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ROCT. Note 3
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A few years ago I made an attempt to tease out the underlying continuities
connecting diverse ideas of categories through history, from their origins
in Arist
At 06:41 PM 10/5/2014, Clark Goble wrote:
The type/token distinction seems definitely to apply here
[Pattee-Fuhrman disagreement].
HP: I agree. Bits are ambiguous. Bit may refer to a measure or type
of information, or bit may refer to a token of information, like 0 or 1.
Howard
---
Gary F,
I was responding to your statement: "Bits (as the name implies!) can
only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word
"symbol"; they are not symbols."
Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a
measure of information. I was trying to indicate that
> On Oct 5, 2014, at 2:20 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
> Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
> kind of sign?
>
> GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0).
> But without the
But, if chemical icons are a direct consequence of physical laws, that would mean, they can be reduced to them. In a prebiotic world, they would not be icons, but only likenesses not interpreted. I think, an icon is an interpreted likeness, and interpretation of a likeness (icon) requires an anima
Howard,
HP: Suppose, in context of a Dicisign or a proposition, you ask me:
Is it true or false? I can give you a one-bit answer. Isn't that bit some
kind of sign?
GF: My answer to your question is: 1. (as opposed to 0).
But without the symbolic context which makes the bit interpretable *as the
At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or
"legisigns". Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of
symbols in the semiotic sense of the word "symbol"; they are not
symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out
Ben, lists,
OK, let me put it this way: a rheme can “denote” a range of possibilities — but
only if it is a symbol. Same goes for a predicate, which is symbolic by virtue
of being a necessary part of a proposition, which is a symbol (and by virtue of
being verbal). To elaborate on this, I’ll
Howard,
Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or "legisigns". Bits
(as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic
sense of the word "symbol"; they are not symbols in the Peircean sense
because a bit by itself, out of any context, will not and cannot
At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol"
is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
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ROCT. Note 2
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My e-neurones tell me that I apparently collected
a lot of material from previous discussions here:
InterSciWiki : Jon Awbrey : Mathematical Notes
http://in
I'd like to ask Frederik about the role of what I consider a basic Peircean
Sign, the Rhematic Indexical Legisign. This triad operates within all three
categorical modes; it's in the centre, so to speak, of the ten classes.
I see it as important because of the openness of its Interpretation Rel
Peircers & Others,
For the benefit of readers who want to learn about mathematical category theory
and may have missed earlier discussions, I will use this thread to collect a few
links and texts on the subject.
Regards,
Jon
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word pr
Gary F., Tom, lists,
A predicate's denotation can be narrowed (and anyway can't be broadened)
by an index attached to it. The resultant compound's denotation is thus
the index's denotation. So one could get to thinking that the index does
the denoting, while the icon or symbol does not. Yet th
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word symbol is used
in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the language of physics
is of limited use in semiotics.
In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirces definition of
symbol as a sign which is fit
Tom, lists,
See my previous message (sorry about the bit before the last sentence that I
forgot to delete before sending). My replies to this one are inserted:
gary f.
From: Tom Gollier [mailto:tgoll...@gmail.com]
Sent: 4-Oct-14 7:50 PM
Gary and list,
A does signify B in the first
Ben, Tom, lists,
It’s true that denotation (the noun) is one of the synonyms for extension or
breadth (as opposed to comprehension or depth) when applied to a term. But
Peirce, from early on, extended the application of these terms from terms to
propositions; and in any context where he is d
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