At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol"
is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
efficient and unambiguous communication is by simple coded sequences
with bits that are not icons or indices or tokens with semantic content.
GF: In discussing Natural Propositions, we are deploying Peirce's
definition of "symbol" as "a sign which is fit to serve as such
simply because it will be so interpreted"
HP: Yes, like bit strings. These physical and information theory
conditions do not depend on Peirce's theory of signs or naming bits
"symbols" or "legisigns". You are free to ignore these laws, but no
semiotic practice can avoid them. In any case, we cannot continue
this efficient communication without bit sequences.
Howard
"In theory, theory and practice are the same. In practice
they are not." Einstein
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