Gary F,
I was responding to your statement: "Bits (as the name implies!) can
only be small pieces of symbols in the semiotic sense of the word
"symbol"; they are not symbols."
Of course, a bit is not a symbol or a piece of symbol. It is a
measure of information. I was trying to indicate that
:hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 5-Oct-14 3:53 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7097] Re: Natural Propositions,
Chapter 3.6
At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
>Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or &quo
At 01:15 PM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Nobody (least of all Peirce!) is naming bits "symbols" or
"legisigns". Bits (as the name implies!) can only be small pieces of
symbols in the semiotic sense of the word "symbol"; they are not
symbols in the Peircean sense because a bit by itself, out
n be a sinsign, won't be a sign at all, if
it doesn't contribute its bit to the activation a semiotic system.
gary f.
From: Howard Pattee [mailto:hpat...@roadrunner.com]
Sent: 5-Oct-14 12:11 PM
To: biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; biosemiot...@lists.ut.ee; 'Peirce List'
Subject: [PEIRCE
At 08:50 AM 10/5/2014, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
Howard, I think this is a good explanation of how the word "symbol"
is used in the language of physics. As such, it explains why the
language of physics is of limited use in semiotics.
HP: Of course it is of limited use. It only explains why the most
