[PATCH 11/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

The policy flags could be targeted by an attacker aiming at disabling IMA, so that there would be no trace of a file system modification in the measurement list. Since the flags can be altered at runtime, it is not possible to make them become fully read-only, for example with __ro_after_init.

Re: [PATCH 11/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

Hi, On 20/12/2018 19:30, Thiago Jung Bauermann wrote: Hello Igor, Igor Stoppa writes: diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 59d834219cd6..5f4e13e671bf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c

Re: [PATCH 11/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

Hello Igor, Igor Stoppa writes: > diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > index 59d834219cd6..5f4e13e671bf 100644 > --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c > @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ > #include > #include >

[PATCH 11/12] IMA: turn ima_policy_flags into __wr_after_init

The policy flags could be targeted by an attacker aiming at disabling IMA, so that there would be no trace of a file system modification in the measurement list. Since the flags can be altered at runtime, it is not possible to make them become fully read-only, for example with __ro_after_init.