Sung, List: The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign. Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an argument. However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description, with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we start taking additional trichotomies into account.
Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign." It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this. However, I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only to a limited extent. Just my opinion, of course. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: > Edwina, > > You wrote: > > "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs." > (122815-1) > > (*1*) Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to the > 9 relations: > > 1) quali*sign,* > 2) sin*sign*, > 3) legi*sign*. > 4) icon, > 5) index, > 6) symbol, > 7) rheme, > 8) dici*sign*, and > 9) argument. > > If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes > when he referred to 4 (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as > "signs " ? > > (*2*) The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be > that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely > triadic. So if something is not triadic (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations > above), that something cannot be a sign. I think such a mode of thinking > is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean. > > (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is > fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting > lesson and warning for all Peircean scholars: > > "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the > (122815-2) > reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce." > > If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may be > able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true. One > possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty > Principle in physics, is something like the following: > > "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object > (122815-3) > and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision." > > Or, > > "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the > (122815-4) > less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*." > > If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may refer > to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the "semiotic > uncertainty principle" (SUP). > > Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not > Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to > what is here referred to as PUP or SUP? > > One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates we > have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of the > Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community, > including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others. > > All the best. > > Sung >
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