Supplement: I suspect, that my below consideration is non-Peircean, as far as I know, because I ony know examples by Peirce, that are about relatives, that is terms, i.e. language. Language, of course, can only be inter-subjective. An intra-subjective consideration as below may be weird or
Franklin, Jeff,
Just to clarify, a percept is a singular phenomenon: X appears. To perceive X
as smoke is a perceptual judgment. The verbal expression of that judgment,
“That is smoke,” is indeed a dicisign (proposition), uniting its subject (that)
with a predicate (__ is smoke), which like
Gary F,
Just to clarify, do the categories still apply to a percept when it is
considered as a singular phenomenon?
I noticed that you say the verbal expression of the perceptual judgment is
a dicisign, but you do not say that the perceptual judgment is a dicisign.
Is it your position that the
Jeff, list,
Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate
Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the
Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual
impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are
Jerry, list,
Well, I'm glad that someone agrees with me, as far as the statement went.
Jerry, I think that you raise some good questions. Though, I must admit I'm
not entirely sure what a couple of your terms mean, such as 'coupling' and
'grammar'. As for 'unit', I'll guess you mean something
