Re: [RFC PATCH v6 08/13] SELinux: Add new peer permissions to the Flask definitions

2007-11-12 Thread Paul Moore
On Sunday 11 November 2007 5:31:44 pm James Morris wrote: > On Fri, 9 Nov 2007, Paul Moore wrote: > > Add additional Flask definitions to support the new "peer" object class. > > Should this be dependent on dynamic class/permission support? I think it's okay to _define_ the Flask definitions regar

Re: [RFC PATCH v6 09/13] SELinux: Better integration between peer labeling subsystems

2007-11-12 Thread Paul Moore
On Sunday 11 November 2007 5:34:27 pm James Morris wrote: > On Fri, 9 Nov 2007, Paul Moore wrote: > > + /* Between selinux_compat_net and selinux_policycap_netpeer this is > > +* starting to get a bit messy - we need to setup a timetable for > > +* deprecating some of this old/obsolete fu

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Bodo Eggert
Rogelio M. Serrano Jr. <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: >> Allowing a user to tweak (under constraints) their settings might allow >> them to do something like create two mozilla profiles which are isolated >> from each other, so that the profile they use for general web

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Crispin Cowan
Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > * Crispin Cowan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > >> I mostly don't see this as a serious limitation, because almost everyone >> has their own workstation, and thus has root on that workstation. There >> are 2 major exceptions: >> >> * Schools, where the "workstati

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Crispin Cowan
Alan Cox wrote: >> but how can the system know if the directory the user wants to add is >> reasonable or not? what if the user says they want to store their >> documents in /etc? >> > A more clear example is wanting to wrap a specific tool with temporary > rules. Those rules would depend on

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Joshua Brindle
Casey Schaufler wrote: --- Crispin Cowan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: ... Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit policy? I would like to better understand the problem here. Note that John Johansen is also interested in allowing non

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Crispin Cowan
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > a question for Crispin, > is there a wildcard replacement for username? so that you could > grant permission to /home/$user/.mozilla.. and grant each user > access to only their own stuff? I realize that in this particular > example the underlying DAC will handle it

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread John Johansen
On Mon, Nov 12, 2007 at 03:50:59PM -0800, Crispin Cowan wrote: > Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > > * Crispin Cowan ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote: > > > >> I mostly don't see this as a serious limitation, because almost everyone > >> has their own workstation, and thus has root on that workstation. T

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Casey Schaufler
--- Joshua Brindle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Casey Schaufler wrote: > > --- Crispin Cowan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > >> Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote: > >> ... > >> > >> Can you explain why you want a non-privileged user to be able to edit > >> policy? I would like to better unders

Re: [PATCH 2/2] Version 11 (2.6.24-rc2) Smack: Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel

2007-11-12 Thread Andrew Morton
On Thu, 08 Nov 2007 20:48:52 -0800 Casey Schaufler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Smack is the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel. This ran afoul of http://userweb.kernel.org/~akpm/mmotm/broken-out/vfs-security-rework-inode_getsecurity-and-callers-to.patch Until that patch gets merged we'l

Re: AppArmor Security Goal

2007-11-12 Thread Rob Meijer
> The > system is "defended" in that the worst the attacker can do to corrupt > the system is limited to the transitive closure of what the confined > processes are allowed to access. The damage the atacker can do would be defined by the authority not the permissions the process has. > A "complic