a separate application server
Well this can be a solution in a trustworthy and friendly environment, on
which I can't count.
I would have been more at ease if libpq could manage a PKCS12 cert. or some
secure wallet/keystore that contains both the public and private keys for SSL
traffic.
a separate application server
Well this can be a solution in a trustworthy and friendly environment, on
which I can't count.
I would have been more at ease if libpq could manage a PKCS12 cert. or some
secure wallet/keystore that contains both the public and private keys for SSL
traffic.
Le Monday 14 September 2009 16:13:45, vous avez écrit :
Secure
wallet is an exercise in self-delusion.
Not really. How can a user extract data from a container, by whatever name we
call it, if he does not have the key to open it ?
Could you please instruct how to achieve this ?
--
Sent
OK guys, I would never have thought about modifying libpq to steal confidential
data, and I have never used debuggers in this respect at all.
So super gurus can yet do the bad thing.
Nevertheless 99% of users are not super gurus who could do such nasty things
but a few of them could use an
Hello,
This concerns use of postgresql.key private key file on the client side.
psql can't establish a connection. with an encrypted postgresql.key file. If
I'm wrong here, the following is invalid and please show me the steps I'm
ignoring.
An application using libpq would require that the
A user must have the TRUNCATE privilege to truncate a table or be the
tables owner.
Well the TRUNCATE example I mentioned is perhaps not explicit of what I meant
to say. A user who can modify data in a client application can also modify
data if he connects directly to the database, bypassing
Hello,
Is there a way to run a pl/pgsql automatically at server startup ?
Is there a way to run a pl/pgsql function with an infinite loop as a daemon ?
Is there a way to start a pl/pgsql function that would persist after the user
session has closed ?
Is there a way for an unprivileged user to
