Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-05-20 Thread Gervase Markham
[Apologies for the delay in replying.] Nigel McFarlane wrote: Not exactly. The point of trust is on reload, not on save. The MOTW is merely metadata about the file's origin. I might configure my Firefox, for example, to not alert for all content saved from www.mybank.com. That's a matter of

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-27 Thread Nigel McFarlane
With MOTW in place, Mozilla and Firefox trusts Word documents more than it trusts web documents, passing them through the file-save cycle without modification. That is silly. Not exactly. The point of trust is on reload, not on save. The MOTW is merely metadata about the file's origin. I might

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-24 Thread Nigel McFarlane
What I didn't say was this: This is a really hard problem. That's why (in my view) some time and effort should be spent on the problem rather than just doing what seems like a good idea. For those seeking a real solution, as opposed to a best efforts, which is the only practical way forward,

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-19 Thread Nigel McFarlane
Can you remind me of the use case here? Who wants to load HTML pages from local disk and have JavaScript in that HTML have local disk access? That specific case isn't a requirement. The use case I'm defending is this one: Developer creates a web page on local disk and is able to load that file

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-18 Thread Nigel McFarlane
There are two worlds, the web and the disk. The assumption is that the web is untrusted and the disk is trusted **. Rather, there are two security models with different goals. Each model provides trust of the kind its users need. I said neither is necessarily less trusted than the other, just

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-18 Thread Gervase Markham
Nigel McFarlane wrote: Firefox's smooth user experience makes Fx a popular product for end users. A similarly smooth experience will help make moz/xulrunner/Fx a popular product for app developers. Developers, however, use local disk a lot and that puts them at odds with some security goals. In

Re: Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-16 Thread Ian G
Nigel McFarlane wrote: [long post] Indeed. My sense of the problem is below. Please correct where I got it wrong. There are two worlds, the web and the disk. The assumption is that the web is untrusted and the disk is trusted **. Anything that is stored on the disk is thought to be secure,

Possible security policy for local disk access

2005-04-15 Thread Nigel McFarlane
[long post] I've been trying to progress bug 273419 (disclosure of local files) and bug 230606 (same origin for local files). Some notes. Where I'm coming from: Firefox's smooth user experience makes Fx a popular product for end users. A similarly smooth experience will help make moz/xulrunner/Fx