--- On Wed, 11/10/10, hi...@safe-mail.net hi...@safe-mail.net wrote:
Like this: Linux Web Server - Linux Tor Gateway -
DSL Router -
No wireless equipment, just LAN cables between them.
I have a question related to the tor client
and hidden service protocol designs which
may be relevant? Can a
--- On Wed, 11/10/10, Robert Ransom rransom.8...@gmail.com wrote:
Martin Fick mogul...@yahoo.com
wrote:
I have a question related to the tor client
and hidden service protocol designs which
may be relevant? Can a tor client/hidden
service sitting behind a NATting router
query its
--- On Tue, 8/3/10, John Case c...@sdf.lonestar.org wrote:
So ... if I've got a 5 or 10 mbps exit node with a healthy
list of connections, can I use lynx locally to browse
anonymously ?
I suspect that latencies would strongly differentiate your
traffic from regular tor exit node traffic.
--- On Wed, 5/19/10, Stephen Carpenter thec...@gmail.com wrote:
Certainly there is a certain amount of sense to the idea
that tortunnel traffic may use another system that focuses more
on speed if tortunnel was unavailable. However, an assumption is an
assumption and I am not sure how much I
--- On Thu, 5/13/10, W waterwai...@gmx.com wrote:
I'm not necessarily suggesting nagware
pop-ups, but I am talking about something like, perhaps, a
splash screen with a reminder -- and a button -- upon
launch.
I would think that the slowness of the network would be
reminder enough, no?
--- On Wed, 5/12/10, Anders Andersson pipat...@gmail.com wrote:
A thought: Currently there is a Donate! section on
torproject.org,
that doesn't mention what the money is used for or how much
money that
comes in. I think a lot more people would donate if they
could see
that the money went
--- On Wed, 2/17/10, downie - downgeo...@hotmail.com wrote:
One of the reasons is to prevent malicious users from
including file:// urls in an external webpage. With file://
urls, a webpage could be designed to test for the existence
of local files on your computer.
How? Same origin
I think that unless you have a good way of telling specific people in the need
of a bridge about your bridge without telling the world, that you should not
consider being a bridge,
-Martin
--- On Mon, 10/19/09, Flamsmark flamsm...@gmail.com wrote:
From: Flamsmark flamsm...@gmail.com
--- On Mon, 10/19/09, Flamsmark flamsm...@gmail.com wrote:
I think that unless you have a good way of telling specific
people in the need of a bridge about your bridge without
telling the world, that you should not consider being a
bridge,
Is that a gut feeling, or based on some
--- On Thu, 10/1/09, Brian Mearns bmea...@ieee.org wrote:
My understanding is that Tor user's are responsible (via their client)
for creating their own circuit, and that this is typically
done at random. However, are there any safeguards in place to
ensure that it is random, and would this be
--- On Fri, 9/25/09, John Case c...@sdf.lonestar.org wrote:
First, am I to understand that this list is referring
specifically to ISPs that allow exit nodes ?
Presumably a relay node is not deteted and your ISP does not
care ...
Entry, middle, and exit nodes all (currently) need to listen
--- On Wed, 9/9/09, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
I figure it's an arms race between those seeking control
and those
valuing freedom. The sooner strong dark [or maybe even
bright] nets
can reach 'impossible to take down' status... whether by
outright
technical strength, or by
--- On Wed, 9/9/09, Eugen Leitl eu...@leitl.org wrote:
http://calumog.wordpress.com/2009/03/18/why-you-need-balls-of-steel-to-operate-a-tor-exit-node/
Perhaps this should be reason enough TO run a tor node? Not for Burma/Iran...
but for those of us in the first world who are threatened by
--- On Mon, 8/10/09, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Next, the conversation took a turn
I was told that having *any* ports open facing the
Internet was a violation of Comcast's Acceptable Use
Policy (AUP) for residential accounts.
Seems like another good argument in favor of
--- On Mon, 8/10/09, Ted Smith ted...@gmail.com wrote:
Martin Fick wrote:
If they couldn't do this, to stay competitive, they
would charge more money for everyone and you would
suffer more. Cheap internet access and serving is
not some inherent human right, so let's not complain
--- On Mon, 8/10/09, Martin Fick mogul...@yahoo.com wrote:
--- On Mon, 8/10/09, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
Next, the conversation took a turn
I was told that having *any* ports open facing the
Internet was a violation of Comcast's Acceptable Use
Policy (AUP
I thought that I would mention the very new Uzbl browser
here since it might be a very good candidate for a simple
anonymous browsing tool. I thought that due to the
simplicity of the design, it might be a lot simpler and
more reliable to create an anonymous profile with this
browser than
--- On Thu, 7/2/09, Arjan n6bc23cpc...@list.nospam.xutrox.com wrote:
He may end up on a government watch list, because they know that all
TOR users are potential child pornographers / terrorists.
Give me a break, so are all internet users, so are all people
of the world. This kind of silly
Obfuscated URL Paths?
Would it be possible to create a URL or some longer string that
describes a hidden path through the tor network to a specific
hidden URL and to implement a routing mechanism to access
documents (files) using this Obfuscated URL?
I am fully aware of hidden services, and
--- On Tue, 6/30/09, Freemor free...@gmail.com wrote:
I envision an onion encrypted URL along with the exact
path through tor (the three hops) also onion encrypted. This
would be similar to the way a client normally wraps requests through
tor, but the wrapping would happen up front and
--- On Mon, 6/22/09, Denis Dimick dgdim...@gmail.com wrote:
If I understand this correctly, as
long as ICANN is owned by the US, they have the
ability to shutdown anyone they don't like.
While this is certainly a threat, it is not as all emcompassing
as it sounds. ICANN may control the
--- On Mon, 6/22/09, Martin Fick mogul...@yahoo.com wrote:
If I understand this correctly, as
long as ICANN is owned by the US, they have the
ability to shutdown anyone they don't like.
[lost's of talk about ICANN problems being surmountable]
...
But, just for grinns, how would ICANN go
--- On Sun, 6/21/09, Chris Humphry humphry.ch...@yahoo.com wrote:
My only 'issue' is human rights and to me politics
plays no roll in that.
Well, unfortunately that just isn't the case. Many
people have different (political) opinions on just
what exactly human rights means. It is not so
--- On Wed, 6/3/09, Scott Bennett benn...@cs.niu.edu wrote:
That's very good to know.
FreeBSD 7.0 came out about a year and a half
ago. I'm just guessing, but would LINUX 2.5 have been
about six months to a year before that?
You're funny! :) Linux 2.6, was released 12/17/03. Not
As the subject says, what I am proposing is likely to be completely naive and
full of bad assumptions and errors, but here it goes anyway. ;) Perhaps my
suggestion will spawn other smarter more creative thinkers than me.
I can't help but wonder (especially after reading the recently published
--- On Wed, 2/18/09, slush sl...@slush.cz wrote:
...rate limiting ... prioritization...
I think it is very similar view to the same problem and it
depends on ease of possible implementation.
I don't quite agree, they really are two very different
solutions to address two different problems.
--- On Wed, 2/18/09, slush sl...@slush.cz wrote:
Yes, but exit nodes already no where your traffic is
going (and on which port), middle and entrance nodes do not.
You probably mean exit nodes already know?
Yes, wow my English was pretty poor in that post, sorry. ;)
...
If they did, it
To be fair, though, 1, 3, and 4 could be configured away in
default FireFox. Updates can be disabled, flash can be removed,
files can be set to ask, referrals can be disabled, and UA can
be modified in firefox or in Privoxy.
Privoxy will not protect ssl connections.
I recall a discussion from last spring about the possibility of adding support
for exit nodes behind firewalls. If I recall correctly, the general idea was
to add these nodes as a fourth hop in the tor network. This allowed these
nodes to connect to pseudo exit nodes which would be the third
--- On Sun, 6/22/08, Bernhard Fischer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
OnionCat creates a transparent IPv6 layer on top of
TOR's hidden services. It transmits any kind of
IP-based data transparently through the TOR network
on a location hidden basis. You can think of it as
a point-to-multipoint
--- Alexander Bernauer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The purpose of client-exit nodes is to give
anonymity to the pseudo-exit nodes.
...
Concerning exit policies we think that propagating
any client-exit information weakens the anonymity of
the pseudo-exit node because it makes the client- to
--- Andrew [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Roger Dingledine schrieb:
adding much additional anonymity. (Or is it?)
I believe this to be the most interesting
question... since the user
does not know his connection will be relayed via a
client-exit, there
will only be encryption up until the
--- Andrew [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Martin Fick schrieb:
Tor is not an encryption technology. The only
reason for encrypting the other hops is for
anonymity so that each hop only knows about its
immediate peers. The question is whether an
unencrypted last leg affects anonymity
--- coderman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
with a rogue exit node you also need to be aware of
intentional injection of http://. since google does
not bind authenticated session cookies to ssl only
(secure only flag) you need to mitigate this
yourself.
otherwise, a single http://...google.com/
--- Ringo Kamens [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Using konqueror with tor can be dangerous. Since
it's not just a browser (also a desktop system), it
handles lots of different types of files such as
videos etc.
This does not sound like a very fair assessment of
konqueror, in fact I would almost
--- Dominik Schaefer [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
first moment... Probably it is a really good idea to
log the assigned IPs,
just to have some own records (even if it is no
proof). (But then again, IPs
logged by some server is also no proof in itself,
e.g. you can just put fake
IPs or times
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I'm currently working on the new project of
tightly secured collabo-
rative/wiki environment software with some neat
features, e.g. GnuPG
server-side integration for users' signatures
verification and display
on page revisions, comments and so on. Another
--- anonym [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On 02/01/08 09:16, anon ymous wrote:
But I'm more interested in smtp on the open
Internet currently as I don't want to push too many
new concepts on the people I try to help,
_and_ I need a solution fast (+ I don't have any
resources for putting up the
Anyone interested in designing a Snail Mail Onion
Routing protocol to be used to build a strong real
world (non-computer) anonymous package receiving
network? :)
Yes, this is probably crazy, but I think that it can
be done. I have started a project to design the
protocols that could be used to
--- Vlad \SATtva\ Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Martin Fick wrote on 18.12.2007 01:05:
--- Vlad \SATtva\ Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
What if on sudden he becomes aware of one of the
recipient key's compromise? Now
sender needs to decrypt the whole site and
re-encrypt it to another
--- Michael Holstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
I have what may perhaps seem like a strange
question. Is there any commonly used software for
encrypting and decrypting web pages?
Let me explain that a little better:
imagine a web
site which has content destined for specific
--- Jonathan D. Proulx [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Dec 15, 2007 at 11:12:46PM +0600, Vlad
SATtva Miller wrote:
...
What about just HTTPS with user certificates? you
get both proof of identity and a means of
encrypting data to that identity, yes?
Is there a mechanism to use HTTPS to
--- Michael Holstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Despite my bias, an embedded java app
would not work since it would be
controlled (provided) by the hostile
server right?
You could sign the applet with a key
provided to your clients, since you're
using a distribution model where
It is now clear to me that I have been
unclear about the requirements. Let
me try to be more explicit.
1) I am looking for a point2point,
sender 2 receiver, secure encrypted
web page mechanism.
2) Senders are untrusted to recipients.
3) Web server is untrusted to recipients.
4) Senders
--- Michael Holstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
Is there a mechanism to use HTTPS to
preencrypt web pages so that they
are encrypted on the server (and so the
server does not have the keys to decrypt
them!)
Not using HTTPS per-se, but you can use SSL to
encrypt files.
Agreed.
--- Vlad \SATtva\ Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Have you looked at FireGPG Firefox extension?
http://firegpg.tuxfamily.org/
--- Alexander W. Janssen
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Why not simply use the Firegpg-extension for
Firefox?
I had not seen this, thank you, this would
certainly be a
--- Jonathan D. Proulx [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Mon, Dec 17, 2007 at 09:25:13AM -0800, Martin
Fick wrote:
: It's an interesting threat model though :)
:
:Yes, but it really is a fairly simple one.
:I am surprised that HTML does not seem
:to have some extension to deal
--- Martin Fick [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
--- Michael Holstein [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wrote:
My thought on Java was to be able to
automate the key scheme within the
browser, versus requiring them download
a .gz.gpg file and decrypt it on their
own. A (sort-of) working example
Hi,
I have what may perhaps seem like a strange question.
Is there any commonly used software for encrypting and
decrypting web pages?
Let me explain that a little better: imagine a web
site which has content destined for specific
individuals. For each individual there is separate
content
Hi,
After reading the docs I am very confused about how
tor/privoxy deals with https(SSL) connections. It
sounds like if I use SSL that I will be basically
bypassing privoxy and therefor could leak personal
info? So what is the alternative if I want to access
a web site that requires https for
--- Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sat, Dec 01, 2007 at 07:42:34PM -0800, Martin
Fick wrote:
So, why even bother suggesting privoxy use at all
if it can easily be bypassed? Is this not just
giving people a false sense of security?
Privoxy doesn't do that much to protect
On Wed, Nov 07, 2007 at 08:20:37AM -0800, Martin
Fick wrote:
My home router offers an http administration
console on port 80 which for obvious security
reasons is normally only accessible from the
internal facing side of the router. While
many of these home routers typically have
--- Kyle Williams [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Nov 8, 2007 8:53 AM, Martin Fick
On Wed, Nov 07, 2007 at 08:20:37AM -0800, Martin
Fick wrote:
My home router offers an http administration
console on port 80 which for obvious security
reasons is normally only accessible from
Hi,
I have a concern that running a tor may in some cases
provide a security breach allowing unexpected access
to the inside of certain networks that are behind
firewalls. In particular, I am concerned with what I
assume is a fairly common design for home routers.
This scenario may well
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