I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as
his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a
response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were
construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I had been about to answer
Joseph Ransdell wrote:
I was intending to warn Ben against adopting a bullying tone toward you, as
his frustration seemed to be mounting. Perhaps a mistake on my part but a
response in part to your own complaints about his tone, which you were
construing as an attempt to silence you. Also I
before answering, I'd like to comment on an obvious confusion (see below)
Benjamin Udell wrote:
[...]
-- are defined by reference to the Sign, the Object, and the
Interpretant, respectively. The Sign is the First, the Object is the
Second, and the Interpretant is the Third. In CP227-229, whi
Jean-Marc, list
> It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in
> the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories.
> In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply
> refer to 3 things presented in a given or
Benjamin Udell wrote:
Jean-Marc, list
It is unfortunate that Peirce used the terms 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' in
the place of ordinals when he used the same vocabulary for the categories.
In the texts that you chose the terms do not refer to categories, they simply refer to 3 things pres
Frances to Ben and others...
In the decadic table or model, the ten classes of signs seem to deal
with immediate objects, and dynamic objects, and sparse selections of
immediate and dynamic and final interpretants. The decagon does not
seem to deal with immediate representamens whatsoever, except
Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list--
For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms
"first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as
Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved
when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Somet
Dear Folks,
Seems I've read somewhere that the rules of logic are in some way truth
preserving. I suppose this mean that these rules allow us to follow the
various ways true statements can be combined to form additional true
statements. Which for me makes logic very close to a form of truth
Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker!
>> 66~~
>> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine
>> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of
>> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic
>> relation to its Obje
I agree, Ben. Peirce used capitalization to mark his use of a term as a
technical one, a term of art. It is a common practice of his and I am
certain that there is at least one place where he states this explicitly.
Ill try to track down a verifying passage but it may be difficult to find.
Jo
Ben, list,
It seems to me that you are quite right about the "distinctly
un-English" use of the ordinals 'First', 'Second' and 'Third' by Peirce
in the passages being considered. Capitalization is used for 'terms
defined' as he writes, for example, at the beginning of the NA and
elsewhere
Here is a verifying passage:, from the neglected Argument paper
Peirce: CP 6.452
The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is the
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really
creator of all three Universes of Experience.
Some words shall herein b
Gary, Joe, list,
Thank you but -- of course! -- I've run into a problem that has bothered far
better scholars than me.
Peirce: CP 2.238
238. Triadic relations are in three ways divisible by trichotomy, according as
the First, the Second, or the Third Correlate, respectively, is a mere
possibil
13 matches
Mail list logo
