> >We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
> >as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
> >problems persist. Often the 'business' reason isn't the tin-foil-
> >hat-brigade's reason so much as 'we can't afford to keep these abuse
> >folks
- Original Message -
From: "Paul Vixie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
:
: now, though, there's an opportunity to do a marketing U-turn on this. cable
: and dsl providers in the USA can point to the national cybersecurity plan and
: say that to comply with it they have to put infected computers
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004, Doug White wrote:
>
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: "Paul Vixie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
> : remotely manage their host ("give me your root passwords, trust me!") for an
> : annual fee of $(0.75*N). if the initial value of N were $500, you might be
> : able to get
the 'customer' is most often NOT the 'miscreant', they are more often than
not your mother/sister/brother/innocent-user#35 penalizing them is a
touchy proposition.
Well... I suggested that there should be a one-incident free policy at the
beginning of this process. I'll stick to that. In that cas
> I don't think it should be limited to cable and dsl providers. I
> think this model is applicable across the board, and, I think it is a
> reasonable solution. ...
thanks for your kind words, but this only scales. for a home dsl/cable user
(or a home ppp user if there still are any), values
: now, though, there's an opportunity to do a marketing U-turn on this. cable
: and dsl providers in the USA can point to the national cybersecurity
plan and
: say that to comply with it they have to put infected computers in cyberjail,
: with a fee of $N to get these machines audited, and if fo
- Original Message -
From: "Paul Vixie" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> now, though, there's an opportunity to do a marketing U-turn on this.
cable
> and dsl providers in the USA can point to the national cybersecurity plan
and
> say that to comply with it they have to put infected computers in
c
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004 18:19:39 EDT, Geoincidents <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> said:
> Paul, why don't you make this offer to all your relatives? Don't want the
> job? NEITHER DO WE!! (hoping the relatives comment will invoke the memories
> of exactly what is required to do this)
Out of curiosity, does *any
The real challenge here is that the "default" Internet service is
wide-open Internet Protocol, w/o any safeties or controls. This
made a lot of sense when the Internet was a few hundred sites,
but is showing real scaling problems today (spam, major viruses,
etc.)
One could imagine changing the
> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rate.
>
> If a site wants wide-open acce
At 6:58 PM -0700 6/12/04, Randy Bush wrote:
> > One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
>> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
>> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
>> problems, but would dramatically cut down the inc
On Sat, 12 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rat
On Sat, 12 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
>
> The real challenge here is that the "default" Internet service is
> wide-open Internet Protocol, w/o any safeties or controls. This
> made a lot of sense when the Internet was a few hundred sites,
> but is showing real scaling problems today (spam, m
At 4:21 AM + 6/13/04, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
>
>We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
>as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
>problems persist. Often the 'business' reason isn't the
>tin-foil-hat-brigade's reason so much a
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
>
> At 4:21 AM + 6/13/04, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> >
> >We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
> >as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
> >problems persist. Often the 'business' rea
>>> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
>>> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
>>> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
>>> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rate.
>>>
>>> If a site wants wide-
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
> I'll argue that we have don't effective methods of dealing with this today,
> and it's not the lack of abuse desk people as much as the philosophy of
> closing barn doors after the fact. The idea that we can leave everything
> wide open for automated exp
On Sun, Jun 13, 2004 at 04:21:03AM +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
> as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
> problems persist. Often the 'business' reason isn't the
> tin-foil-hat-brigade
At 6:31 AM -0400 6/13/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
>If they were, you would expect to see a difference between barns with
>doors and barns without doors. But in practice, we see people with and
>without firewalls with infected computers.
If you're asserting that having firewalls in the path doesn't
At 6:31 AM -0400 6/13/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
>Network level controls aren't as effective as
>some people hope at stopping many things. ISPs should stop porn, ISPs
>should stop music sharing, ISPs should stop viruses, ISPs should
>stop . Yet somehow users manage to find a way around
>all of them
[EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Doug White") writes:
> If I read Paul's post correctly, then I would have to agree that the
> costs of cleaning up the problem customers should be placed on the
> customer (miscreant) as opposed to the rest of us.
and if you read the other post last night you'll see that this
I fully expect my ISP to turn me off if my site starts spewing abuse.
However,
until that happens, I expect my ISP to deliver any valid IP datagram
destined
for me, and, I expect to them to deliver any valid IP datagram I send out,
at least to the next AS in the path to the destination.
If they
Sean... Bigger and more important questions than "How do you make sure your
users only access safe content?" are:
1. Should you?
It is very hard for me to distinguish this from censorship
in my mind. No, I'm not saying malware doesn't violate
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