On Fri, Oct 20, 2023 at 10:31:03AM +, Peter Todd via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> As I have suggested before, the correct way to do pre-signed transactions is
> to
> pre-sign enough *different* transactions to cover all reasonable needs for
> bumping fees. Even if you just increase the fee by 2x each
On Tue, Oct 17, 2023 at 10:34:04AM +, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev wrote:
> Good morning Antoine et al.,
>
> Let me try to rephrase the core of the attack.
>
> There exists these nodes on the LN (letters `A`, `B`, and `C` are nodes, `==`
> are channels):
>
> A = B = C
>
> `A`
Hi,
After writing the mail reply on the economics of sequential malicious
replacement of honest HTLC-timeout, I did write one more test to verify the
behavior on core mempool, and it works as expected.
https://github.com/ariard/bitcoin/commit/30f5d5b270e4ff195e8dcb9ef6b7ddcc5f6a1bf2
Responsible
> As the CLTV
> delta deadline approaches, the fees in case 2 may be 50%, 80%, even
> 100% of the HTLC value under such a scorched earth policy.
A replacement-cycling attacker can afford to pay 100% of the HTLC value
under the defender scorched earth policy and still realize an economic gain.
That certainly helps, yes, and I think many nodes do something akin to this already, but I'm not
sure we can say that the problem has been fixed if the victim has to spend way more than the
prevailing mempool fees (and potentially burn a large % of their HTLC value) :).
Matt
On 10/19/23 12:23
On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 5:22 PM Antoine Riard wrote:
>
> Hi Matt,
>
> This mitigation is mentioned in the attached paper (see subsection 3.4
> defensive fee-rebroadcasting)
> https://github.com/ariard/mempool-research/blob/2023-10-replacement-paper/replacement-cycling.pdf
>
> As soon as you
