Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-15 Thread Michael Richardson
> "Tero" == Tero Kivinen writes: >> The INVALID_SYNTAX notify in response to missing payload in >> IKE_AUTH should be send encrypted using DH keys or unencrypted ? Tero> As it is clear that other end is not following the Tero> specification, i.e. there is bug on the other en

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-15 Thread Tero Kivinen
raj singh writes: > The INVALID_SYNTAX notify in response to missing payload in IKE_AUTH should > be send encrypted using DH keys or unencrypted ? As it is clear that other end is not following the specification, i.e. there is bug on the other end, there is no need to think that much what you shou

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-15 Thread raj singh
Hi Team, One more question. The INVALID_SYNTAX notify in response to missing payload in IKE_AUTH should be send encrypted using DH keys or unencrypted ? Thanks, raj On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 10:12 AM, raj singh wrote: > Hi Yoav, > > If check for mandatory payloads per exchange type is MUST, if i

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-14 Thread raj singh
Hi Yoav, If check for mandatory payloads per exchange type is MUST, if it fails we MUST return INVALID_SYNTAX, why we are not saying it explicitly in the draft ? Putting it clearly in the draft make more sense and avoids many confusions. Thanks, Raj On Wed, May 6, 2009 at 7:24 PM, Yoav Nir wro

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-07 Thread Tero Kivinen
Yoav Nir writes: > A far more common situation is when I'm "outside", not moving > anywhere, and I want to connect. I haven't even opened my mail > client yet, or launched the browser (because those thing hate it > when the VPN client changes routing to addresses they are trying to > reach). > >

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-07 Thread Tero Kivinen
Michael Richardson writes: > > Let me suggest a situation where perhaps I would like to bring up > an IKE_SA and not a CHILD_SA: it might be for just sending initial > contact, and perhaps even a DELETE. > > I sometimes move quickly from being "outside" my IPsec gateway/firewall > (such as being

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-06 Thread Yoav Nir
Hi Michael > Let me suggest a situation where perhaps I would like to > bring up an IKE_SA and not a CHILD_SA: it might be for just > sending initial contact, and perhaps even a DELETE. > > I sometimes move quickly from being "outside" my IPsec > gateway/firewall (such as being on wireless),

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-06 Thread David Wierbowski
Tero Kivinen writes: > Michael Richardson writes: > > Yoav Nir wrote: > > > Hi Raj > > > > > > Matt is correct. There is no way in IKEv2 to do a phase1-only exchange, > > > and then wait for traffic to establish the child SAs. > > > > > > While we do establish an IKE SA if the piggy-backed child S

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-06 Thread Tero Kivinen
Michael Richardson writes: > Yoav Nir wrote: > > Hi Raj > > > > Matt is correct. There is no way in IKEv2 to do a phase1-only exchange, > > and then wait for traffic to establish the child SAs. > > > > While we do establish an IKE SA if the piggy-backed child SA failed for > > whatever reas

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-06 Thread Michael Richardson
Let me suggest a situation where perhaps I would like to bring up an IKE_SA and not a CHILD_SA: it might be for just sending initial contact, and perhaps even a DELETE. I sometimes move quickly from being "outside" my IPsec gateway/firewall (such as being on wireless), to being wired behind the g

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-06 Thread Yoav Nir
Michael Richardson wrote: > Yoav Nir wrote: > > Hi Raj > > > > Matt is correct. There is no way in IKEv2 to do a phase1-only > > exchange, and then wait for traffic to establish the child SAs. > > > > While we do establish an IKE SA if the piggy-backed child SA failed > > for whatever reason

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-05-05 Thread Michael Richardson
Yoav Nir wrote: Hi Raj Matt is correct. There is no way in IKEv2 to do a phase1-only exchange, and then wait for traffic to establish the child SAs. While we do establish an IKE SA if the piggy-backed child SA failed for whatever reason (bad selectors, no proposal chosen), we don't allow

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread raj singh
Hi Tero, It make sense. The same point i want to make, if we as a responder are not going to process the packet, there is NO need to add IDr and AUTH with INVALID_SYNTAX during IKE_AUTH. Regards, Raj On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 4:43 PM, Tero Kivinen wrote: > Matthew Cini Sarreo writes: > > You sti

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread Tero Kivinen
Matthew Cini Sarreo writes: > You still need the IDr and AUTH payloads in the reply. This is needed as > INVALID_SYNTAX is authenticated and encrypted. INVALID_SYNTAX is fatal error meaning that other end didn't follow the protocol specification, and the IKE SA is going to be removed anyways, and

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread raj singh
Hi Matt, Buy as per Youv, we should not process the request. Is that means, that we will not process the request but send IDr and AUTH payloads ? Thanks, Raj On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 2:48 PM, Matthew Cini Sarreo wrote: > Hello Raj, > > You still need the IDr and AUTH payloads in the reply. This

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread raj singh
Hi Matt/Youv, Thanks for your reply. I will conclude as IKE_AUTH exchange MUST have TSi and TSr payload. We MUST NOT process IKE_AUTH packet without TSi and TSr and we should reply with INVALID_SYNTAX notification without IDr, AUTH, TSi and TSr payloads. Regards, Raj On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 1:11

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread Matthew Cini Sarreo
Hello Raj, You still need the IDr and AUTH payloads in the reply. This is needed as INVALID_SYNTAX is authenticated and encrypted. Regards, Matt 2009/4/22 raj singh > Hi Matt/Youv, > > Thanks for your reply. > I will conclude as IKE_AUTH exchange MUST have TSi and TSr payload. We MUST > NOT pr

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-22 Thread Yoav Nir
Hi Raj Matt is correct. There is no way in IKEv2 to do a phase1-only exchange, and then wait for traffic to establish the child SAs. While we do establish an IKE SA if the piggy-backed child SA failed for whatever reason (bad selectors, no proposal chosen), we don't allow for an IKE_AUTH excha

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-21 Thread raj singh
Hi Matt, Let me re-phrase my questions: 1. If there is no TSi and TSr payload in IKE_AUTH exchange, whether we go ahead and process IKE_AUTH payloads or not ? 2. Appendix C: IKE_AUTH: Error in CHILD SA creation. It will come into picture if we process the packet. If we go ahead and process the

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-21 Thread Matthew Cini Sarreo
Hello Raj, According to Appendix C, for IKE_AUTH: error in Child SA <-- IDr, [CERT+], creationAUTH, N(error), [V+] So sending an authenticated and encrypted INVALID_SYNTAX notification over the IKE_SA that has ju

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-21 Thread raj singh
Hi Matt, There is possibility of just IKEv2 SA gets established during IKE_AUTH and IPsec SA getting established via CREATE_CHILD_SA. The question is what behavior RFC mandate ? What you think ? Thanks for your reply. Regards, Raj On Wed, Apr 22, 2009 at 11:40 AM, Matthew Cini Sarreo wrote: >

Re: [IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-21 Thread Matthew Cini Sarreo
In IKE_AUTH TSi and TSr are mandatory, so it is not possible to omit them from an authentication exchange message, as there would be no way for the SA to know what traffic should be forwarded through the SA. It seems that the correct error message would be INVALID_SYNTAX. This would require the me

[IPsec] [IKEv2] IKE_AUTH without TSi, TSr

2009-04-21 Thread raj singh
Hi Group, What is the expected behavior if as a responder we do not receive TSi and TSr in IKE_AUTH exchange ? Shall we go ahead and establish IKEv2 SA ? If yes, shall we send out TSi and TSr ? Or we should reject the packet ? If we reject the packet during packet validation with doing ID and AUTH