ical universe as we know it; but
> that's quite different from an inconceivability claim.
>
> gary f.
>
> -Original Message-----
> From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu]
> Sent: 2-Nov-14 10:33 AM
> To: Gary Fuhrman
> Cc: 'Peirce List';
im.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Sungchul Ji [mailto:s...@rci.rutgers.edu]
Sent: 2-Nov-14 10:33 AM
To: Gary Fuhrman
Cc: 'Peirce List'; 'biosemiotics list'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter
four
Gary F,
I agree with most of what
e by correlating the semiotic system with a cognitive
> system which is necessarily also a biological system, all of these systems
> involving layers of self-reference.
>
>
>
> But I'll leave it there for now, and try to pick up this idea in
> connection
> with Chapter
h that;
they are attempts to depict the process of reasoning as iconically as
possible.
gary f.
From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: 2-Nov-14 12:13 AM
To: Peirce List
Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositi
he question of what kinds of bonds can be
formed between different kinds of elements and less by the series of of
atomic numbers.
--Jeff
Jeff Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
________
From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusy
Jerry,
can you elaborate on why the numbered items in the following statement of
yours pose logical difficulties and how these difficulties may arise from
Peirce's incomplete understanding of the periodic table of his time?
" . . . it plays a critical role in the logic of the (110114-1)
List:
(NB: This post contains many technical terms which are used within the rhetoric
of chemistry but not acceptable to many philosophers.)
On Nov 1, 2014, at 4:42 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote:
> At root, what Peirce seems to see is that the underlying organization of the
> periodic chart
phy
NAU
(o) 523-8354
From: Gary Fuhrman [g...@gnusystems.ca]
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 7:11 AM
To: 'Peirce List'; 'biosemiotics list'
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter
four
Edwina, than
x27;t understand this statement. A molecular formula,
> to me, as a set of letters/words, has a purely symbolic relation to the
> actual chemical components.The chemical composition would be a
> legisign (a sinsign is "an actual existent thing or event which is a sign"
> 2.245)
ry Fuhrman"
To: "'Peirce List'" ; "'biosemiotics list'"
Sent: Saturday, November 01, 2014 10:11 AM
Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter
four
Edwina, thanks for this very useful summary, and for citing your sources
the main topic of NP.
gary f.
-Original Message-
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca]
Sent: 1-Nov-14 9:08 AM
To: Jerry LR Chandler; Peirce List; biosemiotics list
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:7309] Natural Propositions chapter
four
Jerry
1) The nine terms
a sign" (2.245) while
a legisign "is a law that is a Sign. This law is usually established by
menit is not a single object but a general type"...2.246.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Jerry LR Chandler"
To: "Peirce List"
Cc: "Gary Fuhrma
Jerry, list,
"The molecular formula is an (103114-1)
index of the sinsign, is it not?"
Yes. It is, but sinsign is not the only kinds of signs. As you know,
there are in addition the qualisign and the legisign, and each is
irreversibly triadic being associated with i
List, Sung:
Thank you for repeating your personal philosophy. It is a source of curiosity
to me.
Unfortunately, your response simply adds many logical terms and propositions
that are not directly related to the writings of CSP.
Why do you feel at liberty to corrupt the original meanings of C
x27;s posts - and to also consider that these posted
discussions are within the range of the focus raised by Frederik's NP book.
Edwina
- Original Message -
From: "Gary Fuhrman"
To: ; "'Peirce list'"
Sent: Friday, October 31, 2014 4:03 PM
Subject: RE: [
Sung, I wrote that (without the duplication of terms that you inserted) in
response to Edwina's claim that "we need clearer definitions" of those three
terms. She didn't say what was unclear about the Peircean definitions that
NP's argument is based on - indeed, she didn't refer directly to NP at a
List:
A factual question concerning CSP writings, relative to Gary's and Sung's
recent assertions and FS assertions wrt to the meanings of rhetorical logic.
Why are rhetorical terms grouped together, anyway?
I recall a passage that states the second and third rows of the triadic triad
are bot
Gary F wrote:
" . . . we should use the Peircean definitions of "symbol", "argument" and
"Dicisign",symbol, argument and Dicisign.
I am a bit confused here, since symbol is a representamen-object relation,
while dicisign and armgument are the representamen-interpretant relations.
Are you
Edwina, it seems to me that for purposes of discussing Natural Propositions,
we should use the Peircean definitions of "symbol", "argument" and
"Dicisign", because that's what Frederik is doing in NP. Peirce's
definitions can be found in EP2:272 ff. His definition of "symbol" in
Baldwin's Dictionar
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