Dear J, G, lists -
I think Peirce primarily uses "intention" in the scholastic sense (first
intention vs. second intention) where it does not yet have the psychological
connotations it later achieved.
I think J is right in taking "purpose" as the more general term - P did a
similar thing when ta
> On Oct 3, 2014, at 2:28 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>
> I wasn't referring to intentionality in the sense of "aboutness", or to the
> scholastic ideas of first and second intentions; I guess it's tautologically
> true that informational signs must involve intentions in that sense. I’ve
> often
iosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Natural Propositions, Chapter 3.5
Hi Gary F.,
What is the difference between saying that every dicisign involves an
intention, and saying that every dicisign involves (or is somehow related
to) a purpose? My untutored assumpt
> On Oct 3, 2014, at 12:30 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard
> wrote:
>
> Perhaps we should distinguish between different ways that the word
> 'intention' is used in Peirce's texts. There is the common meaning that is
> expressed when I say, for instance, that my intention in writing the
> sentence
ention, that would be good to
spell out.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Friday, October 03, 2014 8:48 AM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Sub
Section 3.5 of NP takes up "The Indexical Side of Dicisigns" by first
showing the importance of (and the more recent terminology for) Peirce's
advances in the algebra of logic which made it possible to separate the
subject and predicate parts of the proposition, and thus the indexical and
iconic pa
