Now that most of the Atlas missile sites have been sold, how about a 1400 acre salt
mine located 1200 feet under the city of Detroit?
http://www.detnews.com/history/salt/salt.htm
It's probably a bit easier to get high quality bandwidth to Detroit than Roswell, NM.
Also has the advantage of be
> On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
>
> In the US, American Tower is/was liquidating a number of cold war era
> ex-AT&T blast-proof sites. They are all in need of an upgrade, but the
> basics are there (underground, multiple layers of concrete, blast doors,
> etc. Even "blast toilets". I'
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Eric Kuhnke wrote:
> I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK
> which is being offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving
> praise about it. This facility is an ex-RAF centralized radar control
> site, buried dozens of feet underground
http://www.thebunker.net/
-Original Message-
From: Eric Kuhnke [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Wednesday, July 09, 2003 3:48 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Backbone Infrastructure and Secrecy
I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK which is being
o
I recall reading, last year, about a "Cyber Bunker" outside London UK which is being
offered as colo to major banks. The banks were raving praise about it. This facility
is an ex-RAF centralized radar control site, buried dozens of feet underground w/
thick concrete and designed to withstand
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_8-7-2003_pg7_4
Daily Times
July 9 2003
LAHORE: Internet services in Pakistan were suspended at 3.40 pm creating a
crisis-like situation in newspaper offices and business circles all over
the country.
The Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd.,
Thus spake "Brian Vincent (C)" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> What's interesting is the US approached a similar problem once
> before - redundancy and survivability in the event of a nuclear
> war. I imagine there's some lessons to be learned there. Granted,
> they were less concerned about folks running
Thus spake <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> In the USA in the past year I've travelled through half a dozen airports
> and the most intense searching scrutiny was when leaving the smallest
> ones, Eugene OR and Memphis TN.
I've been to an airport (MLU) where the TSA employees even outnumbered the
passengers
I can tell you that FREQUENTLY the maps dont match the reality of utility placement.
Especially w.r.t. fiber paths. VERY few cable maps that are availaible accurately
reflect splice points or interconnects between mutiple cables entering a vault.
Without access to the specific GPS points an
Marshall Eubanks wrote:
> I have not been able to get to any www.ietf.org site for the last hour
> or so, nor can I ping it (4.17.168.6) from mulitple network
> locations .
>
> Is this maintenance, a server problem or a DOS attack ?
[EMAIL PROTECTED]:~$ host www.ietf.org
www.ietf.org has addre
Backbone routes cannot be concealed. How could they be? Prior to any
plow ever hitting the ground or strand strung between poles there are
(sometimes very lengthy) environmental impact assessments, permits
issued, RFPs/RFQs and awards to have the work done, USGS surveys, ROW
franchises issued, and
Peter wrote:
>I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and
>rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another
>location in minutes. No amount of diversity could defend against a
concerted
>attack like that unless you start installing very special low-l
>Maybe you guys in the US
>are historically more paranoid, but London is just covered in single
points
>of major failure for telecoms.
I think London is rather more paranoid. I work in London and just on
Monday
I was stopped by police at Tower Hill tube station and searched for
explosive paraph
On Wed, Jul 09, 2003 at 05:30:27PM +0100, Peter Galbavy wrote:
>
> I hate to be a doom sayer, but any chump with a couple of tools and
> rudimentary knowledge can lift manholes, cut cables and jump to another
> location in minutes. ...
Perhaps it's time for IDS on manholes?
But really, since th
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it
> is harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack.
> If they have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an
> increased probability that something will go wrong (as o
On Wed, 9 Jul 2003, Jack Bates wrote:
:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
: > However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
: > harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they
: > have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increas
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: MD5
Hello Marshall,
Wednesday, July 9, 2003, 11:28:04 AM, you wrote:
ME> I have not been able to get to any www.ietf.org site for the last hour
ME> or so, nor can I ping it (4.17.168.6) from mulitple network locations .
ME> Is this maintenance, a serve
I have not been able to get to any www.ietf.org site for the last hour
or so, nor can I ping it (4.17.168.6) from mulitple network locations .
Is this maintenance, a server problem or a DOS attack ?
Regards
Marshall Eubanks
In a message written on Tue, Jul 08, 2003 at 11:29:23AM -0400, Adam Kujawski wrote:
> Who, besides Sean, has maps like this? The state PUC? If so, is that
> information available to the public? Do you have to go thorugh a background
> check and/or sign an NDA? Or is it only the providers themselv
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
harder for terrorists to find a single point of failure to attack. If they
have to coordinate an attack on 3 or 4 locations, there is an increased
probability that something will go wrong (as on 9/11
Daniel Karrenberg wrote:
If you tell us what limits you want removed we may work on that!
Sounds like below as if you are working on it.
We are definitely working towards making the results generally
available; see http://www.ripe.net/ripe/docs/ripe-271.html for details
of that proposal. So far
On Tue, 8 Jul 2003, Pete Kruckenberg wrote:
> So, instead, we will all continue to blindly buy "redundant"
> infrastructure that uses the same fiber bundles, because we
> don't have the information to make a more intelligent
> choice. Just makes it easier for a terrorist to do his job.
All the "o
>The situation is that we'd need to take a DS3 backhaul for DSL in
northern
>Jersey somewhere, and find a cheap way to cross the Hudson and have it
>land at Telehouse.
Free space optical, perhaps?
http://www.isp-planet.com/cplanet/business/piscitelloaug01.html
--Michael Dillon
>Are we going to throw a burlap sack over 60 Hudson, the Westin Building,
One Wilshire,
>or similar buildings and disavow knowledge of their existence? You can't
hide major infrastructure.
Yes.
However we can work to spread out the infrastructure more so that it is
harder for terrorists to
On 08.07 14:59, Jack Bates wrote:
> The RIPE-NNC tests are much more related to
> what I was refering to, although they are limited in many reguards.
If you tell us what limits you want removed we may work on that!
We are definitely working towards making the results generally
available; s
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