[opensc-devel] Review of HSM:s

2011-01-17 Thread Rickard Bellgrim
Hi We have written a review of four different HSM:s (AEP, Safenet, Thales, and Utimaco) with focus on creating signatures for DNSSEC with the PKCS#11 interface. Other topics was also addressed like the security model, administration, and backup/HA-mode. It is typically TLD:s that uses HSM:s

Re: [opensc-devel] Review of HSM:s

2011-01-17 Thread Martin Paljak
Hello. On Jan 17, 2011, at 11:41 AM, Rickard Bellgrim wrote: We have written a review of four different HSM:s (AEP, Safenet, Thales, and Utimaco) with focus on creating signatures for DNSSEC with the PKCS#11 interface. Other topics was also addressed like the security model,

Re: [opensc-devel] Review of HSM:s

2011-01-17 Thread Rickard Bellgrim
On 17 jan 2011, at 12.56, Martin Paljak wrote: Most smart cards, especially smart cards personalized by OpenSC, don't have very fancy and varying managing capabilities, comparable to HSM-s. Yes, so you probably have to create another set of review points in this case. Yet an overall review

Re: [opensc-devel] Review of HSM:s

2011-01-17 Thread Ludovic Rousseau
2011/1/17 Rickard Bellgrim rickard.bellg...@iis.se: On 17 jan 2011, at 12.56, Martin Paljak wrote: From the report: For the test of the PKCS#11 interface (review point A.2) we used a specially developed test tool called pkcs11-testing. If desired, please contact the authors to obtain the

Re: [opensc-devel] Review of HSM:s

2011-01-17 Thread Tomas Gustavsson
A very nice report. I agree with your findings about diversity of authorization models :-) for smart cards or usb tokens there of course don't exist any enforced security models or backup models etc. One could discuss how it would be possible to implement such models (using routines etc) in a