Hi,
In case you're wondering what this is about: If you see high CPU usage
on one core on your high bandwidth server (>200 Mbit/s, lots of
connections), it is very likely that only one of your CPU is handling
network interrupts.
Let me add a few things I've learned from fighting with this problem
On Sat, 2010-10-16 at 03:54 -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> Thus spake Eugen Leitl (eu...@leitl.org):
>
> > On Fri, Oct 15, 2010 at 02:44:59PM -0700, Mike Perry wrote:
> > > Thus spake Eugen Leitl (eu...@leitl.org):
> > >
> > > > https://www.privacy-cd.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
On Mon, Oct 18, 2010 at 09:43:38PM +0200, Benedikt Westermann wrote:
> On Mon, 2010-10-18 at 14:49 -0400, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> > On Mon, Oct 18, 2010 at 2:37 PM, wrote:
> > > Maybe this subject has already been discussed here.
> > >
> > > Given, an attacker succeeds to break into a large num
Another links regarding earlier posts on this topic:
http://www.ntop.org/blog/?p=1
http://www.alexonlinux.com/smp-affinity-and-proper-interrupt-handling-in-linux
http://www.alexonlinux.com/why-interrupt-affinity-with-multiple-cores-is-not-such-a-good-thing
*
On Mon, 2010-10-18 at 14:49 -0400, Gregory Maxwell wrote:
> On Mon, Oct 18, 2010 at 2:37 PM, wrote:
> > Maybe this subject has already been discussed here.
> >
> > Given, an attacker succeeds to break into a large number of tornodes and
> > gets a copy of the secret keys from all those nodes. T
The net already changes session keys.
If referring to the base key... no.
Because a compromised computer must be presumed broken until fixed.
Rotating keys would just churn the fingerprints, directories, etc... all while
the attacker continues to happily read whatever the Tor daemon is doing.
Pract
On Mon, Oct 18, 2010 at 2:37 PM, wrote:
> Maybe this subject has already been discussed here.
>
> Given, an attacker succeeds to break into a large number of tornodes and gets
> a copy of the secret keys from all those nodes. This would increase the
> chance to decrypt parts of the traffic that
Maybe this subject has already been discussed here.
Given, an attacker succeeds to break into a large number of tornodes and gets a
copy of the secret keys from all those nodes. This would increase the chance to
decrypt parts of the traffic that goes through the tor network. Am I right?
So woul
On 10/18/2010 9:34 AM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
BTW, I don't see (or remember) the 'keys' folder or 'fingerprint'
file - don't remember seeing them in past.
My bad. These files only show up when one is running a bridge/relay/exit
node. The majority of my work with Tor is setting up and running exi
wondering if reinstalling with the alpha version would have yielded
the same results.
Well may have. Only reason didn't do that is time limitations. Outcome
wouldn't have been sure fix - but always a good practice. GOOD advice
for others when encounter probs.
I knew the stable ver was wo
On 10/18/2010 9:23 AM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
Thanks Justin,
Good info for the future. Right now, really busy (job search) so went
back to stable ver of Vidalia bundle - for now.
Fair enough. Better one more working node on the network than a broken
one you don't have time to play with.
You
BTW, I don't see (or remember) the 'keys' folder or 'fingerprint' file
- don't remember seeing them in past.
Re: Vista permission. It's not that the alpha ver didn't run - quite a
while in fact - before crash. Seems if was a permissions issue,
would've seen probs right off when started usin
Thanks Justin,
Good info for the future. Right now, really busy (job search) so went
back to stable ver of Vidalia bundle - for now. Your suggestions may
well have solved probs w/ current alpha ver, but from my exper w/
vidalia / tor for couple yrs, this was a new development crashing
(mult
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