Eleanor Saitta:
> On 2013.06.29 12.37, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
>> Eleanor Saitta:
>>> None of those tools exist right now, not for locational privacy
>>> and metadata obfuscation.
>
>> I disagree about the existence. Perhaps, I think we might be able
>> to agree on certain values of 'unusable' rath
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On 2013.06.29 12.37, Jacob Appelbaum wrote:
> Eleanor Saitta:
>> None of those tools exist right now, not for locational privacy
>> and metadata obfuscation.
>
> I disagree about the existence. Perhaps, I think we might be able
> to agree on certain
Eleanor Saitta:
> On 2013.06.29 10.27, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
>> It's not a simplistic choice between using modern devices and being
>> a Luddite. It's about people having a better understanding about
>> what the threats are, digesting that information (unfortunately,
>> slowly) and then using too
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On 2013.06.29 10.27, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> It's not a simplistic choice between using modern devices and being
> a Luddite. It's about people having a better understanding about
> what the threats are, digesting that information (unfortunately,
>
On 06/29/2013 01:07 AM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
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On 2013.06.28 21.02, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
That's anecdotal evidence.
The vast majority of the smartphone userbase just learned the word
"meta-data" a few weeks ago. The news about the scope of NSA
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On 2013.06.28 21.02, Jonathan Wilkes wrote:
> That's anecdotal evidence.
>
> The vast majority of the smartphone userbase just learned the word
> "meta-data" a few weeks ago. The news about the scope of NSA
> surveillance is revelatory to non-speci
On 06/28/2013 12:28 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
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On 2013.06.28 04.21, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
I agree - "no smartphones" is sound advice. "No phones" is even
better. But the problem is, no
>
> I think the key is that it's time to *also* support the "average"
> user. We can't stop working to create systems that are as secure as
> possible for the people who are directly targeted and whose lives are
> at risk -- but we also cannot only support that very motivated individual.
>
> If
On Friday, June 28, 2013 12:28 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote:
> On 2013.06.28 04.21, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
>> On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
>>> I agree - "no smartphones" is sound advice. "No phones" is
>>> even better. But the problem is, nobody follows that advice. So
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On 2013.06.28 04.21, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
> On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
>> I agree - "no smartphones" is sound advice. "No phones" is even
>> better. But the problem is, nobody follows that advice. So we
>> have t
On Fri, Jun 21, 2013 at 04:56:24PM +0100, Michael Rogers wrote:
> I agree - "no smartphones" is sound advice. "No phones" is even
> better. But the problem is, nobody follows that advice. So we have to
> be pragmatic.
[snip insightful comments]
I would like to agree with you -- and in part, I do.
On 21-06-13 17:56, Michael Rogers wrote:
> On 17/06/13 14:12, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
>> One more generic comment/observation: clearly, Usenet or a
>> Usenet-ish mechanism will run on a smartphone. But I'm not sure
>> that's a good idea. Given the existence of things like CarrierIQ,
>> the propensit
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On 17/06/13 14:12, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
> One more generic comment/observation: clearly, Usenet or a
> Usenet-ish mechanism will run on a smartphone. But I'm not sure
> that's a good idea. Given the existence of things like CarrierIQ,
> the propensit
On Mon, Jun 17, 2013 at 11:12 PM, Rich Kulawiec wrote:
>
> Thanks for the comments, and for the pointers to Eternity and Briar.
> It would appear that I have rather a lot of reading to do. ;-)
>
> One more generic comment/observation: clearly, Usenet or a Usenet-ish
> mechanism will run on a smart
Thanks for the comments, and for the pointers to Eternity and Briar.
It would appear that I have rather a lot of reading to do. ;-)
One more generic comment/observation: clearly, Usenet or a Usenet-ish
mechanism will run on a smartphone. But I'm not sure that's a good
idea. Given the existence
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On 15/06/13 00:53, Guido Witmond wrote:
Encrypting everything should stop article spoofing. (Although
it doesn't stop article flooding, and an adversary could try
to overwhelm the network by injecting large amounts of
traffic. Depre
On 14-06-13 21:22, Adam Back wrote:
Kind of old now (1997) but take a look at USENET eternity for a distributed
censor resistant web publishing system based on USENET, PGP and
hashes/committments. The documents could either by public, semi-private
(secret URLs) or secured. Content updateble only
Kind of old now (1997) but take a look at USENET eternity for a distributed
censor resistant web publishing system based on USENET, PGP and
hashes/committments. The documents could either by public, semi-private
(secret URLs) or secured. Content updateble only by the author using PGP,
and yet br
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