On Mon, 12 Aug 2013, Roland Turner wrote:
I mean what benefit would a receiver enjoy over not implementing it at
all?
It would be a spam filter basically. Being an anti-forgery protocol, it
would have a high false negative rate compared to dedicated anti-spam
techniques (since unforged spam
My problem is that absent a draft, you're lobbing a vague proposal over the
wall and hoping the community will do all of the work for you.
That was my sense, too.
Writing a draft and submitting it is not a huge effort (at least, not
if you know what you're going to say), and it has the advantage
On 22 Jul 2013, John R. Levine wrote:
EDSP would be tier 1 both senderside and receiverside. That's its
selling point. ...
TPA ADSP enhancements are tier 1 receiverside and just-barely-above tier
3 senderside. ...
Did I miss some I-Ds describing these?
TPA ADSP is Otis' baby, not
On Sat, Aug 3, 2013 at 2:09 AM, Michael Deutschmann
mich...@talamasca.ocis.net wrote:
Your question about drafts has two possible implications. The first is
I'm not going to pay any attention to Michael until he takes up RFC
lawyering. In which case I can't help you.
My problem is that
On Jul 14, 2013, at 2:38 AM, Michael Deutschmann mich...@talamasca.ocis.net
wrote:
EDSP would be tier 1 both senderside and receiverside. That's its
selling point.
The dkim=except-mlist ADSP enhancement I suggested back in 2011 would
be tier 2 receiverside and just-slightly-below tier 1
EDSP would be tier 1 both senderside and receiverside. That's its
selling point. ...
TPA ADSP enhancements are tier 1 receiverside and just-barely-above tier
3 senderside. ...
Did I miss some I-Ds describing these?
Regards,
John Levine, jo...@iecc.com, Primary Perpetrator of The Internet
On Tue, 2 Jul 2013, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
That's off in the weeds. EDSP would not take any notice of i=, and is
not there to enhance SRS -- rather it's something of a competitor. (Both
try to make return path validation work in spite of forwarding.)
The point is what any of them might
(subject adjusted)
A sender using SRS would need to maintain a database of valid addresses.
However, that task can become unduly complicated if the database has to
be kept in sync across several distant hosts. A digital signature can
substantially complement the security of the
On Tue, 2 Jul 2013, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
(subject adjusted)
A sender using SRS would need to maintain a database of valid addresses.
[...] That's where EDSP can save the day.
That's off in the weeds. EDSP would not take any notice of i=, and is
not there to enhance SRS -- rather it's
On Tue 02/Jul/2013 17:37:20 +0200 Michael Deutschmann wrote:
On Tue, 2 Jul 2013, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
(subject adjusted)
A sender using SRS would need to maintain a database of valid addresses.
[...] That's where EDSP can save the day.
That's off in the weeds. EDSP would not take any
On Tue, 2 Jul 2013, Alessandro Vesely wrote:
So, if the bounce they get has text/rfc822-headers only, they [...]
This is getting OT, but you can't even count on getting
text/rfc822-headers in a bounce. I use Exim, a very popular MTA with the
latest stable release just 8 months old, and it
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