Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-14 Thread raj singh
Hi Yoav, If check for mandatory payloads per exchange type is MUST, if it fails we MUST return INVALID_SYNTAX, why we are not saying it explicitly in the draft ? Putting it clearly in the draft make more sense and avoids many confusions. Thanks, Raj On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 7:24 PM, Yoav Nir wro

Re: [IPsec] Next Header field in WESP header

2009-05-14 Thread Grewal, Ken
I agree in the most part. From other comments, it appears that the Next Header is providing a useful function and if we are keeping it anyway, then the Next Header value of zero also provide a useful function (i.e. payload protocol is opaque, hence data is encrypted). I also agree that the tex

Re: [IPsec] One question for IKE/IPsec

2009-05-14 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 10:07 PM +0800 5/14/09, Hui Deng wrote: >Tunnel waitting for traffic means that all traffic have to go through >this tunnel anyhow. Correct. >the scenario I described is that after IKE procedure, but all the >traffic will not go through this Ipsec tunnle since they are point to >point connecti

Re: [IPsec] One question for IKE/IPsec

2009-05-14 Thread Hui Deng
Thanks Paul and Yoav, excuse me for late reply. Tunnel waitting for traffic means that all traffic have to go through this tunnel anyhow. the scenario I described is that after IKE procedure, but all the traffic will not go through this Ipsec tunnle since they are point to point connection. Many

Re: [IPsec] RFC 4869 questions

2009-05-14 Thread Scott C Moonen
Yoav Nir writes: > I guess the best thing is to do as in RFC 4308: > " ...The initiator of this >exchange MAY include a new Diffie-Hellman key; if it is included, it >MUST be of type..." That makes sense philosophically, but I would like to get the RFC updated or clarified rather than a

[IPsec] another RFC 4869 question

2009-05-14 Thread Scott C Moonen
RFC 4869 makes some statements like: The authentication method used with IKEv1 MAY be either pre-shared key [RFC2409] or ECDSA-256 [RFC4754]. That seems to me like an empty statement, since it doesn't require any particular set of choices nor does it proscribe any choice. Is it intended t

Re: [IPsec] Next Header field in WESP header

2009-05-14 Thread Tero Kivinen
Yaron Sheffer writes: > I agree that the HdrLen and TrailerLen fields MUST be 0 for encrypted WESP. > So yes, we use WESP for encrypted traffic to get: > > - Extensibility (with the 8-bit Flags field). This is future extensibility, which is needed only after we define some future extensions using

Re: [IPsec] Next Header field in WESP header

2009-05-14 Thread Yaron Sheffer
Hi Tero, I agree that the HdrLen and TrailerLen fields MUST be 0 for encrypted WESP. So yes, we use WESP for encrypted traffic to get: - Extensibility (with the 8-bit Flags field). - A single protocol that can do both cases. Thanks, Yaron > -Original Message- > From: ipsec-boun.

Re: [IPsec] Next Header field in WESP header

2009-05-14 Thread Tero Kivinen
gabriel montenegro writes: > Perhaps we need more details on what exactly we mean by "the > endpoint thus must verify the sanity of the WESP header before accepting > the packet"? And the action to drop the offending packet? Yes. I think we need very specific rules with MUSTs in them to say that p