RE: Comments on draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-07

2013-05-24 Thread Dmitry Anipko
> correlation but their admins won't let them use temporary addresses, > then random-per-network (row 3) provides some benefits over random (row 2). So is the goal of the draft to give a new way for network administrators to decrease privacy of users? If yes, then if this goal was removed, would

RE: Next steps for draft-gont-6man-predictable-fragment-id

2013-03-10 Thread Dmitry Anipko
In such an attack, is the attacker on the path between the victim and the server? If yes, there are more efficient ways how they can DoS the victim. If no, how does the attacker know which of the billions hosts on the Internet will be talking to this DNS server in the next second (in order to se

RE: multiple policy tables handling in draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt-01

2011-11-17 Thread Dmitry Anipko
arif...@nttv6.net] Sent: Thursday, November 17, 2011 9:14 PM To: Dmitry Anipko Cc: ipv6@ietf.org Subject: Re: multiple policy tables handling in draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt-01 Hi, thank you for your comment. On 2011/11/14, at 14:21, Dmitry Anipko wrote: Hello, I have a question about this text

multiple policy tables handling in draft-ietf-6man-addr-select-opt-01

2011-11-13 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Hello, I have a question about this text the -01 revision: >>A node MAY use OPTION_DASP in any of the following two cases: 1: The address selection option is delivered across a secure, trusted channel. The OPTION_DASP is configured by a network administrator

RE: RFC3484, Section 6, Rule 7 and ISATAP

2011-05-16 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Hello Fred, Rule 7 does help to distinguish native IPv6 versus ISATAP. However, rule 7 doesn't help to distinguish ISATAP from native IPv4: the rule 7 is only considered after rule 6, and per rule 6 ISATAP is already prioritized higher than IPv4 due to the default prefix policy table precedenc

RE: Routing loop attacks using IPv6 tunnels

2010-03-12 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Hi Fred, >> Are you are referring here to 'draft-nakibly-v6ops-tunnel-loop-01'? Yes, that's correct. Thank you, Dmitry -Original Message- From: ipv6-boun...@ietf.org [mailto:ipv6-boun...@ietf.org] On Behalf Of Templin, Fred L Sent: Friday, March 12, 2010 1:13

RE: Routing loop attacks using IPv6 tunnels

2010-03-12 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Hello, I wanted to follow up on Fred's comment earlier in this thread: >> OK. That will greatly simplify the checks needed for new automatic tunneling protocols that have a format other than ip-proto-41. For the designers of new tunneling protocols, shall perhaps a recommendation on best practi

RE: RFC4 4861 and unicast router solicitations

2009-06-23 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Thanks Hesham, Hemant and Suresh for your responses. It seems from them that the implied intent was that unicast-destined RSes should be allowed to be both sent and received and should be handled equally with multicast-destined ones. If that is the case, shall the RFC text be amended to reflect

RFC4 4861 and unicast router solicitations

2009-06-22 Thread Dmitry Anipko
Hello, I have a question on whether router solicitations with unicast destination addresses are valid under RFC 4861, and if they are, whether they shall be handled by routers equally to the solicitations with multicast destination address. The RFC says: >>6.3.7. Sending Router Solicitations