I installed mimedefang just yesterday, with clamav as the virus checker --
it's reduced my spam by 99%!
Excellent software, thank you!
--
My GPG public key is at http://ronware.org/
fingerprint: 4E91 06E9 2020 114C 8BCD 55B2 0816 60AF 2B3D 4C51
Hi All,
I think the following re-write is breaking the X509
compliant PKI certificate on an outbound email that
has a boilerplate attached:
Aug 17 08:14:38 filter mimedefang.pl[12050]: filter:
i7H8EZ4k026531: append_text_boilerplate=1
Aug 17 08:14:38 filter sendmail[26531]:
i7H8EZ4k026531:
On 18 Aug 2004 at 12:05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This *requires* that my signing MTA talk
directly to the final endpoint checking MTA.
To the checking MTA, sure - not necessarily the final endpoint. If you
have a pass-through MTA running MimeDefang in front of
On 18 Aug 2004 at 13:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This then breaks forwarding, one of the advantages of DomainKeys over
SPF.
How so? Email forwarding works, so long as the forwarding agent (say,
forwarder.example.com) signs the forwarded email with their DomainKey.
You haven't read the
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Jeff Rife wrote:
On 18 Aug 2004 at 13:20, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
This then breaks forwarding, one of the advantages of DomainKeys
over SPF.
How so? Email forwarding works, so long as the forwarding agent
(say, forwarder.example.com) signs
On Thu, 2004-08-19 at 12:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A solution *is* possible, even though the specs aren't (yet) it.
Worst-case, everyone gets a PGP key, publishes the public key in DNS,
and signs all outgoing mail. Then headers can be thrown around at
will.
I don't see why you call that
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Les Mikesell wrote:
On Thu, 2004-08-19 at 12:01, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
A solution *is* possible, even though the specs aren't (yet) it.
Worst-case, everyone gets a PGP key, publishes the public key in
DNS,
and signs all outgoing mail. Then
On Thu, 2004-08-19 at 14:26, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The problem is still that this
identification is meaningless unless there is a way to limit the
number of them that can be generated.
Not meaningless. If I send an email From:
[EMAIL PROTECTED], and sign it with my PGP key, and
Les Mikesell wrote:
The kind of identification I want is to know that if you send
one spam with this signature that I will be able to recognize
all subsequent emails coming from you and reject them.
Ah. Good luck with that. ;)
As long
as you can also send with a different signature that
Hello,
Basically, the description memo says it takes the actual domain in the
From: header, looks up a public key from the DNS server for that
domain, and then uses that public key along with the signature in the
DomainKey-Signature: header to see if the message is OK. Anybody see
the problem
On Thu, 19 Aug 2004, SM wrote:
Furthermore, DomainKeys is trivially defeated with a replay attack.
Send yourself the spam through the signing server. Now you have a signed
spam that you can re-mail far and wide. Of course, you can't mutate it,
which might increase the effectiveness of DCC
Hello,
Ok, I'll try to long counter rant some of these messages... and
explain some points, with copy to dk-filter mailing list. Maybe
not all points, it could be too long.
First of all, before counter ranting, let me explain a point which will
never be solved, nor by DomainKeys, nor by
Hi
I am running mimedefang 2.44 with two scanners - McAfee uvscan and camav-0.75
My understanding is that the mail will be checked by the first scanner. If the first
scanner find a virus, the mail
will be dropped and no more checking. If the first scanner didn't find any virus, the
mail
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