Hi,
In a lot of this dialogue, many say, you should prefix filter.
However, I'm not seeing how an ISP could easily adopt such filtering.
Let's consider the options:
[..]
a) only RIPE IRR uses a sensible security model [1], so if you use
others, basically anyone can add route
Now if only everyone here on NANOG were to do what Matsuzaki has done,
and take the time to educate those less clueless, the world would be a
better place.
Its time that people responsible for BGP routing need to show that they
have the skills and knowledge for it. Every ISP requesting an
Alex Pilosov wrote:
Oh yeah, d'oh! Thanks for correction. But that is also an important point
against PHAS and IRRPT filtering - they are powerless against truly
malicious hijacker (one that would register route in IRR, add the
right origin-as to AS-SET, and use correct origin).
With a
Stephane Bortzmeyer wrote:
On Tue, Feb 26, 2008 at 11:43:10AM +0100,
Arnd Vehling [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote
a message of 12 lines which said:
Every ISP requesting an ASN from one of the LIR's should be required
to make a test covering the neccessary skillsets.
Giving the rapid turnover
Randy Epstein wrote:
This isn't the answer. If it were, there would be no car accidents, pilot
error caused plane crashes, etc.
Probably the reason you dont need to have a pilot license...
Sorry, what?
You _need_ a license to drive a car, fly a plane etc. but until now you
dont need to
Leo Vegoda wrote:
On 26/02/2008 12:06, Arnd Vehling [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
[...]
With a decent LIR DB (like the RIPE DB) this is only possible if an
hijacker breaks the authentication of the according database objects
which is a pain in the a** _if_ the objects use a proper
Randy Epstein wrote:
My point was that even with a license, accidents still occur.
My point is that without a license more accidents will occur.
Vendors currently do train their customers and certify them.
A lot of companies dont send their personel to training lessons because
of the
