Re: [IPsec] #123: Proposal to remove the IANA tables from IKEv2bis

2009-11-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 7:24 PM +0200 11/26/09, Yaron Sheffer wrote: >Given the amount of interest on the list, I prefer the "do nothing" approach. That makes no sense. People seem interested in fixing the problem of the lists being confusing. There is nothing confusing about removing the assigned numbers: it only c

Re: [IPsec] draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-03 was submitted

2009-11-26 Thread Alfred Hönes
Folks, I'd like to confirm that my previously raised concerns regarding draft-ietf-ipsecme-aes-ctr-ikev2-02 have been resolved in the -03 version. Thanks to the authors for discussion and their cooperation. This draft now seems ready to proceed. Kind regards, Alfred. -- +--

Re: [IPsec] #123: Proposal to remove the IANA tables from IKEv2bis

2009-11-26 Thread Yaron Sheffer
Given the amount of interest on the list, I prefer the "do nothing" approach. Just add this text somewhere (maybe multiple times): This table is (these tables are) only current as of the publication date of RFC 4306. Other values may have been added since, or will be added after the pub

Re: [IPsec] #123: Proposal to remove the IANA tables from IKEv2bis

2009-11-26 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 1:25 PM +0200 11/26/09, Tero Kivinen wrote: >Paul Hoffman writes: > > - Remove the numbers from every table > >I would rather keep the numbers for those tables which are really >needed for implementing the protocol. And here we disagree completely. >I hate when I am implementing something and

Re: [IPsec] #123: Proposal to remove the IANA tables from IKEv2bis

2009-11-26 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: > Based on Tero and Yaron's responses, I have a different idea: > > - Leave all the tables in I think the encryption, hash algorithm etc tables could be removed completely, i.e. the Transform type n tables in section 3.3.2. Those tables change quite often, and they are not re

Re: [IPsec] #122: Integrity proposals with combined algorithms

2009-11-26 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: > MUST either offer no integrity algorithm or a single integrity > algorithm of "none", with no integrity algorithm being the preferred > method That is fine for me. It would also be fine for me to change "preferred" with "RECOMMENDED" (RFC2119 synonym for SHOULD), but I can