I would say _supposed_ to be unique. Surely some cheapo manufacturer
has recycled addresses from their old ISA card days.
I've seen at least one manufacturer ship multiple cards with the same
MAC address. One shop in Tottenham Court Road, London sold several
people on the same LAN cards with
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
MAC addresses are not without authority delegation. The IEEE is the ultimate
authority in said case.
Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular ultimate
authority.
Even MACs aren't entirely unique. Some places used
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If the goal were unique identification, MAC addresses would do just fine.
No need for DNS.
MAC addresses are not without authority delegation. The IEEE is the ultimate
authority in said case.
Yep... But have you seen any controversy
Hello Whoever ,
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
MAC addresses are not without authority delegation. The IEEE is the ultimate
authority in said case.
Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 15:10:57 -0400 (EDT)
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
manufacturer assigned macs are guaranteed to be globally unique.
Theoretically. I didn't experience it personally, but I believe there
was at least one fairly well known event a few years back where a
manufacturer shipped cards
There was another manufacturer one of the really low budget cards, I
forget the brand but they were shipped in a box which looked like a
dunkin's munchkins box. If you bought several boxes of these, I think six
in a box and the entire package was $30 you were likely to find more than
2 or 3
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003, John Kristoff wrote:
Fortunately, this practice rarely occurs these days (token ring / SNA
shops often did this) although I'd be curious if anyone still does it.
box:~ # /sbin/lspci | grep 'Happy'
01:03.1 Ethernet controller: Sun Microsystems Computer Corp. Happy Meal
Mr. James W. Laferriere wrote:
Hello Whoever ,
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
manufacturer assigned macs are guaranteed to be globally unique.
A specific enterprise reconfiguring the mac is akin to an enterprise
using RFC1918
* sigh *
s/there/their/
s/mps/mbs/
s/:)/:}/
8-)
Richard Irving wrote:
Mr. James W. Laferriere wrote:
Hello Whoever ,
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
manufacturer assigned macs are guaranteed to be globally unique.
A specific
Dominic J. Eidson wrote:
On Thu, 18 Sep 2003, John Kristoff wrote:
Fortunately, this practice rarely occurs these days (token ring / SNA
shops often did this) although I'd be curious if anyone still does it.
box:~ # /sbin/lspci | grep 'Happy'
01:03.1 Ethernet controller: Sun
On Thursday, September 18, 2003, at 02:10 PM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
manufacturer assigned macs are guaranteed to be globally unique.
A specific enterprise reconfiguring the mac is akin to an enterprise
using RFC1918 space.
I would say _supposed_ to be unique. Surely some cheapo
On 17.09 00:50, Sean Donelan wrote:
On Tue, 16 Sep 2003, John Brown wrote:
not all the *root-servers* carry .arpa or in-addr.arpa
J (one of verisigns) does not carry this zone, based
on their own internal decision.
Actually, I thought that was one of Jon Postel's decisions when
If we take a step back, we could say that the whole Verisign incident
demonstrated pretty clearly that the fundamental DNS premise of having no
more than one root in the namespace is seriously wrong. This is the
fallacy of universal classification so convincingly trashed by
J.L.Borges in The
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To pull a stunt like that at the root, they'd have to get the OTHER 9
or 10 organizations to buy in, or they'd find themselves outvotes 13
servers to 2, or whatever the exact numbers are
- From a purely technical
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, Simon Waters wrote:
As such any root server operator can potentially hijack a significant
amount (majority?) of Internet traffic, at least if no one notices
something odd, and figures out what is going on too quickly. This is DNS
security 101...
A single rogue root
Speaking on Deep Background, the Press Secretary whispered:
Yes, I understand that. But based on their recent actions I dont feel
anyone should trust Verisign to act towards any of the Internet community's
best interests let alone 1/13th of its core functionality. I think there
is a
--On Wednesday, September 17, 2003 02:50:51 AM -0700 Vadim Antonov
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If we take a step back, we could say that the whole Verisign incident
demonstrated pretty clearly that the fundamental DNS premise of having no
more than one root in the namespace is seriously wrong.
On Wed, Sep 17, 2003 at 02:50:51AM -0700, Vadim Antonov quacked:
In fact, we do have an enormously useful and popular way of doing exactly
that - this is called search engines and bookmarks. What is needed is
an infrastructure for allocation of unique semantic-free end point
identifiers
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, [ISO-8859-1] Mathias Krber wrote:
If we take a step back, we could say that the whole Verisign incident
demonstrated pretty clearly that the fundamental DNS premise of having no
more than one root in the namespace is seriously wrong. This is the
fallacy of
I see what it says is pretty much similar to what I was writing on the
matter of DNS some years ago :) Should be on record somewhere in NANOG
archives.
I do not claim that I'm the author of this idea, though. Unfortunately, I
cannot remember how I acquired it :(
Thank you for the pointer!
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, [ISO-8859-1] Mathias Körber wrote:
If we take a step back, we could say that the whole Verisign incident
demonstrated pretty clearly that the fundamental DNS premise of having no
more than one root in the namespace is seriously wrong. This is the
fallacy of
Date: Wed, 17 Sep 2003 18:39:27 -0400 (EDT)
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular
ultimate authority.
Or cooperation between multiple authorities. Of course, how
realistic is that?
Eddy
--
Brotsman Dreger, Inc. - EverQuick Internet
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If the goal were unique identification, MAC addresses would do just fine.
No need for DNS.
MAC addresses are not without authority delegation. The IEEE is the ultimate
authority in said case.
Yep... But have you seen any controversy about
Any solution which requires uniqueness also requires a singular ultimate
authority.
Not really. You can just take random numbers. If you have enough bits
(and a good RNG) the probability of collision would be less than
probability of an asteroid wiping the life on Earth in the next
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, David Schwartz wrote:
In fact, you could just use an RSA public key as the identifier directly.
This is likely not the best algorithm, but it's certainly an existence proof
that such algorithms can be devised without difficulty.
In fact, I'm going to call
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, Justin Shore wrote:
Even MACs aren't entirely unique. Some places used to assign MAC
addresses like they assigned IP addresses and the NIC had to be
reconfigured for the assigned MAC. An admin was freely able to assign a
MAC to Joe Blow using a 3Com or Cisco OUI
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003, David Schwartz wrote:
That doesn't help in this case. You need a way to verify ownership of an
identifier. I don't want anyone else to be able to claim my identifier.
Perhaps we can devise a scheme where I generate a random number and morph
it into a
On Tue, Sep 16, 2003 at 04:07:21PM -0600, John Neiberger wrote:
http://apnews.excite.com/article/20030916/D7TJOF3G0.html
--
my favorite:
VeriSign spokesman Brian O'Shaughnessy said Tuesday that individual
service providers were free to configure their systems so customers
would
The next version of the root-servers.net hints file should not have any
netSOL owned root servers in it. That will make the transition easier.
--
William Allen Simpson
Key fingerprint = 17 40 5E 67 15 6F 31 26 DD 0D B9 9B 6A 15 2C 32
The next version of the root-servers.net hints file should not have any
netSOL owned root servers in it. That will make the transition easier.
excuse me for the harsh language, but that's just silly. verisign's root
name servers (a-root and j-root) are professionally run by some of the best
At 12:20 AM 17/09/2003, Paul Vixie wrote:
The next version of the root-servers.net hints file should not have any
netSOL owned root servers in it. That will make the transition easier.
excuse me for the harsh language, but that's just silly. verisign's root
name servers (a-root and j-root)
On Wed, Sep 17, 2003 at 04:20:29AM +, Paul Vixie wrote:
dns techs in the industry. nothing that's happening with dot-com or dot-net
agreed.
should be considered relevant to verisign's *root* servers in any way. the
*root* servers do not carry dot-com or dot-net, they just carry .
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 00:38:14 EDT, Mike Tancsa [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
I trust your assessment of the DNS techs. But what about the DNS tech's
bosses? They ordered some pretty lumpy things be done with .com and .net.
Given that track record, whats to stop them from ordering the GTLD techs
At 12:46 AM 17/09/2003, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Wed, 17 Sep 2003 00:38:14 EDT, Mike Tancsa [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:
I trust your assessment of the DNS techs. But what about the DNS tech's
bosses? They ordered some pretty lumpy things be done with .com and .net.
Given that track record,
On Tue, 16 Sep 2003, John Brown wrote:
not all the *root-servers* carry .arpa or in-addr.arpa
J (one of verisigns) does not carry this zone, based
on their own internal decision.
Actually, I thought that was one of Jon Postel's decisions when
they were experimenting with creating
I trust your assessment of the DNS techs. But what about [their] bosses?
the ones i've met in recent years seemed like reasonable people.
They ordered some pretty lumpy things be done with .com and .net.
Given that track record, whats to stop them from ordering [the techs]
from doing
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