Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-27 Thread Steve Marquess
aerow...@gmail.com wrote: ... I think that this discussion is good, because it will (hopefully) lead to a tool -- perhaps a script -- that can perform all of the tests that we can identify on an executable to determine if it's been statically linked with a correct fipscanister. With all due

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-26 Thread Steve Marquess
Jeffrey Walton wrote: > On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 3:35 PM, wrote: >> Export the environment variable OPENSSL_FIPS=1, and then try >> openssl md5? >> > I am aware of two companies which are (were?) claiming a FIPS > validated module via OpenSSL sources, but not building the canister. > For completen

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-26 Thread Steve Marquess
Zamora, Robert wrote: > Is there a way to determine if OpenSSL binaries were compiled with the FIPS > "certified" module v1.2.x ? Compiling OpenSSL FIPS test module gives me the > same results using fips_test_suite. > In a word, no, because some of the requirements for creation of the valida

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 7:35 PM, wrote: > Jeff, > > The fipscanister's integrity test must be called before main(), and that's > why fipsld does what it does.  The process to load it and verify it is given > (in source form) in the fips-1.2.0 package, and those bits can be located as > well as th

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread aerowolf
Jeff, The fipscanister's integrity test must be called before main(), and that's why fipsld does what it does. The process to load it and verify it is given (in source form) in the fips-1.2.0 package, and those bits can be located as well as the compiled bits of the canister itself. I think

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 5:56 PM, wrote: > OPENSSL_FIPS=1 causes openssl to invoke FIPS_mode_set(1).  Once that occurs, > MD5 is a prohibited algorithm unless it's explicitly limited to the TLSv1 > PRF (and that only because SHA is also used).  If an MD5 operation completes > successfully, it's no

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread aerowolf
OPENSSL_FIPS=1 causes openssl to invoke FIPS_mode_set(1). Once that occurs, MD5 is a prohibited algorithm unless it's explicitly limited to the TLSv1 PRF (and that only because SHA is also used). If an MD5 operation completes successfully, it's not a FIPS canister that's running the cryptogra

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Thu, Dec 23, 2010 at 3:35 PM, wrote: > Export the environment variable OPENSSL_FIPS=1, and then try openssl md5? > I am aware of two companies which are (were?) claiming a FIPS validated module via OpenSSL sources, but not building the canister. For completeness, the companies may have fixed t

Re: FIPS module determination

2010-12-23 Thread aerowolf
Export the environment variable OPENSSL_FIPS=1, and then try openssl md5? -Kyle H On Tue, Dec 21, 2010 at 1:04 PM, Zamora, Robert wrote: Is there a way to determine if OpenSSL binaries were compiled with the FIPS "certified" module v1.2.x ?  Compiling OpenSSL FIPS test module gives me the s

FIPS module determination

2010-12-22 Thread Zamora, Robert
Is there a way to determine if OpenSSL binaries were compiled with the FIPS "certified" module v1.2.x ? Compiling OpenSSL FIPS test module gives me the same results using fips_test_suite. Thanks, Robert Zamora __ OpenSSL Projec