Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread William B. Norton
Quantifiable Proof and "Peering Profiles"...see below. At 08:53 PM 12/16/2002 -0800, Joe Wood wrote: On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Joe Abley wrote: > I think the idea was to say "well, from the mrtg graph, the difference > between this circuit with all my _9327_ traffic and this circuit > without any _

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 11:41:12PM -0500, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > Also, that method has the same "knowing the routes" problem as netflow. > > Whereever you are getting your list of ASN's route ASN.*"'s routes, there > > is pretty much no way they are accurate (for an ASN of ANY size). >

[Article] Core competency - ISP backbones stand up in grueling 30-day performance test

2002-12-16 Thread Hank Nussbacher
http://www.nwfusion.com/research/2002/1216isptest.html -Hank

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Joe Wood
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Joe Abley wrote: > I think the idea was to say "well, from the mrtg graph, the difference > between this circuit with all my _9327_ traffic and this circuit > without any _9327_ traffic, at what I might reasonably estimate their > peak time to be, looks to be about 2 megs or

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread William B. Norton
At 09:16 PM 12/16/2002 -0500, K. Scott Bethke wrote: Impressive numbers but of course, slackers aside, if it was your connection and resources wouldnt you want more accurate information than just a guess? Yes, but I am also sympathetic to the challenges to ISPs in this economy, and the challen

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread alex
> > > based on ALL the ASN's of the people on the peering switch.. but in most > > > cases anyone pushing any real traffic will probably not have fine grained > > > samples enough to determine a peering relationship based on a single AS > > > with this method. Maybe Im wrong but hey if you are

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread alex
> On Monday 16 December 2002 07:37 pm, Joe Abley wrote: > > If you are interested in traffic *to* a particular destination, surely > > you could just tweak localpref on routes based on an as-path filter? > > And then quantify it how? Ie; useful Netflow-like "x Mbps to AS x, y Mbps to > AS y" sta

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread alex
> > based on ALL the ASN's of the people on the peering switch.. but in most > > cases anyone pushing any real traffic will probably not have fine grained > > samples enough to determine a peering relationship based on a single AS > > with this method. Maybe Im wrong but hey if you are taking 2

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread alex
> Hi all - > > Here is the problem: Everyone wants to know how much traffic would > ultimately be passed in peering relationships at an IX before signing > up/building into an IX. > > I heard an interesting solution recently to estimating the traffic volume > destined to an AS in the absence

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Joe Abley
On Monday, Dec 16, 2002, at 22:47 Canada/Eastern, Grant A. Kirkwood wrote: On Monday 16 December 2002 07:37 pm, Joe Abley wrote: If you are interested in traffic *to* a particular destination, surely you could just tweak localpref on routes based on an as-path filter? And then quantify it ho

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Grant A. Kirkwood
On Monday 16 December 2002 07:37 pm, Joe Abley wrote: > If you are interested in traffic *to* a particular destination, surely > you could just tweak localpref on routes based on an as-path filter? And then quantify it how? Ie; useful Netflow-like "x Mbps to AS x, y Mbps to AS y" statistics? --

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Joe Abley
On Monday, Dec 16, 2002, at 22:28 Canada/Eastern, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 09:16:55PM -0500, K. Scott Bethke wrote: based on ALL the ASN's of the people on the peering switch.. but in most cases anyone pushing any real traffic will probably not have fine grained

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 09:16:55PM -0500, K. Scott Bethke wrote: > > based on ALL the ASN's of the people on the peering switch.. but in most > cases anyone pushing any real traffic will probably not have fine grained > samples enough to determine a peering relationship based on a single AS > w

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
On Mon, Dec 16, 2002 at 05:46:10PM -0800, William B. Norton wrote: > > 1) You adjust routing to prefer one transit provider or the other for the AS > 2) Shift traffic to the particular AS from one transit provider to the > other, noting the change in the loads on the transit providers. Ouch. Am

Re: Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread K. Scott Bethke
Hi Bill, Impressive numbers but of course, slackers aside, if it was your connection and resources wouldnt you want more accurate information than just a guess? This may be effective for an IX decision if you created some sort of a map based on ALL the ASN's of the people on the peering switch..

Alternative to NetFlow for Measuring Traffic flows

2002-12-16 Thread William B. Norton
Hi all - Here is the problem: Everyone wants to know how much traffic would ultimately be passed in peering relationships at an IX before signing up/building into an IX. I heard an interesting solution recently to estimating the traffic volume destined to an AS in the absence of NetFlow or t

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es) Sniffer

2002-12-16 Thread alex
> > Even though you are asking this question with regard to what can > be done on the router itself, it's worth mentioning, if only for > the archives, a non-router approach to the problem...especially if > you are an enterprise network manager. It's even worth > mentioning despite the fact that

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Brennan_Murphy
I can send you screenshots of our tool if you are interested. -Original Message- From: Andre Chapuis [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 9:12 AM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es) Hi, How do you identify a DoS-attacked IP addr

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Feger, James wrote: > > AT&T also does the basics. ACL's, null routes, tracking back to ingress. as does sprint and C&W. MFN can sometimes help, depends on who you talk to as I recall, and Verio is quick to fix problems... L3 had some problems in the past, my last experien

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es) Sniffer

2002-12-16 Thread Brennan_Murphy
Even though you are asking this question with regard to what can be done on the router itself, it's worth mentioning, if only for the archives, a non-router approach to the problem...especially if you are an enterprise network manager. It's even worth mentioning despite the fact that I work for a

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Feger, James
AT&T also does the basics. ACL's, null routes, tracking back to ingress. -james On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, James-lists wrote: > > > I'm sure you can look in the archives of this list for > messages from me > > about this very thing... :) In short: "Every ISP should > have 24/7 security > > support

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Livio Ricciulli
At 09:17 PM 12/16/2002 +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote: On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Livio Ricciulli wrote: > FYI, we developed a system that sniffs FE,GE,DS3,OC3-48 POS and creates > a model using the cross-product of: > 1) source/destination address distributions > 2) packet rate > 3) protocol Bu

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread James-lists
> I'm sure you can look in the archives of this list for messages from me > about this very thing... :) In short: "Every ISP should have 24/7 security > support for customers under attack." That support should include, acls, > null routes, tracking the attack to the ingress. Rarely do rate-limits

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Valdis . Kletnieks
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002 21:17:07 GMT, "Christopher L. Morrow" said: > On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Livio Ricciulli wrote: >> FYI, we developed a system that sniffs FE,GE,DS3,OC3-48 POS and creates >> a model using the cross-product of: >> 1) source/destination address distributions >> 2) packet rate >> 3) prot

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, James-lists wrote: > > I am wondering how much help backbone providers give in > identifying sources of a DoS and deciding what ACL's or > rate-limits need to be placed to bring a DoS under control, I'm sure you can look in the archives of this list for messages from me abo

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread James-lists
I am wondering how much help backbone providers give in identifying sources of a DoS and deciding what ACL's or rate-limits need to be placed to bring a DoS under control, for their downstream clients. (Assuming it is their downstream clients that are being DoS'ed). I realize this will vary from p

[candidhosting.com #25891] AutoReply: RE: Identifying DoS-attackedIP address(es) (fwd)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
who signed up a ticketing system to nanog?? --Chris ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) -- Forwarded message -- Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2002 16:22:09 -0500 (EST) From: Candid Hosting Support <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [candidhosting.com #25891] AutoReply: RE: Identifying DoS

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Livio Ricciulli wrote: > FYI, we developed a system that sniffs FE,GE,DS3,OC3-48 POS and creates > a model using the cross-product of: > 1) source/destination address distributions > 2) packet rate > 3) protocol But I can't field deploy this 2 continents away at 4am with 10

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Neil J. McRae wrote: > > if something is being attacked it'll show in the 'statically limited' > > listing, trust me... this is how we do it all day, every day... > > Yes as have we, however you run out of memory/list entries > quickly and when that happens CEF gets disabled

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Livio Ricciulli
FYI, we developed a system that sniffs FE,GE,DS3,OC3-48 POS and creates a model using the cross-product of: 1) source/destination address distributions 2) packet rate 3) protocol This works very well to detect floods and does not require messing with routers.. Livio. -Original Message---

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Neil J. McRae
> if something is being attacked it'll show in the 'statically limited' > listing, trust me... this is how we do it all day, every day... Yes as have we, however you run out of memory/list entries quickly and when that happens CEF gets disabled and it get pretty ugly. This is more an issue for en

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Neil J. McRae wrote: > Sampled netflow, or look at the traceback stuff in later > IOS 12.0S versions. Avoid filter lists as the GSR engine cards > have a statically limited number of entries. > if something is being attacked it'll show in the 'statically limited' listing,

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Neil J. McRae
Sampled netflow, or look at the traceback stuff in later IOS 12.0S versions. Avoid filter lists as the GSR engine cards have a statically limited number of entries. Regards, Neil.

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Andre Chapuis wrote: > Chris, > I often see the input-interface load is 100%. > André Ok, check the link Barry sent, there is some good info there... Input from the customer is 100%? If this is the case the customer can tell you what is being attacked, no? :) Alternately,

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Andre Chapuis
Chris, I often see the input-interface load is 100%. André At 16:35 16.12.2002 +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote: >On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Andre Chapuis wrote: > >> >> Hi, >> How do you identify a DoS-attacked IP address(es) on your ingress border router, >assuming the latter is a Cisco 12000 ? I

Re: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Christopher L. Morrow
On Mon, 16 Dec 2002, Andre Chapuis wrote: > > Hi, > How do you identify a DoS-attacked IP address(es) on your ingress border router, >assuming the latter is a Cisco 12000 ? I used to use ip accounting but they removed >it from the S-code. What info do you have when you are trying to accomplis

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Barry Raveendran Greene
Check out the following: ftp://ftp-eng.cisco.com/cons/isp/security/ > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] On Behalf Of > Andre Chapuis > Sent: Monday, December 16, 2002 6:12 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(e

RE: Identifying DoS-attacked IP addresses)

2002-12-16 Thread Pena, Antonio
Hello Andre The best way we use to identify DOS attacks is measuring and monitoring the backbone circuits the packets/second in and out, normally most of the DOS attacks generated a lot of packets/second, in our case we created an alarm that sends an email and page each time any of our backbon

Identifying DoS-attacked IP address(es)

2002-12-16 Thread Andre Chapuis
Hi, How do you identify a DoS-attacked IP address(es) on your ingress border router, assuming the latter is a Cisco 12000 ? I used to use ip accounting but they removed it from the S-code. Thanks, André - Andre Chapuis IP+ Engineering Swisscom Ltd Genfergasse 14 3050 Bern +