At 18:02 29-05-00 , Dawson, Peter D wrote:
>is vulnerability and threat analysis part of the
>standardization process ??
YES (shouting intentional).
The "Security Considerations" section of every RFC ought to
contain vulnerability, threat analysis, risk mitigation,
and residual risk information.
> is vulnerability and threat analysis part of the standardization
> process ??
RFCs 2251-2256, which specify LDAPv3, carry a stern warning up front that
that these documents lack a standard mandatory-to-implement strong
authentication method, hence limiting the applicability of the protocol
(ho
At 17:02 29.05.2000 +, Dawson, Peter D wrote:
>is vulnerability and threat analysis part of the
>standardization process ??
Yes.
RFC 2223, "Instructions to RFC authors", section 9.
See also RFC 2316, "Report from the IAB security workshop", section 9,
which gives further guidance.
Peter - for the last few years the IESG has required IETF working groups
to have meaningful Security Considerations sections in standards
track RFCs - these must include a threat and security analysis
Scott
> is vulnerability and threat analysis part of the
> standardization process ??
yes.
->-Original Message-
->From: Steven M. Bellovin [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
->Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 1:56 PM
->To: Dawson, Peter D
->Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
->Subject: Re: Storage over Ethernet/IP
->
->
->In message
-><[EMAIL PROTECT
In message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
"Dawson, Peter D" writes:
>
>
>->-Original Message-
>->From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
>->Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 6:27 PM
>->To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>->Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
->-Original Message-
->From: Harald Tveit Alvestrand [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
->Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 6:27 PM
->To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
->Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
->Subject: RE: Storage over Ethernet/IP
->The point being made, remade and made again here is:
In message , Brian.Rubarts@born
.com writes:
>
>>> Encryption will be offloaded to the network interface. ASICs on the NICs
>>> will greatly improve encryption and authentication performance.
>
>>all well and good, provided that this encryption and
At 10:14 26.05.2000 -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>True, but whether the server accesses the disks via SCSI over TCP or SCSI
>over Fibre Channel, the SERVER is still the weak link. The transport
>protocol doesn't create any inherent weaknesses of the type you are
>refering to--e-mail borne vi
>If your OS is hardened enough, a firewall may not be appropriate.
>
>"New from Kellogs - Firewalls cereal - part of this *COMPLETE* and *BALANCED*
>security breakfast".
Given the recent revelations about Gauntlet, perhaps firewalls aren't quite
the invincible bastions of unassailability they ap
> There were some papers published duing the late '80's or early '90s by
> John Romkey and I belive Dave Clark and Van Jacobson about the length of
> instruction sequences to handle TCP. I'm not sure that those ever became
> RFCs.
>
> Those papers came up with figures indicating that if one str
> I AM saying that if you have Internet access to your network, a firewall is
> extremely important.
and you're wrong. a firewall is just a tool for reducing the difficulty
of your threat analysis. it doesn't inherently make your network more
secure. what makes your network secure (to the ex
> But, should a good technology be nixed because some idiots might mis-use it?
no. but an Internet protocol for accessing storage devices needs to be
able to operate in the Internet.
Keith
p.s. You might as well ask "is an insecure technology for accessing storage
devices a good thing, given
> Yeah, okay. I will grant that. But, should a good technology be nixed
> because some idiots might mis-use it? I personally don't think so.
This thread started with a question about a TCP technology report, and
wandered into firewall and general security technologies. Which is the
good techn
> > Encryption will be offloaded to the network interface. ASICs on the NICs
> > will greatly improve encryption and authentication performance.
> all well and good, provided that this encryption and authentication
> are actually compatible with that specified by higher level protocols
> and the
>IPv6 has NO authentication capability not already shipping for IPv4,
>speaking as the person who designed both AH and ESP. Marketing aside,
>there is nothing in IPv6 that makes it more easily secured than IPv4.
>Both support AH and ESP. Deployed ISAKMP/IKE support IPv4, but might
>not support I
>Experience tells us that although we can design and specify for
>"intra-nets", people will insist on using the results over the public
>internet. Pretending this will not happen is akin to burying ones head in
>the beach sand when one has heard a report of a large wave heading for the
>beach
>Odd.. I thought we had a clue about security. The guys at SANS just
>gave us a 'Technology Leadership Award'. I just walked across the hallway,
>and I didn't see any firewall in our router swamp.
>I guess because we don't have a firewall, we don't have a clue. Or because
>we don't have a firew
At 15:40 26-05-00 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>It will run over incredibly fast Packet over SONET Wide Area
>Networks--behind firewalls. OC-192 and soon-to-come OC-768 (terrabit)
>switches will be the backbone of WANs and MANs of large networks in a few
>years.
I'll note that at least on
On Fri, 26 May 2000 10:14:03 CDT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
> A network server will still authenticate user requests. Only the host
> needs to be authenticated with the disk/disks.
Hmm.
Isn't this security model the cause of most grumbling regarding NFS security?
> If the larger network that i
> >> It won't run over the Internet because of latencies inherent on the
> >> public network.
>
> >at least for some storage applications, latency is not as important
> >as bandwidth. e.g. you can do backups over a high-latency medium
> >as long as your bandwidth is adequate (though recovery fr
> a. TCP is too CPU intensive and creates too much latency for storage I/O operations.
>
> b. The IP stack is too top heavy and processing packet headers is too
> slow to support storage I/O operations.
There were some papers published duing the late '80's or early '90s by
John Romkey and I
>> Encryption will be offloaded to the network interface. ASICs on the NICs
>> will greatly improve encryption and authentication performance.
>all well and good, provided that this encryption and authentication
>are actually compatible with that specified by higher level protocols
>and the aut
> Encryption will be offloaded to the network interface. ASICs on the NICs
> will greatly improve encryption and authentication performance.
all well and good, provided that this encryption and authentication
are actually compatible with that specified by higher level protocols
and the authentic
ssage-
From: Keith Moore [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Friday, May 26, 2000 9:23 AM
To: Jon William Toigo
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Storage over Ethernet/IP
None of the cited limitations of TCP performance are true.
they are also missing the point.
If you're going to run storage a
1911
>
>
> > -Original Message-----
> > From: Dave Nagle [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2000 4:29 PM
> > To: SCSI-over-TCP List
> > Subject: IETF mailing list question on Storage over Ethernet/IP
> >
> >
> >
> >
None of the cited limitations of TCP performance are true.
they are also missing the point.
If you're going to run storage access over IP then you are potentially
allowing it to be run over the global Internet. If you do that you need
good authentication and privacy, and (if you try to do them i
: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
tel: +1 916 785 4578
fax: +1 916 785 1911
> -Original Message-
> From: Dave Nagle [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
> Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2000 4:29 PM
> To: SCSI-over-TCP List
> Subject: IETF mailing list question on Storage over Ethernet/IP
>
>
>
AGENS,RANDY (HP-Roseville,ex1)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: "'Dave Nagle'" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
cc: "Scsi-Tcp (E-mail)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: RE: IETF mailing list question on Storage over Ethernet/IP
Comments
-
1. I agree with you
I too
have heard these arguments. When I heard them I felt a sense of deja vu --
anyone remember
when
the conventional wisdom was that "voice will never run over IP?" In fact,
most of the
assertions below are fallacies or soon will become
fallacies. The only real argument is
about
the exac
On Thu, 25 May 2000 20:08:50 EDT, Jon William Toigo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> Put another way, when I design an aircraft, I know about lift, drag and
> other engineering parameters and can plug them into calculations that will
> enable me to design a wing to lift X number of pounds. When it co
At 22:52 25-05-00 , Jon William Toigo wrote:
>c. The maximum throughput of a GE TCP/IP connection is 768 Mps, which is
>too slow to support storage I/O operations.
Provably false. In fact TCP throughput above 768 Mbps over 1518-byte GE
has been demonstrated publicly in the past in several dif
sage -
From: Dave Nagle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Jon William Toigo <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Cc: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Thursday, May 25, 2000 7:27 PM
Subject: Re: Storage over Ethernet/IP
> Jon,
>
> Original Message
>
> >> I am seeking a few
Jon,
Original Message
>> I am seeking a few points of clarification:
>>
>> 1. Fibre Channel folks have attempted to explain to me why TCP/IP could =
>> NEVER be a viable interconnect for block level storage operations. They =
>> claim:
>> a. TCP is too CPU intensive and
On Thu, 25 May 2000, Jon William Toigo wrote:
> I am seeking a few points of clarification:
>
> 1. Fibre Channel folks have attempted to explain to me why TCP/IP
> could NEVER be a viable interconnect for block level storage
> operations. They claim:
>
> a. TCP is too CPU intensive and creat
I am seeking a few points of
clarification:
1. Fibre Channel folks have attempted to
explain to me why TCP/IP could NEVER be a viable interconnect for block level
storage operations. They claim:
a. TCP is too CPU intensive and creates too
much latency for storage I/O operations.
b.
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