Frederik, lists,
You wrote:
I vaguely recall a picture connecting 1-2-3 - some possibilities (1) seep
through the cracks of existence (2) to become real (3) habits ...
I don't recall where it is from ...
For me there is in Peirce, perhaps especially in late Peirce, a very
specific and repeated
Jeff, Frederik, lists,
Jeff wrote:
JD: For my money, however, [Peirce] is strongly motivated by questions in
the normative sciences--and especially in the theory of signs and logic--to
probe more deeply into both mathematical and philosophical conceptions of
continuity. If I was a betting person
Gary R., Frederik, Lists,
You both say: "I agree with your contention 'that P's strong interest in
mathematical continuity is, in the end, metaphysically motivated'"
Depending upon what you mean by saying "in the end," it appears that I may be
disagreeing with the two of you. Peirce seems to b
Dear Gary, lists,
I vaguely recall a picture connecting 1-2-3 - some possibilities (1) seep
through the cracks of existence (2) to become real (3) habits …
I don't recall where it is from …
But whaddabout Jim Hurford and his challenging hypothesis of the visual/dorsal
split realizing propositio
Frederik, lists,
I agree with your contention "that P's strong interest in mathematical
continuity is, in the end, metaphysically motivated. He wanted a
mathematical tool to describe the reality of thirdness." Paul Forster takes
this "strong interest" up from the standpoint of pragmatism, highligh
Den 06/11/2014 kl. 17.11 skrev Jeffrey Brian Downard
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>>
:
Dear Jeff, lists,
I do not think this P-quote deals with the reduction of individuals to
generalities. It deals with the status of possibilities - it is pertaining to
possibilities he claims the absence of
Afar is where I sit to this discussion, but with great respect for the
minds at work and for what seems to me a persuasive, if not slam dunk,
articulation of universalism or, as it is also called, realism. My
tangental but I feel central concern is with what concerned the writer of
the first chapte
Dear Howard, lists
This is where our ways part.
If iron really were "just a name classifying certain useful collections of
fundamental particles" I would have no criteria for saying I have an iron
knife. I have no access to the presumed fundamental particles in my knife, and
if I had, I would
Gary F., Howard, Frederik, Lists
In his discussion of topological connectedness in the New Elements of
Mathematics, Peirce does seem to say that we can construct discontinuous
relations from processes of generation that are continuous. We do it by
intersecting the things we've generated, which
Howard,
No, what I described as rather trivial was your idea of "the logical
irreducible complementarity of discrete and continuous models", or as you
put it earlier, that "neither conceptually nor formally can discreteness or
continuity be derived from or reduced to the other." What is not tri
Thanks, Frederik, I think your explanation probably clarifies the situation
more than mine, which was sent before I saw yours. By the way, the exchange
between Howard and me was not (until now) copied to the Peirce list. I'll
forward the one I just sent to biosemiotics. I don't think it conflicts w
Dear Howard, Gary, lists -
It is certainly correct, as Howard says, that Peirce also maintained the
irreducibility of discreteness to continuity and vice versa. In his categories,
2-ness is discrete, 3-ness is continuous. It is also correct that this is far
from trivial. Actually Peirce thought
At 04:45 AM 11/4/2014, Frederik Stjernfelt wrote:
I stumbled over a text bite [Edwina and Howard]
from mid-October which gave me the idea that
there may be some terminological confusion at
the root of some of our discussions.
HP: I'm sure that is the case. We also have a
cultural difference
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