On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com
mailto:bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
(He came to regard philosophy as consisting of so-called logical analysis
(intellectual autobiography, 1904, Ketner editor), and to regarding such
logical analysis as really being phaneroscopic
Maybe there is a mental Higgs Boson that no one can quite describe.
*@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose*
On Tue, Sep 16, 2014 at 2:27 AM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote:
On Sep 15, 2014, at 9:23 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
(He came to regard philosophy as
Thread:
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14086
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14122
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14123
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14124
Gary All,
The
Jon, lists,
Jon initially wrote: That last sentence was about sign relations. The
first part was about [. . .] teridentity. Two different subjects.
The reason I pointed to the Pape article is that the trust of its
argumentation is that these are *not* two different subjects, or, rather,
that
Thread:
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14086
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14122
GR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14123
JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/14124
Clark, list,
In regard to the Peirce quote from 1907 that you provided, it's also
pertinent to the discussion of biosemiosis, physiosemiosis, etc., taking
place lately here. It was in the 1906 Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism that he discusses quasi-mind, quasi-utterer,
I think that this is a really valuable point, Ben, and I think that an
application of it bears very directly on discussions of psychologism and
anti-psychologism in Peirce. Despite having opposed psychologism from the
outset, Peirce was happy to pursue psychological solutions to some problems
(For undistorted figures, see the attached.)
Hi,
While preparing for my interdisciplinary lecture on complementarity to
first-year students at Rutgers, called a Byrne seminar, the following
thoughts occurred to me today that may help apply abstract mathematical
concepts to Peirces' triadic
Jeff K., Jeff D., Gary F., lists,
Lists, I should note that Jeff Kasser is familiar with the topic of
Peirce and psychologism. He wrote a paper that Joe Ransdell posted some
years ago at Arisbe, Peirce's Supposed Psychologism
http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/kasser/psychol.htm .
Lists,
On page 29, note 22 Frederick cites Gustav Fechner’s Psychophysik. In his
experiments with Jastrow, Peirce contributed three things central to the
nascent science of Psycho-Physics after Fechner: 1) a better mathematical tool;
2) a recognition of sub-threshold awareness and hence
At 06:51 PM 9/16/2014, Dennis Leri wrote:
And, not only do we do that to a degree of accuracy greater than
chance but that a methodology predicated upon the Method of Least
Squares says it must be the case. Differences that make a difference
need not be conscious.
HP: Meditate, don't reason.
Just a small correction: When you say
the Method of Least Squares was a better fit than the Bell Curve
it should be noted that the method of least squares is the bell curve-that is,
the Gaussian
distribution. What CSP is distinguishing the method of least squares from is
rather the notion
that
On Sep 16, 2014, at 10:32 AM, Benjamin Udell bud...@nyc.rr.com wrote:
Yes, analytic philosophy seems tepid next to Peirce. I hardly know what
analytic philosophers mean by 'analysis' or, more importantly, by
'philosophy'. Decades ago I got a similar vagueness from continental
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