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Francesco, list
Thanks for the clear and logical analysis.
I would simply say that a rheme is in a mode of Firstness and as
such, is a STATE and not an act of cognition or interpretation. As a
st
Francesco, Edwina, Jon, List,
to me it seem as if "is mortal" might have a subject, and is quantifiable, if it means "belongs to the set of mortal entities". But does "is mortal" mean "will die" or "may die"? In the first case, bacteria dont belong to the set, in the latter they do. So, if "mo
Francesco, Jon S, List,
I find the interpretative argument that only propositions and arguments have
immediate objects interesting, but I'm trying to square it with other things
Peirce says about immediate objects and the classification of signs.
Consider the following passage, where Peirce c
Francesco, List:
I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.
FB: Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
either p, s, or u.
Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
general (not universal). In any case, I am not ulti
Francesco, Jon S, List,
I find the interpretative argument that only propositions and arguments have
immediate objects interesting, but I'm trying to square it with other things
Peirce says about immediate objects and the classification of signs. Consider
the following passages, where Peirce c
Jon, List
> I still reject the first premiss of your summary syllogism.
>
> FB: Now Peirce says in 1904–1906 that signs are according to their IO are
> either p, s, or u.
>
>
> Technically he said that Signs are vague (not particular), singular, or
> general (not universal).
>
There is plenty o
Jeff, List
This passage from Prolegomena is exceedingly obscure to me. Peirce says
that the IO of all knowledge is the percept, but then he also says that the
IO of a percept is vague. He also says that the percept is the DO of the
perceptual judgment. My impression – which because of the passage'
Supplement: I refer to a text by Joseph Ransdell
http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/useabuse.htm
and I dont understand it, neither that some sign should not have an IO. The DO is what is, the thing itself, and the IO is what it appears to be in the semiosic process,
Jeff, Francesco, List:
I agree that this passage is very difficult to untangle. It might help,
for the sake of clarity, to spell out what all Peirce said there about
Percepts and Perceptual Judgments.
- For all thought, the Immediate Object is the Percept, and the
Immediate Interpretant i
Dear Francesco, list,
Well, the passage seems obvious to me just as it is obvious to JAS, which
is to say that it is vague.
Now, if it is vague, we could simply apply the logic of vagueness, of which
you must obviously be aware.
And if the logic of vagueness is merely something like a comp
On 9/12/2018 2:28 PM, Francesco Bellucci wrote:
In any case, I am not ultimately seeking to explicate Peirce's
1904-1906 efforts at classifying Signs; I am trying to develop a
viable framework for understanding Signs and their relations based
on Peirce's /entire /corpus, especially his late writi
Helmut, list
I'm a great admirer of the epistemic cut [see Harold Atmanspacher
for a good analysis] - but, in the case of a rheme, which is in a
mode of pure Firstness, I suggest that there is no epistemic cut. The
rheme is a STATE of pure feeling with no distinction between sel
List, Jon, Francesco:
> On Sep 11, 2018, at 8:14 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
> wrote:
>
> He also wrote later that the three different forms of thought--corresponding
> to Icons, Indices, and Symbols--are best explained by positing three
> different "modes of metaphysical being."
>
> CSP: You will
Jerry C., List:
JLRC: Why do you associate this excerpt with Icons, Indices and Symbols?
Because we know from the preceding paragraph that "each kind of sign"
refers specifically to Icon/Index/Symbol.
CSP: All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to
your deeper self
Francesco, List:
FB: Since the IO was introduced in 1904, we have no alternative to
explicating what that notion meant in 1904.
Of course we have an alternative--we can take into account Peirce's *further
development* of that notion over the subsequent years. Why should we be
limited to his wr
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