Jim P,
I really like the connection you provided to Fechner's law. Peirce many times uses the "inward/outward" conceptual distinction that Fechner also uses with his psycho-physical laws. I do not know whether they are using them the same way and I do not know whether their metaphysical as
Jim P,
Thanks for the response. I think that if you allow for the evolution of the mean and stick to the scientific method, then there are strong parallels to Peirce's theory of truth in the "long run." There is a convergence towards the "least total error." This may work for scientific the
Jim P,
Interesting. But if all the scientist did was "average" three defective modes of inquiry, wouldn't we be stuck with the "least total error," yet an error nevertheless? We would have all agreed that the earth is flat, Euclidean geometry is the true physical geometry, a part can never
Response to J Kasser (resend)
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu
Sent: Mon, 2 Oct 2006 11:49 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
J Kasser says,
"It's not easy to see how Peirce co
J Kasser says,
"It's not easy to see how Peirce could have considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as meaning that the statement i
Clark and list,
Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson. I do not see any direct connection to Peirce but one could be made in terms of factoring beliefs or maybe dispositions into prime/composite and contents into narrow/broad. I don't know how all of this would work. The unpubl
Kirsti,
You say,
"What I'm curious about, is whether Peirce ever referred to these two as LAWS of mind. He may have considered them as psychological tendencies, or something like that (something empirical psychology could investigate). " (end)
I thought of the laws of association (
Joe and list,
It is difficult to tell exactly what those two psychological laws are from the text. (preceding the quote below) It is also difficult to frame them universally. Either we talk of all men at all times or some men at all times or all men at some time or another. I think we could talk
Ben,
You say,
"Saying that the NLC 'theory' of cognition (which seems to me no more a cognition theory than Peircean truth theory is an inquiry theory even though it references inquiry) is sufficient except when we talk about possibility, feasibility, etc., is -- especially if that list includ
Ben,
I am playing at trying to reject it. ("poss.Bs & poss.~Bs") I have accepted it more often than not. I also understand the difference between discussing formal properties that hold between propositions (modal or non-modal) and forming a "1st order" proposition out of the discussion of cont
Thanks Ben,
Well, I guess the passage doesn't discuss modal propositions if you disallow rephrasing "this stove is possibly black" with 'It is possible that "this stove is black."' There is certainly a logic of possibility at work. Why aren' t these modal propositions? It is just that the
Ben,
(I responded to your later message first.) I agree with a lot here. The idea that there are objective possibilities that are true, regardless of our knowledge, has been arguably the central issue in discussions of philosophical realism for 2500 years. The idea of objective indeterminacy is
Ben,
Peirce says,
"Very many writers assert that everything is logically possible which involves no contradiction Let us call that sort of logical possibility, essential, or formal, logical possibility. It is not the only logical possibility; for in this sense, two propositions contradict
Thanks Ben,
There is a difference between treating possibility epistemically or treating it ontologically. "Possibly black' and "possibly non-black" are (sub) contraries, indeterminate with respect to a state of information. But since we are considering "this stove," and not allowing multiple r
Thanks Ben,
The proposition "She is possibly pregnant" is easily understood by all. I overstated my case. (nor is their a potential contradiction) But I think it masks a problem for the theory of cognition, and furthermore, not all ordinary expressions are as clear as they might be. So, we migh
Ben,
You say,
"The question is WHETHER the stove is black -- yes, no, novelly, probably, optimally, if & only if..., etc. What is required for assertion or proposition or judging or even conceiving the situation is that the mind can apprehend whether the stove
is,
isn't,
may be,
migh
List,
The question is being too easily dismissed. For Peirce, its not that introspection doesn't exist, but that its results are unreliable for the purposes at hand, namely, a theory of cognition and the deduction of categories. The overall anti-Cartesian emphasis of Peirce's early work is rea
Thanks Ben,
It is a little difficult to assess matters since I have been focusing on the NLC and you are looking more broadly at the corpus. You say you do it differently. Nevertheless, I will try to locate a problem area.
You say,
"The disparity of Peirce's approaches to (1) attributi
Steven,
The theory "already established" is Kant's. The modern improvement is that propositions are taken as more primary than judgements and unity is achieved through propositions rather than the "transcendental unity of apperception" or the ego. Thus, epistemological primacy lies with propos
Ben,
F is a variable. But it does not matter. Vagueness (indefiniteness) is a feature of existential quantification regardles of whether it is the object or predicate. This appears to match what Lane and the trikonic say. You say,
"In that predicate logic which you're useing, does the existence
Ben,
The piece is called "Principles of Excluded Middle and Contradiction " at Arisbe. Click on Peirce related papers and then Lane. I am having trouble sending this message. This will be the last attempt. I have skipped the URL link.
Lane says,
"There are two main types of object-indetermin
Ben,
Here is the URL and relevant passage:
http://www.digitalpeirce.fee.unicamp.br/lane/p-prilan.htm
Lane says,
"There are two main types of object-indeterminacy: generality (or universality) and vagueness (or indefiniteness) (5.447-9, 1905). General object-indeterminacy is, roughly, universal
Ben,
Here is the URL for Lane. Here is the passage:
"There are two main types of object-indeterminacy: generality (or universality) and vagueness (or indefiniteness) (5.447-9, 1905). General object-indeterminacy is, roughly, universal quantification; and vague, or indefinite, object-indeterminacy
Ben,
I will have to type that address in unfortunately. Your stated preference is what Lang thinks is the correct interpretaton of Peirce. Vagueness lies with some indefinite object. This goes against a more common usage. ("Bill is bald." Just how bald is Bill? "The car is red." Which shade of r
Ben,
Peirce says,
"qualities are not, properly speaking, individuals." The idea seems to be that "no multitude can exhaust the narrowest kind of a general," and that "all the qualities, any one of which you can readily think of, are certainly innumerable." (CP4:514 Peirce mentions that "wit
Thanks Ben,
You suggest that H or Hx are vague. Hx is what I called "free." E is nowhere to be found here. But it shows up in the trikon graphic with vagueness. This is what needs explaining. Put E with H such that
EH(Hx) and you have an intensional construction. There is no hard and fast rule.
Thanks Ben
You say,
"If I speak of the "range" of "red" rather than of the range of "something red," "x{x is red}" or "Rx" etc., then it's quite possible that I will be taken to mean "red" as ranging over some portion of the spectrum, from, say, reddish-orange to reddish-purple, ..." (cut en
Hi Ben,
You say,
"If I speak of the "range" of "red" rather than of the range of "something red," "x{x is red}" or "Rx" etc., then it's quite possible that I will be taken to mean "red" as ranging over some portion of the spectrum, from, say, reddish-orange to reddish-purple,..." (cut end)
Hmm
Thanks Ben,
It seems that there has to be a rule or law that governs the quality or aggregate of qualities with respect to their embodiment in a singular occurence. That is what I meant by "assigns." -Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent
Ben
A general term has a "range" or "domain." A quantifier has a "scope." Peirce following DeMorgan called the domain a "universe of discourse." The variables x,y are general terms; as is the predicate letter J. (My post right before this raises a lot of questions about that predicate letter.)
Ben,
A subindexical legisign governs each and every replica. But this assumes that the identity of the replicas is established. We can vary the type but never lose sight of the corresponding replicas. A subindexical qualisign establishes the identity of the type. A subindexical qualisign is not
Thanks Frances,
You say,
"Calling a person by name in their presence and inciting an excitedresponse is the responsive effect of a stimulative cause, and thusnothing more than a hyposemic situation of crude signaling." (end)
I love your terminology, especially the one at the end called "caus
Ben
You say,
"I'm not able to find anything saying that the embodiment of a qualisign could be called a "replica" of the qualisign. I don't see why not, but I don't find anything saying that it would be okay." (end)
You and I considered a sign that is not individual. If a sign is not individua
Hi Ben, Bernard, and list,
Ben says,
"But I was WRONG all the times that I spoke of a "subindexical qualisign." A subindex is a symbol, and a symbol is always a legisign." (end)
Is every subindex primarily a symbol? Maybe linguistic entities are. But the law governing the symptom of a desea
Thanks Frances,
You say,
"if a proper name is used to label anexistent individual person in the actual concrete presence of thesigner, then the sign is mainly an index, but only as a degeneratehyposeme and not as a causal subindex, because the name is after allan arbitrary word and a lingual sym
Ben,
You say,
"But, in any case, why wouldn't you think that the index or the subindex involve a "real relation"? Why, in the case of a (sub)indexical qualisign, wouldn't there be reality in a habit of using a certain set of sound to direct the attention of one or more among a set of minds to
Thanks Ben,
I do not know what is wrong with the program. I will try to fix it. -Original Message-From: Benjamin Udell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Sun, 19 Mar 2006 14:16:58 -0500Subject: [peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals
Jim, list,
I don't have it
Hi Ben,
We need to start over. Would you agree that "subindex" never occurs in Peirce's writing, or at least the relevant passages we are dealing with? You say,
"That which can occur more than once, "x number of times," is the subindex. That which occurs once & only once is the index." (end quot
Ben and List,
Consider that Brutus killed Caesar. If neither Brutus nor Caesar had existed, the relation would be destroyed. I think this is a real relation between individuals. Now consider that "Brutus" names Brutus. Would you say that had the person been named differently, the relation "Brut
Hi Ben,
Thanks for the response. What's in a name? I don't think that the sign's relation to itself is critical. The fact that the sign "Ben" has three letters or that it appears black colored on my screen x number of times does not make for a decision regarding its status as an index or a subindi
Ben
I guess it comes down in part to whether a proper name is an individual or not. One passage suggests that it has the character of a law (legisign). But the application of the law would be through the occurence of a sin sign. Another passage suggests that it is not an individual. If it is not a
You say,
"Subindex" is not a Peircean term, is it? What is it and why should Peirce be concerned to distinguish an index from it?
Joe,
The Commens Dictionary (online) has a single entry for "Subindex" in the left side roll down window. It links to the following passage from CP2.274. But Peir
List,
I am trying to sharpen my understanding of the concept of index with respect to a natural or an artificial language. I was struck by the number of entries, at least in the Commens Dictionary, that fail to isolate what is essential for distinguishing an index from a subindice with respect to
Ben, Bernard, and list,
Peirce has a lot to say in Note A from "Studies in Logic" by Members of the John Hopkins (1883) about a universe of characters and the equivalence of propositions taken in extension or in comprehension. It is difficult to neatly apply his insights to this 3.175 problem b
Thanks Ben,
I guess we are speaking past each other a bit. In a simple sense, re-cognition has for its object something previously cognized. I took this to be where experience comes in. Maybe I should just drop cognition. ( I had in mind the NLC) 3a says basically "determined-by" entails "determine
Ben,
I have a question. What is the relation between cognition and recognition? It seems that 3a and 3b respond to two different questions, namely, what is a correct logical description of the structure of cognition and how is that structure *validated* for any given peice of information. No wonde
Thomas,
The reader is supposed to "represent the state of things in a direct and imaginative way." Maybe we do but must we? Even if we use something like a Euler diagram (see 4.77) for the nota nota principle or most any other general logical principle, Peirce promises a proof of the necessity of
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