Sean... Bigger and more important questions than "How do you make sure your
users only access safe content?" are:
1. Should you?
It is very hard for me to distinguish this from censorship
in my mind. No, I'm not saying malware doesn't violate
I fully expect my ISP to turn me off if my site starts spewing abuse.
However,
until that happens, I expect my ISP to deliver any valid IP datagram
destined
for me, and, I expect to them to deliver any valid IP datagram I send out,
at least to the next AS in the path to the destination.
If they
At 6:31 AM -0400 6/13/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
>Network level controls aren't as effective as
>some people hope at stopping many things. ISPs should stop porn, ISPs
>should stop music sharing, ISPs should stop viruses, ISPs should
>stop . Yet somehow users manage to find a way around
>all of them
At 6:31 AM -0400 6/13/04, Sean Donelan wrote:
>If they were, you would expect to see a difference between barns with
>doors and barns without doors. But in practice, we see people with and
>without firewalls with infected computers.
If you're asserting that having firewalls in the path doesn't
On Sun, Jun 13, 2004 at 04:21:03AM +, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
> as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
> problems persist. Often the 'business' reason isn't the
> tin-foil-hat-brigade
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
> I'll argue that we have don't effective methods of dealing with this today,
> and it's not the lack of abuse desk people as much as the philosophy of
> closing barn doors after the fact. The idea that we can leave everything
> wide open for automated exp
>>> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
>>> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
>>> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
>>> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rate.
>>>
>>> If a site wants wide-
On Sun, 13 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
>
> At 4:21 AM + 6/13/04, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
> >
> >We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
> >as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
> >problems persist. Often the 'business' rea
At 4:21 AM + 6/13/04, Christopher L. Morrow wrote:
>
>We have methods of dealing with these abuse problems today, unfortanately
>as Paul Vixie often points out there are business reasons why these
>problems persist. Often the 'business' reason isn't the
>tin-foil-hat-brigade's reason so much a
On Sat, 12 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
>
> The real challenge here is that the "default" Internet service is
> wide-open Internet Protocol, w/o any safeties or controls. This
> made a lot of sense when the Internet was a few hundred sites,
> but is showing real scaling problems today (spam, m
On Sat, 12 Jun 2004, John Curran wrote:
> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rat
At 6:58 PM -0700 6/12/04, Randy Bush wrote:
> > One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
>> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
>> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
>> problems, but would dramatically cut down the inc
> One could imagine changing the paradigm (never easy) so that
> the normal Internet service was proxied for common applications
> and NAT'ed for everything else... This wouldn't eliminate all the
> problems, but would dramatically cut down the incident rate.
>
> If a site wants wide-open acce
The real challenge here is that the "default" Internet service is
wide-open Internet Protocol, w/o any safeties or controls. This
made a lot of sense when the Internet was a few hundred sites,
but is showing real scaling problems today (spam, major viruses,
etc.)
One could imagine changing the
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