Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Ilpo Järvinen
On Tue, 29 Jan 2019, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le mardi 29 janvier 2019 à 00:59 +0200, Ilpo Järvinen a écrit : > > There are many technical reasons raising from plain > > physics/electronics > > which make an attack chip of that size with the described > > capabilities to > > seem quite utopis

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le mardi 29 janvier 2019 à 00:59 +0200, Ilpo Järvinen a écrit : > There are many technical reasons raising from plain > physics/electronics > which make an attack chip of that size with the described > capabilities to > seem quite utopistic (and the article therefore bogus). ...But of > course >

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Ilpo Järvinen
On Mon, 28 Jan 2019, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > > distributions are #1 targets for national > > China: > https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018

[qubes-users] Re: Cannot add new user to Thunderbird address book

2019-01-28 Thread John Goold
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 1/25/19 2:52 PM, John Goold wrote: > There is only one issue in my complete transition to a Qubes > system. This is the first. > > When I attempt to add a "New Contact" to Thunderbird's address > book, the "OK" button will change to show it is se

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > distributions are #1 targets for national China: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-04/the-big-hack-how-china-used-a-tiny-chip-to-infiltrate

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 13:08 -0800, goldsm...@riseup.net a écrit : > To Alexandre Belgrand > > I'm intrigued how you know can catagorically state "CAs and GNU/Linux > distributions are #1 targets for national > intelligence agencies". This is classified information and therefore > only avai

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-28 19:46, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 10:27:32 AM UTC-5, gold...@riseup.net wrote: >> On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: >> > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: >> >>[snip] >> >> Qubes provides a framework for using

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Alexandre Belgrand
Le lundi 28 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +0100, qubes-...@tutanota.com a écrit : > What do you yourself use? Hope I can answer too. I use an X230 with Intel ME disabled from BIOS. It costs about 160€ on the second hand market and it has pretty decent hardware. Lenovo claims that Intel ME can be disabled,

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-27 14:33, Alexandre Belgrand wrote: > Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 13:11 +, Holger Levsen a écrit : >> I *believe* they probably misunderstood evil32.com and it's fallout. > > CAs and GNU/Linux distributions are #1 targets for national > intelligence agencies. > > Debian developer

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread billollib
On Monday, January 28, 2019 at 10:27:32 AM UTC-5, gold...@riseup.net wrote: > On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: > >>[snip] > >> Qubes provides a framework for using software - it doesn't take away the > >> onus on user

[qubes-users] Upgrades for dom0-Qubes 4; on system reboot skips plymouth, usb kb dies, can't enter decrypt pw

2019-01-28 Thread qubert
First visible error on screen: [FAILED] Failed to start Setup Virtual Console Second vis error: [FAILED] Failed to start Show Plymouth Boot Screen. No problem, eh? Because a few lines later, it prompts me for the passphrase for the encrypted disk. Awesome. But every time, as soon as it gets ther

getting rid of ME on modern CPUs (Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability)

2019-01-28 Thread Holger Levsen
On Mon, Jan 28, 2019 at 11:46:55AM -0600, Stuart Perkins wrote: > Up to a certain manufacture, you can go to coreboot and lose the ME entirely. > After that point, setting the HAP bit may be your best option. We need > someone to to reverse engineer the ME and implement enough of it in coreboot

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread Stuart Perkins
On Mon, 28 Jan 2019 16:47:08 +0100 (CET) wrote: >Jan 27, 2019, 5:04 PM by alexandre.belgr...@mailbox.org: > >> Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +, unman a écrit : >> >>> I'd be interested to know what system has been graced with your >>> approval. >>> If you believe all this, then wha

[qubes-users] HCL - System76 Oryx Pro

2019-01-28 Thread Shahin
ubes-users@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-users/1f94e8ca-744e-1985-6e30-6e7cf94e8212%40gmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. Qubes-HCL-System76-Oryx_Pro-20190128-114149.yml Description: application/yaml

[qubes-users] Reversing dom0 testing repo installation

2019-01-28 Thread qubes-fan
hi, I accidentaly downloaded and installed the dom0 update from the testing repo. Is there any way to reverse the action and keep only the stable version? I already disabled the testing repo in the /etc/yum.repos.d/qubes-dom0.repo Thank you -- You received this message because you are subscrib

Re: [qubes-users] QSB #46: APT update mechanism vulnerability

2019-01-28 Thread qubes-fan
Jan 27, 2019, 5:04 PM by alexandre.belgr...@mailbox.org: > Le dimanche 27 janvier 2019 à 16:47 +, unman a écrit : > >> I'd be interested to know what system has been graced with your >> approval. >> If you believe all this, then what makes you think that national >> intelligence agencies hav

Re: [qubes-users] Debian Template APT Vulnerability - A ticking bomb?

2019-01-28 Thread goldsmith
On 2019-01-27 19:15, billol...@gmail.com wrote: > On Sunday, January 27, 2019 at 12:22:03 PM UTC-5, unman wrote: >>[snip] >> Qubes provides a framework for using software - it doesn't take away the >> onus on users to use that software properly, and to ensure they are aware >> of good practice. (A

Re: [qubes-users] Backup stops when the backup file reaches 3Gb

2019-01-28 Thread Mike Keehan
On Fri, 25 Jan 2019 13:52:55 + Mike Keehan wrote: > On Thu, 24 Jan 2019 11:29:50 + > unman wrote: > > > On Thu, Jan 24, 2019 at 01:00:15AM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: > > > On 01/23/2019 08:15 PM, js...@bitmessage.ch wrote: > > > > Mike Keehan: > > > > > Hi, > > > > > > > > >

Re: [qubes-users] Qube Window Manager; unable to list all open windows

2019-01-28 Thread Franz
On Sun, Jan 27, 2019 at 1:16 PM Chris Laprise wrote: > On 01/27/2019 09:32 AM, Franz wrote: > > Command `wmctrl -l` gives the following error > > > > |Cannot get client list properties. (_NET_CLIENT_LIST or > _WIN_CLIENT_LIST)| > > This works for me with KDE. > > > > > > But when I use |wmctrl| t

[qubes-users] Qubes 4 crashes

2019-01-28 Thread aaq via qubes-users
Hello! I have experienced a couple of times now that my Qubes 4 installation crashes at different times. I do not expect this to be an issue with Qubes, but it would be nice if I could debug this some how. I have no idea where to look for the necessary logs though. Some details: The crash itse