Jeff, list, Peirce does say, in paragraph 539 from Vol. 4 of CP, that "[t]he Immediate Object of all knowledge and all thought is, in the last analysis, the Percept". When you ask whether the percept is the smoke itself, or a visual impression, I think this statement from Peirce implies you are right that Peirce would lean toward the latter conclusion. However, I do not think this is necessarily a fair way to put the matter. It seems to me that while we can directly perceive the real, such perception does not mean that we immediately understand it as a whole; for that understanding, we require a concept of the real that is perceived, and perceptual judgment is an instinctual attempt at applying a concept. The way I would state the matter is that the percept, while not the whole of the real object, is at least in some sense a part of that object, which we find ourselves immediately related to by way of physiological processes, as the eye is affected by, in the supposed example, the smoke (plus light, other percepts, etc.), and so comes to visually perceive the smoke. That effect of the smoke is in some sense part of what it is to be smoke. Going beyond the part of the real that we perceive, and grasping it as a whole, requires the whole work of understanding. But while the percept is not "smoke itself", i.e. is not the whole of the object, it is nevertheless as much a part of smoke as it is a part of the perceiver.
-- Franklin -------------------------------------------------------- On Sat, Dec 12, 2015 at 9:10 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Franklin, Gary F., List, > > If a person sees smoke billowing in the distance, is the percept the > "smoke itself," or is the percept the visual impression of the smoke? > Peirce indicates that it is the latter when he provides the following > explanation of a percept: "A visual percept obtrudes itself upon me in its > entirety. I am not therein conscious of any mental process by which the > image has been constructed. The psychologists, however, are able to give > some account of the matter. Since 1709, they have been in possession of > sufficient proof (as most of them agree,) that, notwithstanding its > apparent primitiveness, every percept is the product of mental processes, > or at all events of processes for all intents and purposes mental, except > that we are not directly aware of them;" CP 7.624 > > This fits with the definitions he provides in the Century dictionary: > > 1. Perceive: 1) in general, to become aware of; to gain knowledge of > some object or fact. 2) specifically, to come to know by direct experience; > in psychology, to come to know by a real action of the object on the mind > (commonly upon the senses); though the knowledge may be inferential > > 2. Perception: 1) cognition (originally, and down through the middle of > the 18th century); thought and sense in general, whether the faculty, the > operation or the resulting idea. 2) the mental faculty, operation or > resulting a construction of the imagination, of gaining knowledge by virtue > of a real action of an object upon the mind. > > 3. Percept: the immediate object in perception, in the sense in which the > word is used by modern psychologists. > > Insofar as the modern psychologists are engaged in a special science that > is empirical in origin, then it would appear that Peirce is importing a > technical term from the special science into his philosophical logic, and > he is trying to articulate what is necessary for the percept to function in > the (uncontrolled) process of drawing perceptual judgments as inferential > conclusions. One might think that these kinds of inferential processes are > only of subsidiary concern if our aim is to understand the divisions Peirce > is drawing between different kinds of signs in NDTR. My assumption is that > Peirce is generalizing from way in which terms and propositions function in > self controlled arguments in order to account for these uncontrolled > processes of mind. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ >
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