Aw Jim, you're a trouble maker! >> 66~~~~~~~~~~ >> *A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine >> triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of >> detemining a Third, called its _Interpretant, to assume the same triadic >> relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object.* >> ~~~~~~~~~~99
Normal English? With capitalization of the ordinals, no less? In English we would say a "given thing," "a second thing," etc. English is characterized by intransigent normalcy. So Peirce is going to use some capitalized ordinals without explicit referents, as if he were talking about Firsts, Seconds, & Thirds in the usual Peirce way, in order to say simply "something," "another thing," and "a third thing"? Peirce is complicated but he is not sadistic toward the reader. The Sign's correlate, when no further specification is provided, is the Object. "On a New List of Categories": Secondness is reference to a correlate. The Object is the Correlate is the Second. "On a New List of Categories": Thirdness is reference to an interpretant. The Interpretant is the Third. Argh, Ben, on three glasses of wine ----- Original Message ----- From: "Jim Piat" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" <peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu> Sent: Thursday, June 22, 2006 10:12 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2) Dear Ben, Jean-Marc, list-- For what its worth, it also struck me that Peirce's use of the terms "first", "second" and "third" in the context cited by Jean-Marc is as Jean-Marc suggests merely a way of indicating the three elements involved when (A) Something --a sign, (B) stands for Something -an object, (C) to something -- an interpretant. I think it is mistaken to suppose a sign (as a function) is a example of a Peircean Firstness. A sign (as I understand the matter) is pre-eminently an example of Pericean Thirdness. OTOH is also seems to me (as Ben and others are suggesting) that Peirce's trichotomies of signs are in some fundamental way related to his categories and less arbitrary than it seems to me that Jean-Marc is suggesting. But I make both of the above comments mainly from the standpoint of an interested bystander who is both enjoying and learning from this interesting discussion which I hope will continue. That said, I am somewhat puzzled by what Peirce means when he refers to a sinsign as not actually functioning as a sign and yet having the characteristics of a sign. The only tentative explanation I can come up with is that for Peirce all that we conceive or experience (and thus all we can or do speak of ) are signs. So to speak of a quality is necessarily not to speak of a qaulity iself (because by defintions qualities are in or as themselves non existant) but to speak of the sign of a quality. IOWs a sinsign is something that stands for a quality that stands for something to something. And since this is more or less open forum I'd like to comment on a special interest of mine and that is the logic of disagreements but I will do that in a separate post. Best wishes, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
