[PEIRCE-L] Triadic Philosophy -- Sign

2015-12-28 Thread Stephen C. Rose
I see a sign as something that emerges in the vague penumbra called First or by me Reality. It is named and acquires identity rising from its primal being. It naturally encounters a blunt index of truths which I call Ethics (Second) and is composed of Values (not virtues) and from there it passes

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

2015-12-28 Thread Edwina Taborsky
John, list - Agreed, there are no 'basic relations' that exist per se. A relation by definition exists only within an interaction. And certainly, the triad is not 'simple composition' - which would imply that those separate relations are each existential in themselves; the triad is a complex

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread Gary Richmond
Jerry, list, I can only reiterate that I do not see that the current thread's analysis of the triadic sign requires a consideration of Tarski's 'levels of propositions'. This is not necessarily to suggest that at *some* level of analysis that these might not be brought in as appropriate and,

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread John Collier
All I can say, Jerry, is to read it more carefully. There are no contradictions, so you must be misreading what I said. I have no idea why you relate what I said to Tarski’s views, with which I am quite familiar. The move that I think lies behind the connection between the triadic relations of

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread Gary Richmond
Jerry, John, Edwina, list, How strange that you should write this, Jerry, as I was just about to remark that I thought John's post helped move the conversation forward regarding the triadic sign relation(s), and that Edwina's post further pointed to some of the remaining differences in their

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread John Collier
The way I understand this continuation is that mere similarity (a second) is not enough, but similarity is not the only way of being of the same sort. I think that this actually supports the interpretation I was giving, that it is of the same kind (or sort), a triadic kind. I am not quite

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Edwina, List: Is it not the case, at least according to Peirce, that the interpretant-object relation is necessarily the same as the representamen-object relation? If so, then there is no need for a separate trichotomy to characterize it. "A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in

RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread John Collier
Jon, List, The interpretant is itself a sign, so at least implicitly there is a separate triad (and on to infinity, given Peirce’s continuity of thought): 1902 | Carnegie Institution Correspondence | NEM 4:54 “A sign is something, A, which brings something, B, its interpretant sign, determined

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

2015-12-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
Sung, List: The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign. Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or

Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations - meta-languages and propositions of triadicity

2015-12-28 Thread Jon Alan Schmidt
John, List: Well, the passage that I quoted previously continues, "Nor can the triadic relation in which the Third stands be merely similar to that in which the First stands, for this would make the relation of the Third to the First a degenerate Secondness merely. The Third must, indeed, stand