Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-12-11 Thread Tero Kivinen
Scott C Moonen writes: > > > > We've interpreted it as follows: 1) the old IKE SA's PRF is used to > > > > produce SKEYSEED, but 2) the new IKE SA's PRF is used to produce > SK_x. > > > > > >Hmm... when reading my code, it seems I do the same, but when I read > > >the text I interpreted it differe

Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-12-10 Thread Scott C Moonen
Ni, and Nr from the new exchange, and using the new IKE SA's PRF. Scott Moonen (smoo...@us.ibm.com) z/OS Communications Server TCP/IP Development http://www.linkedin.com/in/smoonen From: Paul Hoffman To: Scott C Moonen/Raleigh/i...@ibmus, Tero Kivinen Cc: IPsecme WG Date: 12/10/2009 02:4

Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-12-10 Thread Paul Hoffman
At 9:34 AM -0500 11/24/09, Scott C Moonen wrote: > > > > Section 2.18 also states that in the case of the old and new IKE SA >> > selecting different PRFs, that the rekeying exchange (for SKEYSEED) >...snip... > > new PRF, is when new IKE SA is used to generate KEYMAT, or SKEYSEED >> for next IKE S

Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-11-24 Thread Tero Kivinen
Scott C Moonen writes: > We've interpreted it as follows: 1) the old IKE SA's PRF is used to > produce SKEYSEED, but 2) the new IKE SA's PRF is used to produce SK_x. Hmm... when reading my code, it seems I do the same, but when I read the text I interpreted it differently, so I think we need some

Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-11-24 Thread Scott C Moonen
unications Server TCP/IP Development http://www.linkedin.com/in/smoonen From: Tero Kivinen To: Paul Hoffman Cc: IPsecme WG Date: 11/24/2009 08:55 AM Subject: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question Paul Hoffman writes: > We earlier agreed in issue #

[IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-11-24 Thread Tero Kivinen
Paul Hoffman writes: > We earlier agreed in issue #50 to make the KEr in Section 1.3.2 > (Rekeying IKE SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange) mandatory: > <-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr} > Note that this is not in the current draft, but will be in the next one. > > So, wha

Re: [IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-11-24 Thread Pasi.Eronen
Paul Hoffman wrote: > We earlier agreed in issue #50 to make the KEr in Section 1.3.2 > (Rekeying IKE SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange) mandatory: > <-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr} > Note that this is not in the current draft, but will be in the next > one. > > So, wh

[IPsec] #121: Rekeying IKE SAs: KEr errors and PRF question

2009-11-23 Thread Paul Hoffman
We earlier agreed in issue #50 to make the KEr in Section 1.3.2 (Rekeying IKE SAs with the CREATE_CHILD_SA Exchange) mandatory: <-- HDR, SK {SA, Nr, KEr} Note that this is not in the current draft, but will be in the next one. So, what happens if the responder does n