Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

2002-05-02 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

2002-05-02 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
wildly into the internet. The latter is usually used as a stopgap measure to limit the number of spoofed packets coming into your network via transits. The number you'd expect to filter is 50%, assuming the attacker in question is using an evenly distributing random() function. -- Richard

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

2002-05-01 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
a no export community with ones peers (being non transitive, it would still distribute the force of the attack). Many people do this already. If you're looking to purchase transit and you think this is something you'll care about, ask for it or vote with your wallet. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?

2002-05-01 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
can get anything from this is when you admit defeat on keeping your services responding to new connection but want to keep existing connections and/or the end servers from failing completely. Depending on the service in question this may or may not be a good goal. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL

Re: Selective DNS replies

2002-04-24 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
see it. If you have a network, you can just use the same IP for your dns servers in multiple locations, and let your IGP route it to the closest one. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE

Re: UUNET service

2002-04-15 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
somewhere. It's just not an easily scalable solution. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: genuity - any good?

2002-04-12 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
of your network. /rant -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

2002-04-09 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
lack of things for end users to do with that much bandwidth even if they got it. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

2002-04-09 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
particular flow, since you've eliminated the concept of one flow hogging the socket buffer and leave it to TCP to work out the sharing of the link. Second opinions? -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3

Re: [Q] BGP filtering policies

2002-04-09 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
of their networks. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

2002-04-09 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
and simplistic paging. But I think that's plausible.) You're missing the point, you don't allocate ANYTHING until you have a packet to fill that buffer, and then when you're done buffering it, it is free'd. The limits are just there to prevent you from running away with a socket buffer. -- Richard

Re: fixing TCP buffers (Re: packet reordering at exchange points)

2002-04-09 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
data. Once a socket proves its intentions (and periodically after that), it gets to use a BIG buffer, so we find out just how fast the connection can go. That doesn't prevent an intentional local DoS though. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID

Re: Load balancing in routers

2002-04-08 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
greatly when they no longer need a Patricia tree. To quote Avi Freedman, Customer Enragement Feature. To quote Majdi Abbas, John Chambers owes me a pony. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14

Re: NANOG on Trial

2002-04-08 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
said in #nanog I have over 50 cases of showing pornography to a minor.. 'nuf said... -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: packet reordering at exchange points

2002-04-08 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
distribution; it uses hashes. Sure, hashed distribution isn't perfect. But it's better than perfect distribution with added latency and/or retransmits out the wazoo. You don't even need varying paths to create a desynch, all you need is varying size packets. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED

Re: Qwest Transit

2002-04-08 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
? -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: MAE-Phoenix info request

2002-04-06 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
. The MAE in Phoenix was originally constructed by Dave Siegel and it ran from 1996 through 1998/9. Or companies like http://www.maedulles.net/ who aren't exchange points at all. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29

Re: Let's talk about Distance Sniffing/Remote Visibility

2002-03-28 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
of course. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Transatlantic response times.

2002-03-25 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
the people were when they laid your fiber. -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise (fwd)

2002-03-25 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
this problem (Vendor F comes to mind, but their SSH implementation also doesn't work with OpenSSH w/freebsd localisations, so something else is afoot there as well). -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14

Re: 1024-bit RSA keys in danger of compromise (fwd)

2002-03-25 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
. The pace has since slowed down a bit, but appears to be holding steady at doubling every 18 months (1995-present). Not to be too picky, but how is going from doubling every 2 years to doubling every 18 months slowing down? :) -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e

Re: long distance gigabit ethernet

2002-03-22 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
and beliefs about LAN vs WAN technology and all that nonsense... Short of that, Cogent offers a layer 3 transport service with gige on both ends as an option... :) -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8

Re: long distance gigabit ethernet

2002-03-22 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
a couple time there... -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.e-gerbil.net/ras PGP Key ID: 0x138EA177 (67 29 D7 BC E8 18 3E DA B2 46 B3 D8 14 36 FE B6)

Re: Satellite latency

2002-03-05 Thread Richard A Steenbergen
buffer or the file runs out, and then the kernel will spend the 5 minutes transfering it to the dialup user. Have that happen a few times, and you get an instant mbuf exaustion (or whatever internal mechanism your OS of choice uses) and kernel panic... -- Richard A Steenbergen [EMAIL PROTECTED

<    1   2   3   4   5