Re: ra-privacy: my responses to comments

2013-07-30 Thread zhou . sujing
Hi, Rafiee, I don't think using CGA by replacing the public key with a timestamp or other random string is a "higher randomzation" address generation method. Hash is only one technique of generating a random like string, may not be the best one among those specified in RFC4086. ipv6-bou

Re: Re: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

2013-03-21 Thread zhou . sujing
Jari Arkko 写于 2013-03-22 05:55:35: > > Hosnieh, > > > What is it that you don't understand. I will be happy to explain it to you. > > Thanks. I read the details, but I'm missing the big picture. I.e., > some effort is required from the owner to create an address. By > repeating that effort

Re: Re: On draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-03

2013-03-20 Thread zhou . sujing
Thank you. My question come from the so misleading Appendix A text: "It discusses a (non-exaustive) number of scenarios in which host privacy is still sacrificed even when privacy/temporary addresses [RFC4941] are employed, as a result of employing interface identifiers that are constant across

On draft-ietf-6man-stable-privacy-addresses-03

2013-03-19 Thread zhou . sujing
I kind did not understand the privacy issues of RFC4941 describbed in Appendeix A. To my reading and understanding of RFC4941, RFC4941 specified to use privacy/temporary address defined as: temporary address= subnet Prefix|| Randomized interface identifier Randomized interface identifi

RE: RE: [saag] security consideration of CGA and SSAS - Ii-D action : draft-rafiee-6man-ssas

2013-03-18 Thread zhou . sujing
ipv6-boun...@ietf.org 写于 2013-03-18 09:36:25: > 2048 bit RSA security is overstated. Cracking it requires on the > order of 2^112 operations. You should look at NIST SP 800-57 Part > 2, Table 2 Section 5.6.1. It is in Part 1: http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-57/sp800-57_part1_re

New Version Notification for draft-zhou-6man-cga-hashagil-00.txt

2012-11-05 Thread zhou . sujing
A new version of I-D, draft-zhou-6man-cga-hashagil-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Sujing Zhou and posted to the IETF repository. Filename: draft-zhou-6man-cga-hashagil Revision: 00 Title:Supporting Hash Algorithms Agility in C

答复: Re: Comments on

2012-04-17 Thread zhou . sujing
Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou ipv6-boun...@ietf.org 写于 2012-04-18 12:25:26: > Hi, Karl, > > On 04/17/2012 09:58 PM, Karl Auer wrote: > > A DHCPv6 server that allocates addresses linearly would be better fixed > > not to do so, than to go to the trouble of implementing stable addresses > > a la Gont

答复: RE: RE: about security level evaluation of draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00

2012-04-08 Thread zhou . sujing
Hi,Huitema, Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou Christian Huitema 写于 2012-03-29 08:23:38: > Sujin, > > Your statement “after attacker has cracked a CGA address, then it > is in the same stand as the defender” is incorrect. The attacker Thank your for pointing out one of my omission that failing to r

答复: RE: about security level evaluation of draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00

2012-03-28 Thread zhou . sujing
Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou Christian Huitema 写于 2012-03-27 23:00:09: > > Well, I think it is quite a simple trade-off. Increasing Sec > increases computational effort on both sides by equal amount. > Increasing the length of > > the hash increases computational effort only on the attacker side.

about the secrurity evalutaion in CGAs

2012-03-27 Thread zhou . sujing
In response to coments on draft draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00 It can be referred to RFC3972 section 7.2 "This increases the cost of address generation approximately by a factor of 2^(16*Sec). It also increases the cost of brute-force attacks by the same factor. That is, the cost of creatin

答复: Re: about security level evaluation of draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00

2012-03-27 Thread zhou . sujing
Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou Jari Arkko 写于 2012-03-27 16:21:52: > Well, I think it is quite a simple trade-off. Increasing Sec > increases computational effort on both sides by equal amount. > Increasing the length of the hash increases computational effort > only on the attacker side. As a resul

about security level evaluation of draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00

2012-03-27 Thread zhou . sujing
In response to coments on draft draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00 1. It can be referred to RFC3972 section 7.2 "This increases the cost of address generation approximately by a factor of 2^(16*Sec). It also increases the cost of brute-force attacks by the same factor. That is, the cost of crea

答复: Scribes and minutes

2012-03-15 Thread zhou . sujing
hi, what is the agenda for the 6man? Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou ipv6-boun...@ietf.org 写于 2012-03-15 19:32:41: > All, > The preliminary agenda has been posted for the 6MAN meeting in > Paris. We have the 0900-1130 slot on Tuesday morning. > > If you are willing to serve as a Jab

hi, the adenda of 5man at ietf 83 decided?

2012-03-12 Thread zhou . sujing
IETF IPv6 working group mailing list ipv6@ietf.org Administrative Requests: https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/ipv6

Request for a time slot for "draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00.txt"

2012-03-04 Thread zhou . sujing
Hi, all I requested for a time slot (in pending status now ) for my newly submitted draft draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00, in response to request of chairs, I give a short descriptioin here, any comments are welcome. the problems it solves: The draft provides a simple method of enco

答复: Re: request for a time slot for "draft-zhou-6man-mhash-cga-00.txt"

2012-03-01 Thread zhou . sujing
the problems it solves: The draft provides a simple method of encoding multiple hash function types in a CGA address, it can be thought of as an improvement or an update to RFC4982. the motivation: RFC3972 defined CGA (cryptographically generated address) but only use one hash

Time slot at 83 meeting?

2012-03-01 Thread zhou . sujing
How can I ask for a presentation time slot? Regards~~~ -Sujing Zhou ipv6-boun...@ietf.org 写于 2012-02-29 03:08:51: > On 2/28/2012 5:12 AM, Jeroen Massar wrote: > > Hi, > > > > I was wondering, if anybody had a rough idea how many MLDv1-only > > listeners are still out there in the wild. My assum