Gary f. wrote:
- “Categories”, “elements”, “Firstness”, “Secondness”
and “Thirdness” are all technical terms of Peircean phenomenology...
Many mistakes in this. - Just offer one example where CSP explicitly
states that these are TECHNICAL TERMS. (If you can.)
Categories concern definitely
John,
Thank you very much! - I was wondering why I did not find PEG in the
list.
Now it's all making sense.
With gratitude,
Kirsti
John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 09:05:
Gary F, Mary L, Kirsti, Jerry LRC, and list,
In 1911, Peirce presented his clearest and simplest version of EGs.
He ex
John, Kirsti, List ...
JFS:
> In 1911, Peirce clarified that issues by using two distinct terms:
> 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
> identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
> couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.
There is a diffe
List,
I must apologize to the list for introducing the term "dot" into this
discussion, as Peirce actually uses that term not in Lowell 2, but in some
of his other explanations of existential graphs, notably CP 4.438:
"Let a heavy dot or dash be used in place of a noun which has been erased
from
Hi Helmut, List,
I had missed that reference and update. Thank you! I have
corrected the notes to the table, but have retained his earlier
names because they are more commonly referenced and it retains the
idea of 'representation', more allied with the idea of knowl
John,
Unfortunately you've added to the rampant confusion by saying that "a spot is
just a very short line of identity.” This is not true of Peirce’s “final
preferred version” of EGs because, as you point out yourself, he does not use
the term “spot” in that version. And it is not true of Lo
On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
JFS:
In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'. The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.
Ther
Continuing from Lowell Lecture 2.14,
https://fromthepage.com/jeffdown1/c-s-peirce-manuscripts/ms-455-456-1903-low
ell-lecture-ii/display/13623:
Now let us further agree that a heavily marked line
* ,
all whose points are ipso facto heavily marked and therefore denote
individuals,
Gary, Jon, List,
To the question, whether "categories" are "elements" or "universes" I can say little how Peirce has answered to this, but I would say, based on my contemporary dealing with the difference between composition and classification:
I think, that "universes" sounds like classificatio
I wrote both, "a sign consists of sign, object, and interpretant", and: "A sign consists of sign relation, object relation, and interpretant relation". To me (in my theory) the first kind of consisting is functional composition, and the latter is composition from traits. I just wanted to add t
John, List ...
JFS:
This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
write a proof by contradiction. In that case, there would be no
universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
In that ca
John, List ...
JFS:
> This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
> For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
> write a proof by contradiction. In that case, there would be no
> universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
In t
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