Christine:
Ping me off list and I will get yer mail flowing.
> On May 21, 2024, at 1:37 PM, Christine Borgia via mailop
> wrote:
>
> Good question, Richard, I'm not sure! However, Kent, I sent to those emails
> and received an immediate response. You're a rockstar!
>
> Chris
>
> On Tue,
Hey Marcel - thanks for the reply:
On 2024-05-21 3:42 PM, Marcel Becker via mailop wrote:
So it is looking like Yahoo is not accepting email forwards (at
least from us) since Friday, May 17th.
No, that's not the case.
PH01 errors are suspected phish.
It's very strange - the same
It's beginning to sound localized to us, so thanks for all the replies.
(I'm checking if our ops team have submitted a ticket via the URL Faisal
mentioned, if not we will)
We have three separate paths these messages could take:
1) standard email forwarding + SRS enabled - this is affected
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 12:06 PM Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop <
mailop@mailop.org> wrote:
> So it is looking like Yahoo is not accepting email forwards (at least from
> us) since Friday, May 17th.
>
No, that's not the case.
PH01 errors are suspected phish.
And as I suggested yesterday, please
Have you tried reaching out to them directly to get more details? I know
they also lurk here, but pretty sure they prefer you contact their team
first and then escalate if necessary.
https://senders.yahooinc.com/contact/
On 5/21/24 8:01 PM, Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop wrote:
Following on my
It appears that Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop said:
>The only difference between messages that get through vs ones that are
>rejected (same message) is whether we send to the Yahoo email box
>directly, or else via an email forward (which has SRS enabled, and
>optionally SPF and even minimal
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 12:25 PM Richard W via mailop
wrote:
> Since Shaw is now owned by Rogers, would that be a Yahoo issue?
>
No.
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Am Tue, 21 May 2024 15:25:22 -0400
schrieb "Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop" :
> we've tried it from domains with no SPF enabled (and no SRS) as well
> as domains with SPF + SRS
Do they have DMARC?
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Good question, Richard, I'm not sure! However, Kent, I sent to those emails
and received an immediate response. You're a rockstar!
Chris
On Tue, May 21, 2024 at 3:23 PM Richard W via mailop
wrote:
> Since Shaw is now owned by Rogers, would that be a Yahoo issue?
>
> Richard
>
> On 2024-05-21
On Tue, 21 May 2024, Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop wrote:
The only difference between messages that get through vs ones that are
rejected (same message) is whether we send to the Yahoo email box directly,
or else via an email forward (which has SRS enabled, and optionally SPF and
even minimal
yes I mispoke there (mis-typed)
we've tried it from domains with no SPF enabled (and no SRS) as well as
domains with SPF + SRS
On 2024-05-21 3:23 PM, Andrew C Aitchison wrote:
On Tue, 21 May 2024, Mark E. Jeftovic via mailop wrote:
The only difference between messages that get through vs
Since Shaw is now owned by Rogers, would that be a Yahoo issue?
Richard
On 2024-05-21 12:37 p.m., Christine Borgia via mailop wrote:
Shaw.ca is completely blocking our transactional mail and we haven't
been able to make contact there. Wondering if there is anyone here that
I can talk to about
Following on my email yesterday and after running a few more tests.
The error message from Yahoo is simply
Remote-MTA: dns; mta6.am0.yahoodns.net
Diagnostic-Code: smtp; 554 Message not allowed
[PH01] Email not accepted for policy reasons
which links back to
Shaw.ca is completely blocking our transactional mail and we haven't been
able to make contact there. Wondering if there is anyone here that I can
talk to about it?
Thx!
Chris
--
*Christine Borgia*
Staff Deliverability Specialist
[image: Shopify]
It’s not unusual, selling into central government (UK & NL at least), to
require TLS <1.2 to be disabled even on SMTP and, in my experience, this
does mean a small (I’d suggest very small) number of remotes that are
unable and "fallback" to clear.
I personally find it a bit of a moot point;
It appears that Benny Pedersen via mailop said:
>Suresh Ramasubramanian via mailop skrev den 2024-05-21 15:18:
>> Yeah Benny – if you’re running 16 year old code and certificates
>> that you’re still on TLS v1 or 1.1, it is time to upgrade, asap.
>> What you have is not much better or worse than
They will not remove it to allow backwards compatibility. They did however move
it to Security Level 0
I agree, but only to a point. Cryptographic protocols such as TLS 1.0/1.1 are
still usable and strong against attackers with limited resources. The issue is
that hardware is now a commodity that is only getting cheaper and more
powerful. As such, it is now much easier to break the TLS1.0/1.1
False sense of security (well-known broken/insecure SSLv2/v3) is worse then
plaintext usage. Anyway, you are arguing with Best Common Practice, which is
not the best pastime.
2024-05-21T14:32:28Z Benny Pedersen via mailop :
> still possible to enable sslv2, sslv3 on openssl
--
Send
Suresh Ramasubramanian via mailop skrev den 2024-05-21 15:18:
Yeah Benny – if you’re running 16 year old code and certificates
that you’re still on TLS v1 or 1.1, it is time to upgrade, asap.
What you have is not much better or worse than sending it en clair
anyway.
tls is self adaptive, so
Serhii via mailop skrev den 2024-05-21 14:59:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996/
yet its still possible to enable sslv2, sslv3 on openssl :)
i dont think openssl will remove support for any tls versions yet
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It's been so long since I needed to mitigate with
Charter/Spectrum/Roadrunner that I have no idea anymore what the process
is. Does anyone here know?
Thanks,
John
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Yeah Benny – if you’re running 16 year old code and certificates that you’re
still on TLS v1 or 1.1, it is time to upgrade, asap. What you have is not
much better or worse than sending it en clair anyway.
From: mailop on behalf of Serhii via mailop
Date: Tuesday, 21 May 2024 at 6:39 PM
To:
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996/
This document formally deprecates Transport Layer Security (TLS)
versions 1.0 (RFC 2246) and 1.1 (RFC 4346). Accordingly, those
documents have been moved to Historic status. These versions lack
support for current and recommended
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