Re: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Mark Andrews
In message <6504f50e-c15b-4233-bd5d-f917f35bb...@muada.com>, Iljitsch van Beijn um writes: > On 8 jul 2009, at 15:12, R=E9mi Despr=E9s wrote: > > >> The u/l bit is reserved for global use as Brian Carpenter also noted. > > > Well, it gets complex. > > Discussing the point offline in Stockholm mi

Re: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 9 jul 2009, at 21:55, Christian Huitema wrote: There are about 3.7 billion usable IPv4 addresses. Do you really want to make a table that big, when the IPv6 host is going to expose everything to every IPv6 node it talks to anyway? Very few hosts speak to 3.7 billion peers at the same time.

RE: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Christian Huitema
> There are about 3.7 billion usable IPv4 addresses. Do you really want > to make a table that big, when the IPv6 host is going to expose > everything to every IPv6 node it talks to anyway? Very few hosts speak to 3.7 billion peers at the same time. Those who do probably have dual stack. In most

Re: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 9 jul 2009, at 16:05, Christian Huitema wrote: The DNS64 does not have "to stuff the IPv4 bits somewhere in the IPv6 bits." It could also use mapping tables to map the IPv4 bits to arbitrary IPv6 bits. There are about 3.7 billion usable IPv4 addresses. Do you really want to make a tabl

RE: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Christian Huitema
> The DNS64 has to stuff the IPv4 bits somewhere in the IPv6 bits. > Although it's simpler to do that at a 32 bit boundary (and a 16 bit > boundary has checksumming advantages), as far as I know all of this > happens in software and can be handled fast enough even if the rules > get more complex to

Re: [BEHAVE] Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-09 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 8 jul 2009, at 15:12, Rémi Després wrote: The u/l bit is reserved for global use as Brian Carpenter also noted. Well, it gets complex. Discussing the point offline in Stockholm might be better than by mail. Would that be useful? The whole point of NAT64 is to work with unmodified clie

Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-08 Thread Rémi Després
Le 7 juil. 09 à 21:56, Dave Thaler a écrit : -Original Message- From: Rémi Després [mailto:remi.desp...@free.fr] Sent: Tuesday, July 07, 2009 3:03 AM To: Christian Huitema Cc: Brian E Carpenter; Xing Li; 6man; Behave WG; Dave Thaler Subject: Re: Perils of structured host identifiers

RE: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Dave Thaler
> -Original Message- > From: Rémi Després [mailto:remi.desp...@free.fr] > Sent: Tuesday, July 07, 2009 3:03 AM > To: Christian Huitema > Cc: Brian E Carpenter; Xing Li; 6man; Behave WG; Dave Thaler > Subject: Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modifie

RE: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Dave Thaler
Christian Huitema wrote: [...] > Structured identifiers are not compatible with privacy address > extensions. Moreover, embedding addresses in identifiers discloses > information that would otherwise have remained hidden behind the NAT > and the firewall. The IPv4 address encoded in the host identi

Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 7 jul 2009, at 20:27, Christian Huitema wrote: I'm not seeing this. vXuser - routers -- vXserver v6user - NAT64 -- v4server In the first case, the addresses are visible everywhere. In the second case, the destination address (in one form or another) is visible everywhe

RE: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Christian Huitema
> I'm not seeing this. > > vXuser - routers -- vXserver > > v6user - NAT64 -- v4server > > In the first case, the addresses are visible everywhere. In the second > case, the destination address (in one form or another) is visible > everywhere. How is this suddenly a privacy issue?

RE: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Christian Huitema
CGA are not only used in SEND, but also in SHIM6, and they have a clear potential in other applications. You can take the narrow view that CGA are only useful to secure neighbor discovery, but doing that limits any future application. Iljitsch makes another point, that CGA are inherently not us

Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Christian Huitema
May I throw a dose of caution in this debate about host identifiers formats? Many transition mechanisms rely on encoding information in the 64 bit host identifier. This is of course a tempting design point, because it diminishes the amount of state that servers have to keep. For example, Teredo

Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Rémi Després
Le 7 juil. 09 à 15:40, Christian Huitema a écrit : CGA are not only used in SEND, but also in SHIM6, and they have a clear potential in other applications. I agree that other useful uses of CGAs are possible. For those where CGAs never appear in link-layer addresses, compliance with the u-

Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Iljitsch van Beijnum
On 7 jul 2009, at 15:40, Christian Huitema wrote: I think Iljitsch missed the point about privacy. Consider an IPv4 enterprise network manager that wants to gain IPv6 access. Embedding the internal IPv4 addresses in the IPv6 address makes these addresses public, while previously they were p

Re: Perils of structured host identifiers (was: Modified EUI-64 format)

2009-07-07 Thread Rémi Després
Christian, Thanks for this analysis. Caution is indeed a must before any amendment of a basic document. As my proposal is, its relationship with cryptographically generated addresses (and with secure neighbor discovery which uses it) should however not be a problem. The proposal is, in sho