[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-27 Thread Eve Maler
Other than injecting identification into OAuth explicitly, *and* then using a uniform identification system on both the consumer and service provider side (e.g. OpenID), strong equivalence -- test(B==C) -- is impossible. And if identification in any one case is associated with a

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-27 Thread Peter Keane
On Mon, Apr 27, 2009 at 9:42 AM, Eve Maler eve.ma...@sun.com wrote: Other than injecting identification into OAuth explicitly, *and* then using a uniform identification system on both the consumer and service provider side (e.g. OpenID), strong equivalence -- test(B==C) -- is impossible.  

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-27 Thread Eve Maler
Peter, thanks for putting the PIN idea in context for me. This is perhaps a dumb question, but since testing equivalence of the *user* (a bag of protoplasm) is sort of a last-mile problem anyway, and since -- if I'm understanding the long Security Advisory discussion thread correctly --

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-27 Thread Peter Keane
On Mon, Apr 27, 2009 at 10:50 AM, Eve Maler eve.ma...@sun.com wrote: Peter, thanks for putting the PIN idea in context for me.  This is perhaps a dumb question, but since testing equivalence of the *user* (a bag of protoplasm) is sort of a last-mile problem anyway, and since -- if I'm

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-27 Thread Rob Richards
Peter Keane wrote: On Mon, Apr 27, 2009 at 10:50 AM, Eve Maler eve.ma...@sun.com wrote: Peter, thanks for putting the PIN idea in context for me. This is perhaps a dumb question, but since testing equivalence of the *user* (a bag of protoplasm) is sort of a last-mile problem anyway, and

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-26 Thread John Kemp
On Apr 26, 2009, at 12:32 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote: I agree that 2. test(B==C) , i.e., verify that the user at B is the same user at C is not the same as 2b. min Prob(B!=C). The former is clearly more desirable. +1 If someone logs in to the both sites using something like OpenID, then

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-26 Thread Nat
=...@san Francisco via iPhone On 2009/04/26, at 5:38, John Kemp j...@jkemp.net wrote: On Apr 26, 2009, at 12:32 AM, Nat Sakimura wrote: I agree that 2. test(B==C) , i.e., verify that the user at B is the same user at C is not the same as 2b. min Prob(B!=C). The former is clearly more

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-25 Thread pkeane
Sorry: Almost all of the proposed solution attempt to minimize the possibility that user at B is NOT the same as user at C. is what it should say... On Apr 25, 10:19 pm, pkeane pjke...@gmail.com wrote: Here is an attempt to help spell out the OAuth security in simple terms and thus provide a

[oauth] Re: a simple view of the OAuth security issue

2009-04-25 Thread Nat Sakimura
I agree that 2. test(B==C) , i.e., verify that the user at B is the same user at C is not the same as 2b. min Prob(B!=C). The former is clearly more desirable. If someone logs in to the both sites using something like OpenID, then it is trivially achieved without much user interaction impact,