wrote about. It is a reaction to the lack of filtering
done by the low priced ISPs.
Of course, none of those words belong in John's document.
Of course, I'm not serious about VoIP spam. To start, the bandwidth
needed for 10,000,000 5KByte spa
no one else will take the job and if there is any hope of getting it
past the IESG, I'll happily be your editor, elaborator, or whatever. My
strengths don't include writing intelligible English, but it needs doing.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
eep talking about suits and
> such.
We all know why people go on about suits and such. It is because they
have something personal to lose if spammers are routinely terminated.
That is variously cheap services subsidized by the lack of an abuse
desk at their ISP, services subsidized by revenue from spammers, a
desire to get rich or at least famous by flogging a Final Ultimate
Solution to the Spam Problem (FUSSP), a job at a spam haus of an ISP,
or a job at a spammer.
I realize this observation is impolitic, but it's past time to be
honest about the motives for the persistent nosense about spam.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
customers with less
than minimal evidence. Within the last 10 days, I watched a business
customer, not merely a home end-luser, get cut off by a major ISP with
telco connections for some time because it failed to respond to a report
of mine. Of course an ISP must be careful to avoid breaking contracts
and so forth, but that does not prevent termination. Why else is the
spam advertising "bulletproof hosting" common?
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
en the only room for improvement is in the trust query
protocol. DNS is a screw driver being used as a hammer in DNS blacklists.
However, this is merely a matter of optimization or elegance.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ernet down into the tenement slums. There are interests that would
love to see laws funnel all mail sent through Microsoft/AOL/Verisign
servers (probably using a form of PKI cert). Spooks, spies, and police
state officials would find those servers as convenient as monopolists
would find them profitable.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
reputations to exchange.
You can add to your backlist only based on evidence that you can defend
in court. Reports from outsiders, including users of your blacklist,
are almost useless.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
sts and they're better connected than hosts on
the UUCP network were, but hosts on the UUCP network is what they are
like. There is a pressing need to admit and publish this fact to
forestall governments "saving" the situation. Contrary to the cries
of the free lunch crowd, governm
entitlement and of hurt
and outrage at being snubbed by various blacklists.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
less of the ambitions of individuals to "make a difference"
or become famous, the IETF should strive first and foremost to do no
harm outside its charter in primarily non-technical arenas such as the
fight against spam.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
access reall costs, your ISP could afford real abuse instead of just
letting the spam flow from your fellow $30/month lusers, and it could
afford to give you spam filtering than the worst DNS blacklists.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
e, say, China uses its governmental/monopolistic powers to block
> all email from Taiwan. It's an abridgement of a fundamental human
> right to communicate, which I think trumps the rights of monopolistic
> ISP's to cut their spam-related expenses. -- Nathaniel
That is offensive nonsense. The only right yours that is being abridged
is your supposed right to buy Internet access for $30/month.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
, and then complain about terrorist and vigilantes who keep
them from getting services they've not paid for.
That Internet service no longer costs several $1000/month is great
but irrelevant. That it costs more than $30/month is also irrelevant.
I think it's too bad that Internet access is not cheaper than it is,
but just now I'd rather worry about the costs of food and water for
most people on Earth.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
BAD!
Next you'll be telling me that if you telephone me, I can't hang up on
you. not that I would, but I reserve the right.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
- they are being actively discussed in the ASRG
Somehow "actively discussed" is doesn't quite convey "continually
discussed round and round without any change."
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
dministrating anti-spam mechanisms, designing, writing
or deploying code, enforcing laws, or anything else that directly
affects spam in more than their personal mailboxes are contributing
to solutions.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> aren't, policy-dependent. ...
Have you looked at SMTP-AUTH?
What about SMTP-TLS with verified certs required?
I hope you won't be too offended if someone points out
http://www.rhyolite.com/anti-spam/you-might-be.html
I wrote it during the first months of the ASRG mailing list.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
e contact, telephone and face to face meetings often
occur, but email is often the cheapest (not just in money or time)
way for an initial contact.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
whose penalty for abuse consists of making the spammer sign up for a
new drop box, or tier 1 providers that lie about the impossibility of
determining which of their resellers is hosting a spammer.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
MTP disappears doesn't
matter to me. I was using email long before it appeared.
And I say again: every time you, with your standing, even whisper about
replacing SMTP with a protocol that carries trust tokens, you give aid
and comfort to spammers and the parasites using the spam problem.
y kinds of whitelisting.
These problems with trust have nothing to do with the network protocols
involved. They are fundamentally non-technical. Talking about replacing
SMTP to implement transitive trust is at best a distraction.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
-technical problems with
"communicating consent." You are implicitly supporting the worse
than snake oil being flogged as spam solutions by big outfits.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
re
incomprehensible to many people. Some MTAs (e.g. Hotmail's when I last
checked) include random text in their session transcripts apparently
drawn from random SMTP sessions during that last several hours. However,
this sort of standardization seems more appropriate for some SMTP WG
or the A
d spam disappears. So does much of the
justification for mail.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
f 1,000,000,000 clues. We not
only won't; we can't.
Only the meta-hoop of fear of prosecution might work. 419 spam
demonstrates its severe limitations.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
e
creative definitions of "spam" and "false positive." Usually they are
merely obvious wishful thinking and nonsense, like the hoary old claim
that authentication (including digital signatures) will stop spam.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
in this case just
as effective if the IETF list processor would offer to do SMTP-TLS and
for an appropriate cert to be published on http://ietf.org/
However, I would not suggesting that for any practical or operational
reason. It would merely set a good example.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
y.xhtml?story_title=Online_Privacy_Policies_Misleading
] An analysis of Web sites carrying those seals found that the
] companies running them ask for more personal information -- and
] protect it less -- than sites that have no seals.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
er is the sender of an incoming message, then
crypto keys are irrelevant to determining the message is unsolicited
bulk. If the sender of spam is not a stranger, then you made a mistake
in handling keys.
The PGP mantra that a good key does not imply that the sender or the
message is good applies here.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
am-for-a-day certs to Ralsky/Ricther/&co, then today you
could trust the same outfits to not sell spam-for-a-day/week/years IP
bandwidth accounts.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: "Tony Hain"
> To: "'Vernon Schryver'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> So if you had received the mail sent here yesterday claiming to be from
> Alain Durand would you block Sun or IBM? ...
I should not have respo
only about senders of
unsolicited bulk email.
An advantage of a vanity or other tiny domain is that it can use
blacklists that would have intolerable false positive rates at other
or larger outfits but that have 0.000% local false positive rates.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
gh an unusually braindea)
challenge/response spam filter at DownloadFAST.com. If so, the
Secretariat should blacklist accuspam.com and/or downloadfast.com from
subscriptions to IETF mailing lists. (It would need to be unusually
braindead to send me the challenge instead of the envelope sender.)
V
kelihood of being spam (or a virus) on
> the basis of a whole battery of tests. Scores that exceed a given
> threshold can easily and automatically be rejected or binned for a
> ...
All of that can be done during the SMTP transaction just as effectively
as after. Rejecting spam after the SMTP transaction should be and in
many quarters already is seen as network abuse requiring at least a
stern warning.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
everything should be logged, particularly
including discarded mail, and in that case, enough of bodies to allow
targets to identify senders and the nature of the discarded messages.
Of course, one should assume users won't normally look at those logs.
Spam you read is not filtered, but at most categorized and stigmatized.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
se targets that want it filtered.
In theory the second problem could be fixed if the DATA command could
accept a vector of 250-OK/4yz-try-later/5yz-fatal responses, one for
each target named with a Rcpt_To command. In practice the spam problem
will be solved one way or another long before such a p
e been through Mission Statement charades.
Have you ever seen one that with 12 months hindsight was not a waste
of time or worse? My personal experience suggests that "write a mission
statement" means the same as "jump the shark." See
http://www.google.com/search?q=%22jump+the+shark%22
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
rotocol-t1-t2-ad-sp-06.pdf
draft-terrell-iptx-dhcp-req-iptx-ip-add-spec-00.pdf
draft-terrell-iptx-dns-req-iptx-ip-add-spec-03.pdf
draft-terrell-iptx-spec-def-cidr-ach-net-descrip-01.pdf
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
s
literally?
If cable-modem IP is good enough for you, then you're not interested
in multihoming or even running your own VoIP system. You might be
happy to have your phones connected to the email and web browser
demark/appliance maintained by your telco/cableco, but you're not really
interested in the Internet. You lack the interest to be allowed to
run your own servers for anything.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
ve spam controls,
the evils of NAT, the evils of blacklists, media conglomerate ISPs
distributing NAT boxes to break VoIP, and monopolisitic ISPs using
blacklists is one thing. Actually doing something is something else.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Is everyone who disagrees with your conclusions
> necessarily dishonest? If so, why are you wasting time talking with
> us?
You might be ignorant instead of dishonest. If you have not looked
any blacklists except those that have affected your mail, then you
have not, in my words, rea
c (56K).
> Blacklists also, quite clearly, don't work to eliminate spam.
No honest person who actually looks at spam agrees with that.
Good blacklists (e.g. CRL) are better than 70% effective with
false negative rates that large, very conservative corportations
can tolerate.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
am
facilitation system, they send mail to random, spam-obsessed strangers
like me asking how to add spam filtering to Outlook.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
t least
somewhat "administrative" and subject to the whims of any fools
administrating it. The buyer must beware, not only of hiring a spam
friendly ISP, but contracting with a foolish spam filter. The greater
fool is often the buyer of services offered by lesser fools.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
. Any fool
can set up a blacklist. That many fools have and other fools have
used them does not show that blacklists are bad any more than the ease
of setting up an IP network shows TCP is the spawn of the devil.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Cc: Keith Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: Keith Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> >>> If that is an issue, it ought to be raised by those who are being
> >>> misled, the targets of mai
> Cc: Keith Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From: Keith Moore <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> To: Vernon Schryver <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> ...
> > If that is an issue, it ought to be raised by those who are being
> > misled, the targets of mail, inste
foaming flaming nonsense and started
dropping senders into my personal, non-published blacklist.
If you want to see apoplectic fits, use a sendmail access_DB instead
of procmail to for your filtering. That will spare your system a few
cycles, but it also lets senders know they're not being heard. People
who hate the RBL and DUL for impersonally filtering their earthshaking
words really hate being being personally shunned.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
addresses at any given instant requires
only the will to maintain and consult RADIUS or other logs.
Vernon Schryver[EMAIL PROTECTED]
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