Re: Impossibility of cryptographic verification of downloads

2016-05-25 Thread Eduard - Gabriel Munteanu
On Wed, 2016-05-25 at 17:22 -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote: > > Well, you could certainly put the key and signify sources on the main > > website. The CVS thing doesn't seem to be HTTPS-enabled. > > You mean like here? [...] Oops, I completely missed those. I was looking at the download page and

Re: Impossibility of cryptographic verification of downloads

2016-05-25 Thread Eduard - Gabriel Munteanu
On Wed, 2016-05-25 at 17:02 -0500, Chris Bennett wrote: > Get the SHA256.sig from a different server than the install files, after > all, using just one server could be a problem if it is compromised. > > And face the reality of things: > > 1. The small bad guys. They can put up compromised

Re: Impossibility of cryptographic verification of downloads

2016-05-25 Thread Eduard - Gabriel Munteanu
On Wed, 2016-05-25 at 16:18 -0600, Theo de Raadt wrote: > > It currently seems impossible to verify downloads from a computer > > without OpenBSD, for a few reasons: > > > > 1. No securely-distributed public key > > 2. Lack of signify packages in e.g. Linux distros, or > > securely-distributed

Impossibility of cryptographic verification of downloads

2016-05-25 Thread Eduard - Gabriel Munteanu
Hi, It currently seems impossible to verify downloads from a computer without OpenBSD, for a few reasons: 1. No securely-distributed public key 2. Lack of signify packages in e.g. Linux distros, or securely-distributed sources To keep things simple, I propose mirrorring SHA256SUM files onto the