Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>
> So we have bumped from 1 to 2 with just a simple addition in the past.
> But maybe that was from before we knew better?
>
probably.
> At any rate, since the only thing that we're doing is emitting
> message.crypto, i think we can avoid bumping the version in this
On Fri 2018-06-15 20:47:59 -0300, David Bremner wrote:
> Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
>
>> +
>> +const _notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto =
>> mime_node_get_message_crypto_status (node);
>> +if (msg_crypto->sig_list ||
>> +msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPT
Daniel Kahn Gillmor writes:
> +
> + const _notmuch_message_crypto_t *msg_crypto =
> mime_node_get_message_crypto_status (node);
> + if (msg_crypto->sig_list ||
> + msg_crypto->decryption_status != NOTMUCH_MESSAGE_DECRYPTED_NONE) {
> + sp->map_key (sp, "crypto");
I believ
This allows MUAs that don't want to think about per-mime-part
cryptographic status to have a simple high-level overview of the
message's cryptographic state.
Sensibly structured encrypted and/or signed messages will work fine
with this. The only requirement for the simplest encryption + signing
i
